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vRe´sume´
A l’e`re de l’informatique omnipre´sente et a` la demande, ou` les applications et
les services sont de´ploye´s sur des infrastructures bien ge´re´es et approvision-
ne´es par des grands groupes de fournisseurs d’informatique en nuage (Cloud
Computing), tels Amazon, Google, Microsoft, Oracle, etc., la performance et
la fiabilite´ de ces syste`mes sont devenues des objectifs primordiaux. Cette in-
formatique a rendu particulie`rement ne´cessaire la prise en compte des facteurs
de la Qualite´ de Service (QoS pour Quality of Service), telles que la disponibil-
ite´, la fiabilite´, la vivacite´, la surete´ et la se´curite´, dans la de´finition comple`te
d’un syste`me. En effet, les syste`mes informatiques doivent eˆtre re´sistants aussi
bien aux de´faillances qu’aux attaques et ce, afin d’e´viter qu’ils ne deviennent
inaccessibles, entrainent des couts de maintenance importants et la perte de
parts de marche´. L’augmentation de la taille et la complexite´ des syste`mes en
nuage rend de plus en plus commun les de´fauts, augmentant la fre´quence des
pannes, et n’offrant donc plus la Garantie de Service vise´e. Les fournisseurs
d’informatique en nuage font ainsi face e´pisodiquement a` des fautes arbitraires,
dites Byzantines, durant lesquelles les syste`mes ont des comportements im-
pre´visibles comme, par exemple, des re´ponses incorrectes aux requeˆtes d’un
client, l’envoi de messages corrompus, la temporisation intentionnelle dans
l’e´change de messages, le refus d’honorer des requeˆtes, etc.
Ce constat a amene´ les chercheurs a` s’inte´resser de plus en plus a` la
tole´rance aux fautes byzantines (BFT pour Byzantine Fault Tolerance) et a`
proposer de nombreux prototypes de protocoles et logiciels. Ces solutions de
BFT visent non seulement a` fournir des services cohe´rents et continus malgre´
des de´faillances arbitraires, mais cherchent aussi a` re´duire le couˆt et l’impact
sur les performances des syste`mes sous-jacents. Ne´anmoins les prototypes
BFT ont e´te´ e´value´s le plus souvent dans des contextes ad-hoc, soit dans des
conditions ide´ales, soit en limitant les sce´narios de fautes. C’est pourquoi
ces protocoles de BFT n’ont pas re´ussi a` convaincre les professionnels des sys-
te`mes distribue´s de les adopter. Tandis que certains conside`rent les protocoles
de BFT trop couˆteux et complexes a` mettre en place pour contrer des de´fail-
lances arbitraires, d’autres sont tout simplement sceptiques quant a` l’utilite´
de ces techniques. Cette the`se entend re´pondre a` ce proble`me en proposant
un environnement complet de banc d’essai dont le but est de faciliter la cre´a-
tion de sce´narios d’exe´cution utilisables pour aussi bien analyser que comparer
l’efficacite´ et la robustesse des propositions BFT existantes.
Dans ce contexte, les contributions de cette the`se sont les suivantes :
• Nous introduisons une architecture ge´ne´rique pour analyser des proto-
coles distribue´s. Cette architecture comprend des composants re´utilis-
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ables permettant la mise en œuvre d’outils de mesure des performances
et d’analyse de la fiabilite´ des protocoles distribue´s. Cette architecture
permet de de´finir la charge de travail, de de´faillance, et l’injection de ces
dernie`res. Elle fournit aussi des statistiques de performance, de fiabilite´
du syste`me de bas niveau et du re´seau. En outre, cette the`se pre´sente
les be´ne´fices d’une architecture ge´ne´rale.
• Nous pre´sentons BFT-Bench, le premier syste`me de banc d’essai de la
BFT, pour l’analyse et la comparaison d’un panel de protocoles BFT
utilise´s dans des situations identiques. BFT-Bench permet aux utilisa-
teurs d’e´valuer des imple´mentations diffe´rentes pour lesquels ils de´finis-
sent des comportements de´faillants avec diffe´rentes charges de travail. Il
permet de de´ployer automatiquement les protocoles BFT e´tudie´s dans
un environnement distribue´ et offre la possibilite´ de suivre et de ren-
dre compte des aspects performance et fiabilite´. Parmi nos re´sultats,
nous pre´sentons une comparaison de certains protocoles BFT actuels,
re´alise´e avec BFT-Bench, en de´finissant diffe´rentes charges de travail et
diffe´rents sce´narii de fautes. Cette re´elle application de BFT-Bench en
de´montre l’efficacite´.
Globalement, cette the`se vise a` faciliter l’analyse de performance et de fia-
bilite´ de la BFT afin d’en encourager l’utilisation aussi bien par les de´veloppeurs
des protocoles BFT que ses utilisateurs finaux. Le logiciel BFT-Bench a e´te´
conc¸u en ce sens pour aider les utilisateurs a` comparer efficacement diffe´rentes
imple´mentations de BFT et apporter des solutions effectives aux lacunes iden-
tifie´es des prototypes BFT. De plus, cette the`se de´fend l’ide´e que les techniques
BFT sont ne´cessaires pour assurer un fonctionnement continu et correct des
syste`mes distribue´s confronte´s a` des situations critiques.
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Abstract
In the modern era of on-demand ubiquitous computing, where applications
and services are deployed in well-provisioned, well-managed infrastructures,
administered by large groups of cloud providers such as Amazon, Google,
Microsoft, Oracle, etc., performance and dependability of the systems have
become primary objectives. Cloud computing has evolved from questioning
the Quality-of-Service (QoS) making factors such as availability, reliability,
liveness, safety and security, extremely necessary in the complete definition
of a system. Indeed, computing systems must be resilient in the presence of
failures and attacks to prevent their inaccessibility which can lead to expen-
sive maintenance costs and loss of business. With the growing components in
cloud systems, faults occur more commonly resulting in frequent cloud outages
and failing to guarantee the QoS. Cloud providers have seen episodic incidents
of arbitrary (i.e., Byzantine) faults where systems demonstrate unpredictable
conducts, which includes incorrect response of a client’s request, sending cor-
rupt messages, intentional delaying of messages, disobeying the ordering of
the requests, etc.
This has led researchers to extensively study Byzantine Fault Tolerance
(BFT) and propose numerous protocols and software prototypes. These BFT
solutions not only provide consistent and available services despite arbitrary
failures, they also intend to reduce the cost and performance overhead incurred
by the underlying systems. However, BFT prototypes have been evaluated
in ad-hoc settings, considering either ideal conditions or very limited faulty
scenarios. This fails to convince the practitioners for the adoption of BFT
protocols in a distributed system. Some argue on the applicability of expensive
and complex BFT to tolerate arbitrary faults while others are skeptical on the
adeptness of BFT techniques. This thesis precisely addresses this problem and
presents a comprehensive benchmarking environment which eases the setup of
execution scenarios to analyze and compare the effectiveness and robustness
of these existing BFT proposals.
Specifically, contributions of this dissertation are as follows.
• First, we introduce a generic architecture for benchmarking distributed
protocols. This architecture comprises reusable components for building
a benchmark for performance and dependability analysis of distributed
protocols. The architecture allows defining workload and faultload, and
their injection. It also produces performance, dependability, and low-
level system and network statistics. Furthermore, the thesis presents the
benefits of a general architecture.
• Second, we present BFT-Bench, the first BFT benchmark, for analyzing
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and comparing representative BFT protocols under identical scenarios.
BFT-Bench allows end-users evaluate different BFT implementations
under user-defined faulty behaviors and varying workloads. It allows
automatic deployment of these BFT protocols in a distributed setting
with ability to perform monitoring and reporting of performance and
dependability aspects. In our results, we empirically compare some ex-
isting state-of-the-art BFT protocols, in various workloads and fault
scenarios with BFT-Bench, demonstrating its effectiveness in practice.
Overall, this thesis aims to make BFT benchmarking easy to adopt by
developers and end-users of BFT protocols. BFT-Bench framework intends
to help users to perform efficient comparisons of competing BFT implemen-
tations, and incorporating effective solutions to the detected loopholes in the
BFT prototypes. Furthermore, this dissertation strengthens the belief in the
need of BFT techniques for ensuring correct and continued progress of dis-
tributed systems during critical fault occurrence.
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2 Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Background and Motivation
Cloud computing, the internet (cloud) based development using computer
technology (computing), dynamically scalable, providing virtualized resources
as a service over the network where users have no knowledge, expertise or con-
trol over the technology infrastructure in the cloud [2, 85]. Cloud computing
enables easy access to resources, anytime, anywhere, and from any platform
such as mobile devices or desktop. From an end user’s perspective, a cloud
is a single entity composed of potentially large numbers of configurable com-
puting resources running multiple service instances. Cloud computing focuses
on maximizing the effectiveness of the shared resources and dynamically re-
allocate them on-demand. It provides users various capabilities to store and
process their data in third-party data centers. Figure 1.1, presents the features
of a cloud computing domain.
Cloud computing is the result of the evolution and adoption of existing
technologies and IT paradigms such as Virtualization, Service Oriented Ar-
chitecture (SOA), Distributed and Parallel Computing. Definition of Cloud
computing in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is com-
posed of five essential characteristics, three service models, and four deploy-
ment models [85].
Essential characteristics of cloud systems.
Cloud computing shares these characteristics with client-server model [9], grid
computing, utility computing [10, 33, 42] and peer-to-peer distributed archi-
tecture.
1. On-demand self-service and Cost. Users can unilaterally provision com-
puting capabilities, such as a number of servers, server time, replication
and network storage, as needed. Cost depends on the type of services
and infrastructures [4].
2. Wide network accessibility. Services are available over the network and
accessed through standard mechanisms that promote the use of het-
erogeneous thin or thick client platforms, for example, mobile phones,
tablets, laptops, and workstations.
3. Resource pooling and Multitenancy. Provider’s computing resources are
pooled to serve multiple consumers using a multi-tenant model, with
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Figure 1.2: Service Models of Cloud Computing
Deployment Models
1. Public Cloud. The public cloud infrastructure is provisioned for open use
by the general public where its computing services are delivered over the
Internet. The data center is off-premises and uses a “pay as you go” or
”metered service” model.
2. Private Cloud. The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclusive use
by a single organization comprising multiple consumers (e.g., business
units). It may be owned, managed, and operated by the organization,
a third party, or a combination of them, and it may exist on or off
premises. It is not shared with another organization.
3. Community Cloud. The cloud infrastructure is provisioned for exclu-
sive use by a specific community of consumers from organizations that
have shared concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and
compliance considerations). It may be owned, managed, and operated
by one or more of the organizations in the community, a third party, or
some combination of them, and it may exist on or off premises.
4. Hybrid Cloud. The cloud infrastructure is a composition of two or more
distinct cloud infrastructures (private, community or public) that remain
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unique entities, but are bound together by standardized or proprietary
technology that enables data and application portability (e.g., cloud
bursting for load balancing between clouds).
5. There are many more deployment models such as Distributed cloud [41],
Inter cloud [23] and Multi cloud [72, 91].
Currently, most of the cloud applications or services are deployed in well-
provisioned and well-managed infrastructures administered by large groups of
cloud providers such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft. Cloud computing has
evolved from addressing the Quality of Services (QoS) and with its expansion,
factors such as availability, reliability, liveness, safety, and security of the sys-
tems have become important in the complete description of the system. With
the increase in hardware and software components in cloud systems, faults
occur more commonly alike exceptions, resulting in failure to meet expected
consumer QoS.
Furthermore, the performance of these systems degrades when servers
encounter arbitrary (i.e. Byzantine) faults [80]. Cloud providers have seen
episodic incidents of such Byzantine faults in practice. For instance, Google
Compute Engine (GCE) became unavailable as GCE’s virtual network stopped
issuing routing information, Apple iCloud cloud-based services went down
while some were extremely slow. Rackspace suffers from Distributed Denial-
of-Service (DDoS) attack which caused malfunctioning of DNS servers and
blocked network Another example, Amazon Web Services suffered long hauls
of unavailability due to increased error rate for DNS. But for none of the cases,
it could be proved that the techniques proposed by state-of-the-art BFT pro-
tocols are adept in preventing such faults. Some argued on the assimilation
of expensive BFT to tolerate faults which perhaps could be handled with
simpler approaches such as error detection checksums, voting, etc. Recently,
some researchers are also skeptical about the applicability of BFT protocols
in cloud systems and questions the integration of very complex and difficult
to implement BFT protocols in practice [25, 111]. Alysson et al. proposed to
first use BFT protocols for improving the security of critical systems, particu-
larly, critical infrastructures (e.g., power plant distributed control networks),
network infrastructure systems (e.g., name services, authentication systems,
firewalls) and coordination services for open and dynamic systems (e.g., wire-
less ad-hoc and P2P networks) [14]. However, Byzantine community stands
affirm on the need of BFT for ensuring correct and continued progress of cloud
services during critical fault occurrence [16, 25]. They claim that BFT proto-
cols are scalable, capable of being optimized for high load, sustain transaction
streams and variant enough to terminate expensive execution when there are
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no faults [25]. Thus, to attain non-disrupted availability, BFT services must
be employed in cloud-based systems to prevent faulty events like network fail-
ures, software glitches, maintenance issues, faulty performance updates and
hardware collapses.
Many fault tolerance mechanisms are employed by major cloud providers
to prevent unavailability but failed to mask the arbitrarily occurring failure
and led to periods of cloud outages. For example, Google App Engine uses
automatic replication of data on number of fault tolerant servers, AmazonWeb
Services employ fail-over alerts and syncs back to the last known consistent
state. Another instance, Netsuite uses hot backups to store data on redundant
servers.
In the past fifteen years, constant improvements and enhancements have
been proposed to state-of-the-art BFT protocols. Some of them focus on
improving the performance of the protocols in fault-free scenarios [11, 30,
37, 40, 57, 74, 90, 98, 104]; while others consider the impact on performance
in faulty cases [15, 18, 36, 105, 106]. Considerably lesser progress has been
made to test the robustness and effectiveness of BFT implementations under
real world conditions where nodes can demonstrate arbitrary behaviors [19].
Spinning [105], Aardvark [36], Prime [15] and Redundant BFT (RBFT) [18]
performed the evaluation in the face of certain Byzantine behaviors. However,
these evaluations were conducted in simple settings.
Recent fundamental trends such as increasing expensive hardware (for
replication), frequent occurrence of Byzantine faults and reduction of BFT
replication overhead are in line with the 3-way replication (commercial used
by many systems such as Google File System (GFS) [54], bridges the gap
between acceptance of BFT protocols in practice [35]. Evaluation of different
BFT prototypes under various Byzantine behaviors would allow incorporate
corrective measures during the designing and implementation of BFT pro-
tocols. To convince the practitioners to use BFT implementations in cloud
systems, we believe, it is important to have performance and dependability
metrics showing the robustness and effectiveness of BFT implementations in
practice.
1.2 Problem Statement and Research Chal-
lenges
Cloud computing models are attracting a lot of users’ with alluring benefits
such as reliability, scalability, on-demand access, availability, etc. However,
these models still face challenges of maintaining the performance, reliability,
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security of user data in the presence of arbitrary incidents. Companies such
as Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Apple, Facebook, Verizon, etc., have suffered
from many incidents of cloud outage [3]. The reasons for such unavailability of
these cloud services are not very clear. There are speculations of incorrect in-
tegration of fixes (Microsoft), cyber attacks (Facebook), etc. Companies have
also experienced severe performance degradation and unreliability issues. For
example, eleven cloud services, of Apple went slower, which included storage
spaces like iCloud Drive, iCloud Mail, iCloud Backup, etc. and with a huge
loss of users data. Reasons for this behavior are still not revealed, but it has
affected a lot of cloud users relying on Apple cloud services. Similarly, AVG
data center went down abruptly affecting its customer email security services
across all regions. The exact cause of this outage is still to be determined,
but it is speculated to be a third-party intervention to get rights on storage
arrays. There are many other such cases of long duration of unavailability,
performance degradation, data security, and unreliability caused by internal
issues of cloud services, software faults, hardware failures, outdated network
control systems, DNS issues or unknown arbitrary failures. These commonly
occurring outages affirm the fact that there is a need to handle arbitrary faults
in cloud services to prevent frequent performance and dependability issues.
For any cloud service to 100% available and reliable, it is important for it
to be fault tolerant. Considerable work has been done on performance bench-
marks for web services, databases, cluster computing, web servers, etc., by
both academia and industry but we recognize the absence of scientific ap-
proaches for evaluating many fault tolerant protocols, precisely, BFT proto-
cols which can benefit in controlling random cloud outages due to mishandled
arbitrary faults [5, 6, 8, 27, 65, 70]. Fault tolerance is a fundamental require-
ment for reliable cloud services. Companies have matured adopting solutions
for benign faults [73] such as crash faults using the well-known Paxos algo-
rithm [77, 78] but they still lack fault tolerant solutions for arbitrary failures.
BFT protocols replicate services in several replicas to ensure service availabil-
ity and correctness despite the fault occurrence [51, 53, 76, 94, 95].
BFT problem in itself is very complex to understand and comparing many
of such proposed BFT solutions can be extremely hard and time-consuming.
However, considerable effort has been made in studying Byzantine faults and
plenty of BFT algorithms have been introduced. Traditional approaches to
compare these protocols are theoretical. We have recognized that practical
evaluations of BFT protocols have been performed in the most ad-hoc settings.
There is a lack of efficient approaches to characterize and empirically evaluate
the performance and dependability aspects of BFT systems under several real
world faulty and fault-free settings. Understanding BFT protocols in itself is
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difficult and developing a benchmark solution for the same can be extremely
challenging. Here we list a few of the challenging issues encountered while
developing our framework:
1. Understanding complex Byzantine behaviors. Any arbitrary fault
is said to be Byzantine. Byzantine faults are the arbitrary behaviors
shown by the servers when they deviate from the correct execution of
the protocol specifications. It is not only important but also very nec-
essary to distinguish them from network failures, incorrect routing and
switching, DNS issues, Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, etc., to prevent
from incorrect detection of fault. This might lead to expensive fault de-
tection and recovery mechanism without resolving the impacting fault.
2. Challenging BFT implementations. BFT protocols are generally
perceived as too complex to understand because the implementations
are large and the protocol logic is hidden in low-level implementation
details. Although most of the protocols use PBFT as their baseline, but
their communication patterns, a number of message exchanges, crypto-
graphic operations performed, etc., makes them a class apart and equally
difficult to comprehend. Each protocol has a different way of interaction
between the client and server replicas which again adds on to the tricky
comparisons and analysis. Most importantly, these variations add new
challenges during runtime. Complex BFT implementations add higher
complexities as they become vulnerable to a higher number of software
bugs, and thus can reduce the overall performance and dependability of
the systems.
3. Quantitative Evaluation in Realistic Conditions. With a dozen
of practical BFT protocols proposed so far, focusing particularly on im-
proving performance in ideal conditions such as zero latency, gigabit
bandwidth, zero packet loss, and no faults, makes no sense in today’s
practical and complex evaluations. There is a lack of an appropriate
implementation, simulation, and evaluation environment to understand
their performance in realistic conditions such as high network delay, low
bandwidth, frequent packet loss, and faults. Additionally, the avail-
able implementations of these protocols use different language primi-
tives, crypto libraries, and transport protocols, which makes it difficult
to compare these protocols fairly. Correct analysis of the behaviors
of BFT implementations using proper performance and dependability
metrics is important to demonstrate their robustness and effectiveness
in practice; otherwise opportunity for BFT integration in cloud-based
systems may be lost.
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1.3 Contribution of the Thesis
In this thesis, we present a benchmark solution to evaluate and compare the
performance and dependability aspects of many BFT implementations. This
will make BFT benchmarking easy to adopt by developers and end-users in-
tending to use BFT protocols. We first introduces a generic architecture for
benchmarking any distributed protocol, and later we present our novel frame-
work for benchmarking BFT implementations by adapting the components
of a generic architecture and accelerating the software development process.
Contributions of this thesis are as follows.
1. General Architecture for Benchmarks for Distributed Proto-
cols: We introduce a generic architecture for benchmarking distributed
protocols used in cloud services. This architecture comprises of various
modules which are reusable and adaptable for building any benchmark
for performance and dependability analysis of any distributed protocol.
This architecture encompasses the generation of various workloads and
faultloads, injection of these loads in an application or service running
on a cloud system, and production of performance, dependability and
network statistics. Furthermore, we demonstrate the benefits of hav-
ing a general architecture and how it can be re-used for building cost
effective benchmarks for distributed protocols used in cloud computing.
2. BFT-Bench Framework: We introduce BFT-Bench , a novel frame-
work for measuring the effectiveness and robustness of BFT implemen-
tations in practice by analyzing their performance and dependability
aspects in the face of real world settings. We tested our framework by
evaluating state-of-the-art BFT protocols. The benchmark is extend-
able to incorporate other BFT code bases using portability attributes
of BFT-Bench. BFT-Bench allows users to define and inject various
workloads and faultloads. It also includes mechanisms for automatic
deployment of experiments in the cluster and cloud environments, as
well as performance and dependability monitoring and reporting.
3. No-One-Guarantee-All Analysis: Our extensive study of behaviors
and properties of BFT protocols and practical analysis of a few of them
strengthened our believe that none of the protocols is robust enough to
handle all types of Byzantine faults and maintain a constant performance
of fault-free scenario. We perform three steps of analysis: (1) theoretical
analysis of performance on the basis of a number of message exchanges in
communication pattern and number of authentication needed; which is
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only limited to fault-free scenario. (2) second analysis considers a num-
ber of faults tolerated by each protocol during their evaluation analysis.
and (3) final study is experimental which determines the capabilities of
BFT protocols in the presence and absence of faults using BFT-Bench.
This thesis aims to BFT benchmarking easy to adopt by developers and
end users of BFT protocols. BFT-Bench framework intends to help users to
perform efficient comparisons of competing BFT implementations and incor-
porating effective solutions to the detected loopholes in the BFT prototypes.
1.4 Organization of the Thesis
The rest of the document is organized as follows:
Chapter 2
Chapter 2 gives an overview of different types of faults with a major focus on
Byzantine behaviors. It provides a detailed study of Byzantine fault tolerant
models and their importance in today’s world of cloud-dependent services. We
present some BFT concepts and techniques, and give a brief introduction to
some of the well-known state-of-the-art protocols (some are them are used in
this thesis for evaluation) and their evolution from theory to practice. This
chapter motivates and demonstrates the need for a benchmark solution which
compares and evaluates dependability and performance measures of competing
BFT protocols in the face of Byzantine faults. We also focus on the previ-
ous works done in the area of dependability and performance measurements
of cloud services. Furthermore, we describe some fundamental outcomes of
distributed computing which form the baseline for all the BFT protocols.
Chapter 3
Chapter 3 introduces the generic architecture for performance and depend-
ability framework for distributed protocols used by cloud services. This archi-
tecture is validated in the next chapter with our BFT-Bench-framework. We
present the benchmarking design specifications and validations of the generic
architecture and demonstrate how it can be re-used to build software frame-
works for other distributed protocols. We present various modules that are
reusable and adaptable, and can help to reduce the cost of building new soft-
ware prototypes.
Chapter 4
The BFT-Bench framework is introduced in Chapter 4. This chapter begins
by presenting the overview of the BFT-Bench, the novel benchmark suite
for evaluating and comparing BFT implementations in practice by measuring
their performance and dependability aspects in the presence of different types
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of Byzantine faults. It then presents how various components of generic ar-
chitecture have been re-used and the various functions performed by them.
It defines workloads and faultloads and their corresponding injections in the
system for evaluating prototypes of BFT protocols. This chapter also presents
the system model considered for testing the proposed benchmark. It defines
different fault types and BFT implementations in considered. Further in the
chapter, we demonstrate the automatic deployment of experiments in BFT-
Bench framework and portability of different components of the benchmark
to incorporate other fault models and BFT protocols.
Chapter 5
Chapter 5 explores an interesting experimental performance and dependability
evaluation of BFT implementations using BFT-Bench framework, followed
by a demonstration of ineffectiveness of BFT protocols under different fault
injections. The results expose many loopholes in BFT implementations, which
leads to termination of prototypes when a fault is triggered. This chapter
affirms that BFT prototypes have always been tested in an ad-hoc manner
and why having BFT-Bench framework is important.
Chapter 6
Chapter 6 summarizes the main contribution of this work followed by future
research perspectives.
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This chapter characterizes a distributed system and presents the funda-
mentals of State Machine Replication (SMR) techniques for building robust
and effective fault tolerant services. Our focus is five-fold. First, we present
system definitions and assumptions of a distributed system (Section 2.1). Sec-
ond, we define and discuss the SMR approaches for implementing replication
management protocols to tolerate different types of faults (Section 2.2). Third,
we discuss Byzantine Fault-Tolerance (BFT) concepts and properties, and
describe the motivation of a having a BFT service in a distributed system
(Section 2.3). These three sections are important to learn for better under-
standing various BFT protocols discussed in the next section. Fourth, we
present a concise summary of research on BFT protocols by briefly discussing
some of the prominent state-of-the-art BFT protocols (Section 2.4). This sec-
tion gives the taxonomy of BFT protocols proposed so far categorized under
various type-based protocols. Our benchmark comparatively evaluates some
of these BFT protocols to demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our
benchmark, BFT-Bench. This section also performs a theoretical compari-
son of performance of the discussed BFT protocols in terms of throughput
and latency. Finally, we discuss some of the existing benchmarking tools for
evaluating performance and dependability aspects (Section 2.5).
2.1 Distributed System Characterizations
A distributed system involves the cooperation of autonomous, heterogeneous
computing entities, interacting with each other over a network via different
communication protocols and distributed middleware services, which enables
them to coordinate their activities and share resources. Examples of such
distributed systems include Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) based sys-
tems, peer-to-peer applications, distributed databases, network file systems,
aircraft control systems, and cloud computing. In this section of the chapter,
we present some theoretical aspects and abstractions of a distributed system
model. We also discuss some traditional fault behaviors that bring resource
conflicts and disruptions in continuous coordination and service availability of
a distributed system. Such phenomenon led to the research on State Machine
Replication (SMR), quorum replication, agreement and consensus problems,
Byzantine fault tolerance and fault recovery mechanisms.
A distributed system is structured as a set of processes, called servers,
coordinating together to offer underlying services to its users, called clients.
The client-server architecture is usually based on a simple request/response
protocol, implemented with send/receive primitives, Remote Procedure Calls
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(RPC) or Remote Method Invocation (RMI). The server is defined as a com-
puting resource selectively sharing its resources and services to process the
client requests. The client is a computer or a computer process initiating
contact with a server in order to use its resources and services. Each server
has its own local memory and the information between servers and clients can
be exchanged only by passing messages using communication channels. The
network enables data access through client-server and server-to-server com-
munication protocols. In this thesis, we consider server as a single physical
machine. We will use terms servers, nodes and processes interchangeable in
the entire manuscript.
2.1.1 Interaction Models
In a distributed system, it is difficult to set time limits on the time taken
to process (service/task) execution, message delivery between two interacting
servers or clock drift at a server. This can be achieved by making some
assumptions at the system level. Following are three such interaction models.
2.1.1.1 Synchronous Distributed Systems
Servers in synchronous distributed systems are synchronized with an external
clock before they start to communicate. A system makes some strong tem-
poral assumptions over process and communication network which include:
(i) time to execute a process has known lower and upper bounds, (ii) each
message transmitted over a channel is received within a known bounded time,
and (iii) drift rates of local clocks from real time has a known bound. Syn-
chronous systems give a notion of global physical time with a relative precision
depending on the clock drift rate and predictable behavior in terms of timing
which makes it possible and safe to use timeouts in order to detect failures
(of a process or communication links). Such systems are easier to handle with
lower communication overhead, but determining their realistic bounds can be
hard or impossible. These are used for hard real-time applications or critical
embedded systems.
2.1.1.2 Asynchronous Distributed Systems
Asynchronous distributed systems are more abstract and general with no
bounds on temporal process and communication network: (i) process execu-
tion may take any arbitrary time, (ii) a message can have long hauls of trans-
mission delays (message delivery time), and (iii) clock drift rates are random.
Servers exchange data intermittently, without any prior clock synchronization.
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This exactly models the Internet, in which servers have different computing
powers with no intrinsic bounds (on server or network load) and communi-
cation channels are unreliable (message drops, loss, delay, etc.). Therefore,
servers can take any amount of time to execute a request (task/operation), or
transmit a message. There is a notion of a logical clock, but only to account
the passage of time and the number of events that have occurred since the
system started.
2.1.1.3 Partial Synchrony
Partial synchrony [51] refers to eventually synchronous distributed systems
where temporal bounds on computation and communications may exist, but
knowledge of such bounds is limited. It is an intermediate model between syn-
chronous and asynchronous systems to achieve optimal resiliency. These sys-
tems can be intuitively modeled as somewhat timely which helps distributed
algorithms distinguish between a crashed process from a slow process, cir-
cumventing impossibility results of consensus in fault tolerant distributed sys-
tems [53] and others in pure asynchrony [52]. Partial synchrony asserts two
constants which can vary during executions: an upper bound δ on the maxi-
mum delay of any message, and an upper bound φ on relative execution speeds.
Values of δ and φ are known, but holds after some unknown Global Stabiliza-
tion Time (GST). It has been generally observed, that messages are somewhat
timely synchronous and server speeds do not change randomly except during
communication delays or crashes. Partial synchrony can handle such occur-
rences of uncertain faults like node crashes [93], Byzantine behaviors [80, 89],
state corruptions during consensus [48, 79, 89], atomic commit [81], mutual
exclusion [46] and clock synchronization [76]. This fundamental contribution
also demonstrated that by separating the Safety and Liveness properties (dis-
cussed in Section 2.2) of a protocol, it is possible to solve consensus in a
partially synchronous system model. This separation was later exploited by
many state-of-the-art BFT protocols [15, 18, 30, 36, 71, 77, 105].
2.1.2 Network
In a distributed setting, servers and clients communicate with each other
through communication protocols using network links (or communication chan-
nels). These communication channels are bi-directional and used by nodes to
exchange messages. Each server has two message primitives, sending and re-
ceiving: send(m,p), where server p sends a message m and receive(m,q) where
server q receives a message m.
Each message uses a unique identifier for detecting and rejecting duplicate
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packets and checksums to detect and reject corrupted packets. Network fail-
ures are common and at times difficult to detect. We consider a network to
be asynchronous and unreliable where the network itself may fail to deliver
messages, duplicate them, delay them out of order, or corrupt them. In case
of the message delivery failures, the incoming buffer of a server is full and can-
not accept any new messages. This tends to reject some incoming messages
which can be prevented by re-transmitting a message until receipt of its ac-
knowledgment. Message duplication and disorder are common faulty network
behaviors. These issues can be handled by using unique sequence numbers
that define an order to message delivery and nonces to detect duplication of
the same message. The network may also intentionally delay some messages
which are difficult to distinguish from a malicious server demonstrating the
same behavior (we will discuss this fault again in following chapters). This
is usually handled using a timeout at receiving servers. Finally flooding and
corruption of a message by the network or by an intruder, or by a malicious
server are also possible. These faults overload the computational resources to
perform expensive executions (precisely, verification and authentication using
expensive cryptographic techniques). These faults can bring a great overhead
in terms of performance degradation.
It has been argued that it is impossible to achieve a reliable communication on
top of unreliable channels, considering the fact that network links are prone
to be broken even if two communicating nodes are correct. A reliable channel
where message m send by process p (e.g., through the primitive send(m, p))
will be eventually delivered to the destination process q (e.g., through the
primitive receive(m, q)). A communication protocol such as TCP which is
built over a best-effort protocol (IP) gives no reliability guarantees.
However, it is possible to implement a reliable channel on top of fair channels
(fair-links) through the use of retransmissions and acknowledgments. More
precisely, the sender keeps re-transmitting message m periodically until it
receives an acknowledgment (ACK) message from its destination server. Ad-
ditionally, authentication and integrity can be guaranteed by using message
authentication codes (MACs) on the exchanged messages and digital signa-
tures if non-repudiation is also one of the concerns.
2.1.3 Verification & Authentication Mechanisms
A fundamental concern of a distributed system is authentication and data
security [66, 109]. A distributed system is susceptible to a variety of secu-
rity threats imposed by intruders as well as legitimate users of the system.
Legitimate users are more powerful adversaries as they possess internal state
information unknown to an intruder. An adversary can corrupt the system
2.1. Distributed System Characterizations 19
state, modify or delete transmitted messages, replay old messages or per-
form any arbitrary attack affecting the system’s reliability and availability.
In distributed systems, secrecy and integrity are two main requirements for a
secure communication achieved via authentication protocols that verifies the
identity of senders and correctness of their messages. We now discuss the
mechanisms used for verification and authentication purpose in most SMR
(also distributed) protocols.
2.1.3.1 Cryptographic Hash Function
A cryptographic hash function is considered infeasible to invert, i.e., to recre-
ate the input data from its hash value alone. This one-way hash function takes
input data (message plaintext) and generates the hash value which is often
called the message digest. For any message, it is easy to compute its hash
value and infeasible to modify it without changing the hash. And it is practi-
cally difficult to find two different messages with the same hash value. These
hash functions are inexpensive, fast to generate and commonly used in digital
signatures for verifying the integrity of message files, password verification,
generating Message Authentication Codes (MACs), indexing hash tables, to
detect duplication of data, and as checksums to detect data corruption. The
two most commonly used cryptographic hash functions are MD5 (128 bits)
and SHA-2 (up to 512 bits). Hash digest is a cryptographic checksum that
each server computes to verify a message. For example, both servers use the
same algorithm and share a key to compute the digest of the message which
is included in the packet. The receiving server must perform digest computa-
tion on the received message, and compare it to the original (included in the
packet from the sender). If the message is modified in transit (the hash values
will be different), the packet is rejected. Digest can only guarantee message
integrity but not the authenticity of the message, i.e., a malicious server can
alter the message and regenerate the digest (of the altered message) without
being detected.
2.1.3.2 Message Authentication Code (MAC)
A message authentication code (MAC) is used to authenticate a message while
providing integrity and authenticity assurances on the message. MAC is a
keyed digest where digest is encrypted using a secret key shared between com-
municating servers. It is necessary for the involved servers to confidentially
share the keys previously which is generally done using public-key cryptog-
raphy. In a client-server architecture, when a client broadcasts a message, it
includes a MAC authenticator consisting of a MAC for every server. Each
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MAC is calculated over the digest of the message using a previously shared
secret key between the client and the corresponding server. Each server, upon
receiving the MAC authenticator can verify the content of the request from
its MAC (dedicated for this server). Shared key cryptography ensures mes-
sage authenticity while digest ensures its integrity. However, a faulty client or
server can include some corrupt MACs in the authenticator to prevent a sub-
set of servers from verifying the request. This is a well-known faulty behavior
called MAC attack. It is also possible for an adversary to perform a replay
attack where it can record a MAC authenticator and resend it back at a later
time without getting detected.
2.1.3.3 Digital Signatures
Digital signatures [87] employ asymmetric cryptography (such as RSA [67])
ensuring authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation of a message. Asymmet-
ric or public key cryptography uses two keys: a public key and a private key
where the public key is disclosed to everyone, but private key is known only
to the entity (server). A valid digital signature validates the sender (authen-
ticity) and this sender at a later time cannot deny having sent the message
(non-repudiation). It also ensures that the message was not altered in transit
(integrity). Digital signatures are calculated on the digest of a message. If
the message changes, so will the digest (integrity). The digest is encrypted
using the private key of the sender (authenticity and non-repudiation). This
encrypted digest is the digital signature. The receiver will decrypt the mes-
sage using the public of the sender and verifies the digest. Digital signatures
are computationally expensive than MACs, but they can guarantee the prop-
erty of non-repudiation. They are commonly used for software distributions,
financial transactions, and also to detect forgery or tampering.
2.1.4 Fault Categorization
There exist different types of faults that can happen in a system (distributed,
real-time, mission-critical, etc.) at any point of time. Failures can occur both
in processes and communication channels due to any software and hardware
faults. These faults can affect the system at different levels of degradation in
terms of performance and dependability. Fault models are necessary in order
to build robust fault-tolerant systems or algorithms with predictable behaviors
in case of fault occurrences. Researchers have categorized these faults accord-
ing to their nature and have proposed several protocols and mechanisms to
handle them.
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1. Crash Fault. It occurs when a server in a system operates correctly
until some point of time but suddenly fails to produce any results. Other
processes may not be able to detect this state. Crash faults occur at the
process level and are further categorized as:
(a) Fail-stop. Server fails to respond and stops forever until it is manu-
ally recovered. Such crash faults take longer to repair as they need
human interventions. It is not a practical way to deal with a crash
fault as it can be catastrophic if not repaired within a time limit.
(b) Fail-recover. Server stops responding, but it is automatically re-
covered after a period of time. For handling such faults, there are
solutions for instant recovery such as self-rebooting the system and
self-restoration to the point of failure with checkpoint synchroniza-
tion from other servers.
2. Omission Fault. It occurs when a server is up but fails to produce re-
sults. It happens mostly due to a faulty server or a faulty communication
channel. Following are the possible omission faults at a server:
(a) Send Omission. The server sends a message, but it never goes to
the outgoing message buffer.
(b) Receive Omission. The message is there at the server’s incoming
message buffer, but the server never receives it.
These faults are easy to detect and resolve in synchronous systems with
the help of timeouts. If a message is sure to arrive, a timeout will indicate
a fault at the sending server or in the communication link. However, this
fails to distinguish from a timing fault.
3. Timing Fault. Timing faults can occur in synchronous distributed sys-
tems, where time limits are set for process execution, communications,
and clock drifts. A timing fault occurs if any of these time limits is
exceeded. For example, in mission critical systems like telecommunica-
tions, power distribution (to hospitals, data centers), aerospace commu-
nications, etc., it can be catastrophic if the timing constraints are not
respected. For non-critical systems, performance is affected but timing
faults can be ignored (if it is not so critical); for example, loading of a
webpage, accessing emails, etc.
4. Byzantine Fault. It is any arbitrary fault that can occur at any time.
It is the most general and worst possible fault semantics omitting in-
tended execution paths. Byzantine faults envelop all of the above men-
tioned faults (crash, omission & timing). They include faults like sending
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incorrect response to a request, out of order execution of requests (which
may change the system state), flooding of correct servers with incorrect
messages (having incorrect cryptographic operations) or intentional de-
lay in sending messages to other nodes.
With the augmenting dependencies over service providers (over the inter-
net), it is becoming critical for systems to deal with these arbitrary fail-
ures and preserve the Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees for their end-
users. Several Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) algorithms have been
designed and proposed to help systems cope with such unpredictable
faulty behaviors of the servers. We will discuss some of these algorithms
later in this chapter (see Section 2.4).
Figure 2.1 represents the inclusion relation of all the above discussed faults.
Byzantine Faults
Crash Faults
Fail-stop
Fail-recover
Timing
 Faults
Omission Faults
Send
Receive
Figure 2.1: Inclusion relation of different fault types
2.2 State Machine Replication
State Machine Replication (SMR) is a technique to implement fault toler-
ant services by replicating these services on a set of servers [76, 94, 95]. In
other words, copies of these services are maintained on different servers im-
plementing state machines and clients communicate through SMR protocols.
SMR technique is often implemented for guaranteeing system’s performance,
reliability and availability in the face of software and hardware failures.
According to Schneider [94], implementation of SMR must hold following
three properties.
• Initial state. All the correct replicas must start with the same state.
By same state we mean, having the same input and output conditions.
2.2. State Machine Replication 23
Arbitrary faults such as a crash, random machine reboot can bring some
periods of inconsistencies. SMR employs techniques like checkpoint,
local histories of all the servers, etc., to bring back the system to the
same consistent state.
• Determinism. All the replicas should produce the same output for a
given set of inputs. Determinism can be challenging to achieve due
to complicated multi-threading processing or multiple cored physical
machines. A deviation in output at replicas can determine a faulty
state change in the replicas within a few finite number of steps. Indeed,
determinism guarantees that status of multiple copies of a system will
not diverge under the same inputs. In the context of replication, we
consider implementing only deterministic state machines and not non-
deterministic (where output depends on the inputs and internal states)
due to the above stated obvious reasons.
• Coordination. All correct replicas process the client requests in the
same order.
Consensus or total order multicast protocols [58] help the replicas to reach
an agreement on the total ordering in the presence of partial synchrony.
The two main objectives of any SMR protocols are:
• Robustness : It is the ability to ensure availability and reliability of the
services with consistent performance, despite contentions and failures in
the system.
• Consistency : All the correct replicas produce consistent responses and
their system states are always same.
These objectives are achieved through Safety and Liveness properties
which we define next.
2.2.1 Definitions
There are 2 fundamental properties which every BFT-SMR protocol must
satisfy during both fault-free and faulty scenarios. The primary aim of these
protocols is to maintain the same internal state at each server where all the
servers are consistent and execute the same request at any time. All the
requests are executed automatically in a deterministic way, which means that
they start with the same state, executes the requests in the same way and
results in the same state at all the correct replicas. For example, in case of
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a bank transaction, if the replicated servers do not possess the same state,
it can be damaging and might result in a situation where rollback is unable
to fix the issue. Considering the nature of communication channels, servers,
and asynchronous networks, it becomes important for the service providers to
guarantee the following properties.
2.2.1.1 Safety
Safety property states that all the correct servers execute the same request
in the same order. According to the property, a system which starts in a
correct state will always complete in a correct state after executing client’s
request. Strongly consistent services satisfying Linearizability [61] property
can guarantee Safety.
2.2.1.2 Liveness
Liveness property states that all the requests coming from the correct clients
will eventually be executed by all the correct replicas. SMR technique em-
ploys a replica as primary for giving sequence numbers to the incoming client
requests. The correct replicas (with consensus) agree with the ordering by
primary before executing the request. Total ordering ensures Safety property.
Liveness is ensured by timeouts (bounded finite delay) at clients and replicas,
i.e., under partial synchrony [51].
2.2.2 Message Primitives
State machine replication technique is implemented in a distributed system
comprising a set of clients and servers where clients invoke an operation to a
deterministic service implemented by the servers. The model is illustrated in
Figure 2.2 where clients communicate with servers via request and response
message primitives for an operation to be performed. In the rest of this
manuscript, we will use the same model where an operation is either read-
only or read-write. This separation is important because, in most BFT-SMR
protocols, read-only operations can be processed without undergoing complex
steps of consensus among replicas since the state of the service is not changed.
This is an optimization employed by protocols to provide high performance
during read-only operations.
Clients can request local logs at servers to discover inconsistencies, state
changes while considering the computational overheads and performance degra-
dation due to such operations. Whereas, servers are limited to provide re-
sponses and cannot initiate any communication with the clients. In the general
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cas execute the requests in the same order) and since the replicas are well
synchronized before executing a request, no extra monitoring is required.
In this and forthcoming chapters, we will consider only active replication
(as used by BFT protocols). Paxos [77] and PBFT [30] are the first protocols
to tolerate crash faults and Byzantine faults, respectively, using active repli-
cation approach. We will discuss more protocols using the same approach for
fault tolerance, later in this chapter.
2.2.4 Problem of Consensus
Coordination among replicas is a fundamental requirement for implementing
a state machine replication where all correct replicas must agree on the same
order for executing client requests. Conceptually this requirement can be
satisfied by implementation of a total ordered multicast (atomic multicast)
protocol [58]. Total ordering communication primitive and consensus problem,
both subject to the same constraints and, thus, considered equivalent. The
problem of consensus states that all the communicating processes propose
different values for a request and they must agree on a single value with
consensus. A consensus protocol is correct if it meets the following three
conditions.
• Integrity (Consistency). All agreed values must have been proposed by
some process.
• Agreement (Validity). All processes agree on the same ’correct’ value
and all decisions are final.
• Termination. All the correct processes eventually decide on a ’correct’
value (within a finite number of steps).
Consistency property is violated if a process decides not to commit on
the proposed value (this is possible due to slow processes or omission faults).
Agreement is never reached if there are not enough processes validating the
same proposal. Termination condition is violated if processes were never to
agree.
Regardless of the faults, some processes cannot participate in the request
execution leading to violations of above properties due to asynchronous dis-
tributed systems. This led to another well-known result in distributed com-
puting, i.e., impossibility of deterministic consensus among processes in an
asynchronous system [53], also called as FLP impossibility. This impossibility
is a consequence of difficulty in identifying or detecting malicious processes
in asynchronous systems. Considering a case, where a process p waits for a
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message m from a process q before proceeding to the next step. In this sce-
nario, process p cannot determine if the process q has crashed or is slow in
responding. Process p might decide to wait longer or just proceed without the
message from the process q. In either case, technical proofs of FLP impossibil-
ity demonstrate that (i) consensus protocol never terminates or (ii) different
processes may decide different values. Thus making it impossible to have a
consensus protocol satisfying the above defined properties, precisely, Termi-
nation and Agreement.
Since then, the consensus problem has been studied under different synchrony
and failure assumptions. Initial research on database operating systems [55]
and distributed database systems [101] presented solutions to the problem of
consensus which were extensively studied by Byzantine community. Several
BFT-SMR protocols [11, 30, 40, 56, 57, 104] were devised thereafter guarantee-
ing consensus properties in an asynchronous fault-prone distributed systems.
2.2.5 System Model
We assume a distributed system where servers (replicas) are connected in dif-
ferent network topologies, for example PBFT [30], RBFT [18], Aardvark [36]
are fully connected whereas Chain [56], Ring [57] connect the replicas in a
chain-like pattern (a replica followed by another) or completely disconnected
like in OBFT [98].
System Assumptions. The system is defined as a set of clients and
servers where a client sends a request in a closed loop, i.e., clients have to wait
for the response of a request before sending a new request. We assume a finite
client population where any number of them may be faulty and, a total of N
replicas implement BFT-SMR deterministic protocol where up to ’f ’ number
of replicas can behave maliciously. The total number of replicas, N, depend
on the number of replicas a system can tolerate, precisely, ’f ’. The BFT-SMR
protocols demonstrate that 2f + 1 replicas are enough to solve the problem
of consensus but 3f + 1 replicas are required to tolerate and continue in the
presence of f simultaneous Byzantine faults. We assume that there will be no
more than f simultaneous faults at any moment.
Faulty servers behaving arbitrarily are subject to independent or adversary-
coordinated failures. In case of identical replicas, a flaw on one will be repli-
cated in the others as well, thus violating this assumption. To ensure the
independence of failures, a technique such as N-Version programming is used
to obtain different copies of the protocols or heterogeneous physical machines
with different operating systems and hardware are used. We assume any num-
ber of clients may be faulty. Nevertheless, in some specific protocols such as
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OBFT [98] where clients are assumed to be trusted and non-malicious. Clients
are only prone to crashes.
Network Assumptions. The links between nodes are asynchronous and
unreliable with synchronous intervals during which messages are delivered
within a known bounded delay. We do, nevertheless, assume that if a node
keeps re-transmitting a message, the message will eventually be received (par-
tial synchrony [51], see Section 2.1.1.3). However, the Liveness property can
only be ensured during periods of synchrony where a message reaches its des-
tination within some fixed worst case delays [53]. Furthermore, the network
itself may fail to deliver messages, delay them, duplicate them, delay them
out of order, or even corrupt them.
Cryptography Assumptions. BFT protocols rely on cryptographic
techniques such as collision-resistant hashing (digests), message authentica-
tion codes (MACs), public-key cryptography and digital signatures to ensure
authenticity, integrity, and non-repudiation properties (see Section 2.1.3 for
details).
Adversary Assumptions. We assume a Byzantine failure model, where
node/(s) (replicas or clients) may behave Byzantine. We assume a strong
adversary capable to manipulate and coordinate the malicious nodes to com-
promise the replicated service. However, we do assume that this adversary is
computationally bounded and unable to break cryptographic techniques, i.e.,
it cannot produce a valid signature of a non-faulty (correct) node.
These assumptions are common to all the state of the art BFT protocols
discussed in this manuscript (see Section 2.4).
2.3 Byzantine Fault Tolerance
Improving integrity, performance, availability and reliability of internet-based
distributed computing has become challenging. The expanse of new comput-
ing technologies has potentially raised numerous threats to deployed services,
compromising integrity due to failures such as software bugs, crash failures,
omission faults and arbitrary malicious attacks and degrading other aspects
of Quality of Services (QoS). Replication is an essential technique to survive
these problems and maintain system reliability through replicating services
at redundant servers (backup replicas) As discussed in the previous section,
State Machine Replication (SMR) is used to make services fault-tolerant.
Traditional fault-tolerant systems such as Paxos [77], survives benign fail-
ures (i.e., crash or fail-stop faults) [78, 88]. However, the problem arises in the
presence of arbitrary faults, called Byzantine [30, 80]. This problem was first
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presented as Byzantine General’s Problem by Lamport [80] where the gener-
als of an army must decide if they want to attack the enemy or retreat in the
presence of some traitors among them. These traitors can mischievously trick
some generals, force them to change their decisions to be inconsistent with
other generals or forge the messages to create distrust among loyal generals.
Byzantine fault tolerance is possible if and only if all the loyal generals con-
sistently commit to the same decision. And it was demonstrated that if there
are N generals, out of f are traitors, then the problems created by traitors
could only be handled with N > 3f generals1.
On the same lines of idea proposed by Lamport, BFT protocols were pro-
posed to maintain resiliency against Byzantine (arbitrary) faults in distributed
settings. From the perspective of distributed computing, Byzantine faults are
those faults that force services to demonstrate an unpredictable behavior, dif-
ferent from the normal execution paths; such as sending inconsistent responses,
producing wrong responses, corrupting messages and local states, intention-
ally delaying request processing, flooding the communication channels, etc. A
BFT protocol requires at least 3f + 1 replicas to ensure Safety and Liveness
among replicas, while tolerating up to f Byzantine replicas. Many BFT pro-
tocols have been designed so far, some ensuring consistency with more number
of replicas, i.e., 5f+1 in Q/U [11] or trying to minimize the number of replicas
using trusted components [37, 71] or enhancing the performance of the system
in fault-free scenarios [56, 57, 74] or minimizing the performance degradation
in the face of Byzantine faults [15, 18, 36, 105]. We will discuss some of the
state-of-the-art BFT-SMR protocols in this section.
2.3.1 Understanding 3f+1 Bound
Different system models require a different number of processes to implement
consensus, client request ordering while tolerating up to f failures. Table
2.1 presents the minimum number of servers/replicas required by consensus
protocols for tolerating crash [77, 78] and Byzantine faults, respectively [51]
under synchronous and partially synchronous system models for ensuring their
Safety and Liveness. The table also represents the minimum number of repli-
cas that must execute the client requests to enable client always have the
correct responses and for the system to be always consistent despite the pres-
ence of up to f faults. As can be seen in the table, under partial synchronous
model, crash-prone system needs 2f + 1 replicas [77], while BFT system re-
1N also represents the number of replicas required to tolerate f arbitrary (Byzantine)
faults by a BFT protocol. Also, we will use f for faulty, arbitrary, Byzantine, malicious
and traitors replicas, interchangeably
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Table 2.1: Table presents some results from Dwork [51] showing the minimum
number of replicas required for handling crash (or fail-stop) and Byzantine
faults in synchronous and partially synchronous environments. It also presents
the minimum number of replicas required to execute client request once the
request is totally ordered.
Type of Fault Synchronous
Partially
Synchrony
Replicated
execution
Crash or Fail-Stop f + 1 2f + 1 f + 1
Byzantine 3f + 1 3f + 1 2f + 1
quires 3f + 1 replicas [80] for total ordering and tolerating f simultaneous
faults. However, once the request is totally ordered (by at least 2f +1 correct
replicas), f fewer replicas are required to execute the request in both the fault
models.
We now explain the bound of 2f + 1 replicas to ensure consistency for
Byzantine faults with an example for read and write operations. We con-
sider a replicated service with mutually exclusive read/write operations in an
asynchronous environment. The service must be correct, consistent, ensuring
Safety and Liveness, and always available and reliable even in the presence of
faults. Assuming the total number of replicas is N , and up to f replicas can
be Byzantine. In a BFT system, quorums consist of N − f replicas where f
replicas might be the faulty replicas. Considering the first request to be a read
operation which is carried out by a quorum (quorum A) of N − f replicas,
out of which f replicas might be faulty. Similarly, during the second request,
which is a write operation is carried out by another quorum (quorum B) of
N − f replicas. Out of two quorums (which probably contain responses from
different replicas) might contain responses from two sets of f replicas where
these f replicas might be either Byzantine or just slow (e.g., due to network
congestion).
So we can guarantee that the number of correct responses is at leastN − 2f
which does not contain responses from f Byzantine and f slow replicas. This
would mean, that each quorum must have 2f + 1 replicas (Figure 2.3) where
quorums of two consecutive operations will intersect in at least one correct
replica, masking the responses from f malicious replicas, thus ensuring that
no faulty replica violates Safety property. Finally, to ensure, there are no
responses from the Byzantine or slow replicas, the responses from non-faulty
replicas must be higher than f faulty responses, i.e., N − 2f > f which
is equivalent to N > 3f . Therefore, at least, 3f + 1 replicas are required
to maintain Safety and Liveness where each step of the protocol must be
2.3. Byzantine Fault Tolerance 31
Quorum A: Read Quorum B: Write
2f + 1 2f + 1 1
'f' replicas can be slow while other 'f' might behave Byzantine
Figure 2.3: Read and write quorums need 2f + 1 replicas to intersect in at
least one correct replica executing both the operations (read/write).
executed by at least 2f +1 replicas. For any two quorums (A and B) of 2f +1
responses for two consecutive operations, there is at least one correct replica
which executed both the operations, reflecting the correctness of previous
operations. The quorum of 2f + 1 replicas with another f which may not
respond at all, define the threshold of 3f + 1.
2.3.2 Types of Byzantine Behaviors
Any fault is a Byzantine fault that brings inconsistencies with the capabil-
ities of degrading the performance of the system many folds. Out of many
Byzantine faults, some faults are not observable and therefore, cannot be de-
tected [59]. In this section, we discuss some of the detectable Byzantine faults
which are intentionally induced by an adversary forcing an algorithm to devi-
ate from its correct execution. We consider two categories of these Byzantine
behaviors, they are as follows.
Context-Free Faults
Context-free faults are the faults triggered by a malicious node without any
prior knowledge of the information at a node like messages exchanged, or con-
tent of the messages, or the state of the node, etc. These faults can occur in-
dependently without any understanding of underlying distributed algorithms
or applications.
1. CPU Load : This fault is triggered by increasing load in terms of the
number of concurrent clients sending requests.
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2. Replica Crash: A Byzantine node crashes and terminates all future in-
teractions with other replicas.
3. Replica Hibernation: A faulty replica delays all the communications
(message exchange) with other replicas. It may also delay the processing
of a request by a certain amount of time.
4. Drop Packets : A malicious replica accomplishes this attack by dropping
packets for a particular replica(s), at a certain time of the day, for exam-
ples dropping x packet every n packets or every t seconds, or a randomly
selected portion of the packets.
Context-Dependent Faults
These types of faults need access to the information regarding the protocol
specifications, the content of the messages including header and payload, the
size of the messages, the signature of the node for forgery, etc.
1. Message Delay : Faulty replica intentionally delays sending of a specific
message to increase the overall response time of the system.
2. Corrupted Messages (header and payload): A faulty replica will corrupt
the header to trigger the re-transmission of the messages with an inten-
tion of buffer underflow/overflow. Payload corruption is done to waste
the CPU cycles in performing heavy cryptographic operations over ver-
ifying malicious information.
3. Network Flooding : A Byzantine replica randomly starts to send cor-
rect/incorrect messages to all the correct nodes to flood their incoming
network.
4. Message Authentication Code(MAC) Attack : Clients send incorrect au-
thenticators to make all the replicas accept the requests without verify-
ing their MACs.
5. Non-repudiation: A Byzantine replica denies the authenticity of its sig-
nature on sending of a message. This attack is generally possible when
using only collision-resistant hashing (digests) or MAC authenticators.
6. Forge Signatures : Forging some parts of a signature in an effort to con-
vince correct replicas to commit to a wrong response.
We implemented some of the above mentioned faults in BFT-Bench (see
Chapter 4) which were also considered in a robust state-of-the-art BFT pro-
tocols [15, 18, 36, 105] (see Section 2.4.3.1).
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2.4 BFT Protocols at Present
BFT protocols have been the focus of research for well over a decade and
have advanced many folds in terms of improved and robust performance. Re-
search on these protocols has evolved from theoretical proposals to practical
approaches. And in this section, we review the related work on some of the
state-of-the-art BFT protocols under different categories. This section also
demonstrates their comparative theoretical analysis.
2.4.1 BFT from Theory to Practice
The Byzantine General’s Problem was first described theoretically by Lamport
in [80]. It defines that a Byzantine agreement requires 3f + 1 replicas to
tolerate up to f arbitrary faults under partial synchrony, i.e., a known fixed
upper bound on the message delivery time [51, 53, 79] (see Section 2.1.1.3).
Lamport presented the first theoretical model of Byzantine problem while
PBFT introduced the first practical protocol which analyzes and performs
evaluation in terms of performance metrics [80]. Since then PBFT has been
considered the baseline for BFT protocols and its pattern is widely reused for
its practical efficiency [15, 18, 24, 36, 105].
Numerous BFT protocols have been designed since PBFT, each one adding
new features for improving the performance. All of these protocols can be
broadly categorized under two groups: (1) protocols optimizing performance
under fault-free settings, like Chain [104], Q/U [11], Zyzzyva [74], Ring [57],
CheapBFT [71], HQ [40], Quorum [56], MinBFT [106] and OBFT [98] and,
(2) protocols minimizing performance degradation under faulty scenarios in-
cluding Spinning [105], RBFT [18], Aardvark [36] and Prime [15].
The engineering of BFT protocols followed several directions, varying from
various communication patterns to adopting different cryptographic techniques
to dependency over the third party trusted components for reducing the num-
ber of replicas to robust protocols for handling faulty scenarios [15, 18, 36, 37,
98, 106]. In the following, we present these two families of BFT protocols.
2.4.2 Group 1: Performance Enhancements in Fault-
Free Conditions
According to the analysis of protocols in first group, one of the main concerns
of researchers was to enhance the performance of BFT protocols in fault-free
cases, while maintaining the Liveness and Safety properties in the presence
of faults [11, 24, 37, 40, 56, 57, 71, 74, 86, 100, 104, 110]. For example,
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Zyzzyva [74], Zeno [100], ZZ [110], Q/U [11], HQ [40] and Quorum [56] allowed
the replicas to be temporarily in inconsistent states and moved the task of
detecting these inconsistencies to the client side of the protocol, improving
both throughput and latency in fault-free scenarios. CheapBFT [71], BFT-
TO [37], BFTMencius [86] and MinBFT [106] use trusted components for
ordering the client requests, along with reducing the total number of replicas
required to handle Byzantine faults to 2f + 1. Chain [104], Ring [57] and
Aliph [56] make improvements with regards to throughput. They also propose
protocol switching at fault occurrence. During fault-free cases, they run a
more simplified version of the protocol, and on detection of a fault, the protocol
switches to a more robust protocol to handle faults. This is motivated by the
fact that faults occur rarely in a system, and that it is more important to
provide priority to fault-free cases. The following part of this section describes
some of the state-of-the-art protocols in details under various categories.
2.4.2.1 Agreement-Based Protocols
The primary replica is pivotal in an agreement-based protocol. It has the
major responsibilities than any other replica in the system, and it often be-
comes the bottleneck and a deciding server for the performance of the system.
Primary replica orders the client requests and forwards the same to other
replicas. All the replicas with consensus agree to the ordering done by the
primary and eventually executes the request in the same order, maintaining
the Safety property. For most of the protocols, replicas send their responses
directly to the client, thus preserving liveness, by executing the clients’ re-
quest. Agreement-based protocols require a minimum of 3f + 1 replicas to
tolerate up to f faults. Communication overhead is maximum for such pro-
tocols as they follow all-to-all communication among replicas for consensus.
This at times, leads to poor performance and fault scalability issues.
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Figure 2.4: Communication pattern of PBFT
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PBFT. PBFT [30], the first agreement based practical BFT protocol tol-
erates upto f simultaneous faults with 3f + 1 replicas. It is considered the
most robust protocol; therefore, it has been used as the baseline for many
protocols [15, 18, 24, 36, 74, 104, 105]. Figure 2.4 presents the widely used
communication pattern of PBFT. PBFT has a dedicated replica called pri-
mary to order the requests of the clients. PBFT undergoes 3 rounds (phases)
of message exchanges; PRE-PREPARE, PREPARE and COMMIT. Primary
upon receiving a request from a client, assigns a sequence number and broad-
casts a PRE-PREPARE message to all the replicas containing the ordered
request. Once replicas receive PRE-PREPARE message, they verify the or-
dering and acknowledges the message by broadcasting a PREPARE message
(containing the PRE-PREPARE message sent by primary) to all other repli-
cas. Replicas upon receiving matching 2f + 1 PREPARE messages, commits
the request in its local history and broadcasts COMMIT message to all repli-
cas. On receiving COMMIT messages, replicas put them in their logs only if
they are correctly signed, ordered and belongs to the same view. If a replica
receives 2f + 1 COMMIT messages, it executes the request and responds to
the client. The client commits the request only if it receives f + 1 matching
responses, otherwise it retransmits the request. Upon expiration of the timer
at client or any other replica, it initiates a view change protocol to elect a
new primary. All the replicas then send a VIEW-CHANGE message contain-
ing checkpoints and previously sent PRE-PREPARE messages as a proof of
misbehavior. The new primary multicasts a NEW-VIEW message containing
the new view number to all the replicas. Non-primary replicas verifies the
correctness of the NEW-VIEW message; if correct, the protocol resumes to
normal operation.
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Figure 2.5: Communication pattern of Chain
Chain. Chain [56, 104] is an abortable speculative protocol with the com-
munication pattern like a chain. Figure 2.5 presents the communication steps
of the protocol where all the replicas are arranged in a chain fashion, starting
with a head (primary) replica and ending with a tail replica. A client sends
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a request to the head, which assigns a sequence number to the request. Each
replica forwards the request to its successor except the tail, which replies to
the client. A replica would only accept a message from its predecessor (except
the head which accepts requests only from the clients). Chain ensures: (1)
that content of a message is not modified by any malicious replica, (2) no
replica is bypassed, and (3) reply sent by the tail (to a client) is correct. To
provide these guarantees, Chain depends on lightweight MAC authenticators
generated and verified by each replica in the Chain. Each replica (except
Head) verifies f + 1 MAC authenticators from its predecessor replicas and
adds (except tail) f +1 MAC authenticators (corresponding to the next f +1
successor replicas) to the forwarding request. The last f + 1 replicas include
the digest of their histories (which has the forwarding request and its cor-
responding response) for the client. The client verifies these digests and if
they match, client commits the request with the response obtained by the
tail. This step ensures that reply sent by the tail is correct. In case of an
incorrect response or no response, the client broadcasts a PANIC message to
all the replicas. Similar to protocols, Quorum, Zyzzyva and HQ; replicas stop
executing requests and send back a signed message containing their histories.
The client waits for 2f + 1 matching histories and creates an abort history.
Furthermore, upon fault detection, Chain switches to a backup protocol (eg.,
PBFT) to commit the requests. Chain’s efficient implementation of pipeline
topology brings two benefits: (1) reduced number of MAC operations at the
bottleneck replica, and (2) better network usage (any replica communicates
only with two other replicas). Nevertheless, these benefits makes sense only
when the pipeline is completely fed. This can be done either by using a large
number of messages or a large number of clients sending requests. It has been
observed that Chain outperforms PBFT and Zyzzyva in terms of throughput
when the number of clients is higher (at least more than 40). The pipeline pat-
tern achieves consistently lower response-time than PBFT (due to the complex
message exchange in PBFT). Chain demonstrates lower latency than Zyzzyva
only when the pipeline is saturated.
Ring. Ring [57] is another speculative abortable BFT protocol like Chain
that achieves high throughput (although less than Chain) during contention.
Ring tries to overcome the drawbacks of other protocols such as the use of
IP multicast, the presence of bottleneck replicas due to asymmetric replica
processing, dependency over one primary replica for total ordering and un-
balanced network bandwidth utilization. Ring uses ring topology where each
replica has a successor and a predecessor (Figure 2.6). Like Chain, Ring
protocol must ensure: (1) no replica in the ring is bypassed, (2) Byzantine
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Figure 2.6: Communication pattern of Ring
clients cannot corrupt the total ordering of correct requests, and (3) the reply
sent by the last replica is not forged. The client sends request to any of the
replicas (in round robin fashion) called as entry replica and this submitted
request is forwarded in the ring until it reaches the predecessor (called as
exit replica) of the entry replica. A sequencer replica (can be any replica)
assigns a sequence number to the request. The protocol undergoes another
round of message passing in Ring which forwards the acknowledgment (ACK)
message (for receiving the sequence number) and the exit replica replies to
the client. Requests are executed in the second round only after they have
received the ACK message. Ring uses the similar MAC authentication (Ring
Authenticators) technique as of Chain but has additional ACK messages. In
case of a fault, client cannot commit the request and sends a PANIC message
to all the replicas and protocol switches to resilient mode. In the resilient
mode, replicas and clients use signed messages which detect a faulty client, a
faulty replica and also a faulty sequencer. In this mode, Ring switches to a
new instance with a different configuration, and a new sequencer is elected.
Due to the two rounds of Ring in fault free scenarios, Ring achieves the worst
performance as compared to most of the state-of-the-art protocols in Group
1. However, under contention or large size messages (when the network or
the primary replica becomes a bottleneck), Ring gradually outperforms some
protocols in terms of performance. Ring demonstrates the best network and
CPU utilization and it is the only protocol to consider the evaluation of these
metrics.
BFT-SMaRt. BFT-SMaRt [24] is another BFT state machine replication
protocol which is similar to protocols such as PBFT [30] and UpRight [34]
but, improves reliability, modularity of components, multicore-awareness while
providing reconfiguration support and flexible programming interface. BFT-
SMaRt aims to be robust in terms of high performance in fault free executions
and correctness during fault occurrences. Design principles of the protocol
include: (i) Tunable fault model where it provides tolerance to Byzantine
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faults using robust protocol and simplified version of SMR protocol (similar
to Paxos [77]) to tolerate crash message corruptions, (ii) Simplicity to avoid
all the performance optimizations used by other protocols such as pipelin-
ing [56, 104], resource efficiency with trusted components [37, 71, 106], spec-
ulation [56, 74, 100], and IP multicast [31, 74], (iii) Modularity is achieved
by separating agreement protocol from client requests ordering and consen-
sus, state transfer and reconfiguration, and (iv) Multicore-awareness to scale
throughput by running separate hardware threads for signature verification
and computational loads.
BFT-SMaRt protocol comprises of three core protocols considering above men-
tioned design principles.
Total Order Multicast. It is similar to the normal case execution of PBFT [30].
Protocol undergoes three communication steps (for consensus) with messages
PROPOSE,WRITE, and ACCEPT.When a fault occurs, the protocol switches
to synchronization phase where a new primary is elected using the state trans-
fer protocol and reconfiguration techniques.
State Transfer Protocol. Protocol periodically creates logs after every certain
number of request batches or takes snapshots at different points of executions.
During fault occurrence, every replica sends these state information for cre-
ating a consistent state history. When all the correct replicas are consistent,
they switch to a new view. Reconfiguration. During this, faulty replicas are
replaced with new replicas from the same cluster, initiated with the same state
as of correct replicas in the new view.
BFT-SMaRt displays higher throughput than PBFT, UpRight and JPaxos
(Java implementation of Paxos) for a higher number of clients. Also, BFT-
SMaRt underwents reconfiguration during a crash.
2.4.2.2 Quorum-Based Protocols
Another category of protocols is quorum-based. Replicas do not communicate
with each other to reach an agreement, rather they execute the request as send
by the client directly. After execution, they send their responses to the client
without any consensus. For such protocols, clients send their requests to a
set of replicas forming a quorum, which execute the requests independently
and assign their own ordering. We have explained this briefly under 3f + 1
bound in the previous section. Client commits the request only if it receives
the required number of matching responses (depends on the protocol spec-
ifications) and the ordering is consistent for each replica. The performance
of quorum based protocols is higher than agreement based (when there is no
contention), but in case of a fault or an inconsistency, they are a lot more
expensive. Quorum-based protocols cannot handle contention due to lack of
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request ordering mechanism.
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Figure 2.7: Communication pattern of Q/U
Query/ Update (Q/U). Query/Update (Q/U) [11] protocol is a quorum
based fault-scalable Byzantine fault protocol ensuring better performance than
PBFT under no contention. It needs 5f+1 replicas unlike commonly required
3f + 1 to tolerate f Byzantine faults. Figure 2.7 presents the communication
pattern of the protocol. It requires only one round-trip of message exchange
between a client and replicas to commit a request. Namely, a client sends
a request to a preferred quorum of replicas and these replicas speculatively
executes it and respond directly to the client. Q/U employs no primary for
ordering the incoming client requests. Consistency is maintained through
periodic exchange of up-to-date history at each replica with other replicas.
Clients ensure that they always obtain the final and correct version of the
history. For performance efficiency, clients can contact a quorum of 4f + 1
replicas, but it results in out of order execution of requests and outdated
histories at the remaining f replicas. These f replicas induce the cost of
synchronization phase where they demand up-to-date histories from at least
f + 1 replicas. This phase ensures that history is not manipulated by more
f faulty replicas. Q/U cannot handle contention as it can cause concurrent
updates leading to different versions on different replicas. This is usually
detected by the client that initiates an expensive recovery phase where all the
replicas are brought to the same version. The performance of Q/U gradually
decreases due to a high number of concurrent updates; therefore, Q/U is
also not scalable where there are a large number of clients. But under no
contention, Q/U is scalable in terms of a number of Byzantine faults tolerated
by the system. Performance of Q/U decreases by only 36% when f = 5
(in comparison to f = 1) whereas the performance of other BFT protocols
decreases by 83%.
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HQ. Hybrid Quorum [40] replication protocol is another quorum-based pro-
tocol which improves over the shortcomings of PBFT [30] (i.e., the quadratic
cost of inter-replica communication is unnecessary when there is no contention
and poor fault scalability) and Q/U [11] (i.e., Q/U requires a large number
of replicas which not only augment the hardware cost but also increase the
number of possible points of failure and it suffers concurrency issues under
contention). HQ requires 3f + 1 replicas and uses two approaches; (i) in
the absence of contention, it uses a lightweight quorum protocol which re-
quires one round-trip (between client and replicas) for read operations and
two round-trips for write operations, and (ii) when contention occurs, it uses
agreement-based techniques (protocol similar to PBFT) to agree upon the
ordering of contending requests. Therefore, when a client receives conflicting
responses (or dissimilar history digest), client requests conflict resolution by
sending RESOLVE messages with conflict certificate (formed from responses
and history digests). To resolve the conflicts, HQ use BFT-SMR protocol
(PBFT), to reach agreement on a deterministic ordering of the conflicting
messages. Results of HQ exhibit that it performs better than Q/U and PBFT
in contention-free scenarios and scales acceptably for f up to 5. Under con-
tention, HQ achieves better performance than Q/U and similar to PBFT.
Nevertheless, with a rise in contention, contention resolution leads to gradual
degradation in performance.
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Figure 2.8: Communication pattern of Quorum
Quorum. Quorum [56] is designed to be abortable with the same communi-
cation pattern as Q/U in fault-free cases, however, it requires 3f + 1 replicas
instead of 5f + 1 replicas (unlike Q/U). Quorum is targeted for system con-
ditions that do not involve asynchrony, failures or contention. Figure 2.8
presents the communication pattern where a client sends the request to all
replicas. These replicas independently execute the request (again without any
message exchanges among them), update their local history and reply to the
client (with the digest of up-to-date history). If the client receives matching
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responses from all the 3f + 1 replicas and all the histories match, client com-
mits the request; otherwise, it invokes a panicking mechanism. Client sends
a PANIC message to all the replicas. Upon reception of PANIC message,
replicas stop executing the requests in their queues and send a signed message
containing their history to the client. Client upon receiving 2f + 1 signed
messages, generates an abort history and aborts Quorum; and, switches to
a backup protocol which uses the history for maintaining consistency across
replicas (in this case, it is PBFT) [56]. Similar to Q/U, Quorum does not
tolerate contention. Quorum achieves the best performance (high throughput
and minimum latency) in comparison to other BFT protocols, but only with
a fewer number of clients. Nevertheless, with f > 1, the Quorum outperforms
Q/U as Q/U requires additional 2f replicas forcing the client to perform addi-
tional MAC computations. Furthermore, Quorum also reduces the overhead
of hardware cost of extra 2f replicas.
There are other protocols like Scrooge [96] which further aim to reduce the
number of replicas required for a quorum while tolerating f Byzantine faults.
2.4.2.3 Speculation-Based Protocols
In these protocols, replicas respond to the client’s request without going
through the expensive 3 phase commit protocol as in agreement based. Repli-
cas optimistically agree with the ordering proposed by the primary replica
and responds to the request. Replicas do not care about the inconsistencies,
it matters only to the clients. If there is a problem, like primary sending differ-
ent operations or assigning different sequence numbers to requests, the correct
client will eventually detect the fault and informs the replicas to rollback to a
consistent state. The client or replicas can initiate the view change upon any
malicious behavior. Speculation-based protocols improve upon performance
in best case scenarios, i.e., partial synchrony and fault free.
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Figure 2.9: Communication pattern of Zyzzyva
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Zyzzyva. Zyzzyva [74] is a speculative, high throughput BFT protocol that
improves the performance of PBFT. Similar to many state-of-the-art proto-
cols, Zyzzyva also requires 3f + 1 replicas to ensure Safety and Liveness in
presence of up to f Byzantine faults. Figure 2.9 illustrates the message ex-
change pattern of Zyzzyva. During a fault-free scenario, the client sends the
request to the primary which is in charge of assigning a sequence number to
all the incoming client requests. Primary then forwards the ordered request
to other replicas. All the replicas speculatively execute the request and send
the response to the client along with the digest of their local histories. Spec-
ulative approach bypasses the expensive agreement phase (like in PBFT) for
achieving total ordering of the messages before executing (committing) the
request. If the client receives 3f + 1 mutually-consistent matching responses
with complete history, client commits. If the client receives between 3f and
2f + 1 mutually-consistent matching responses, it creates a COMMIT certifi-
cate which contains the SPEC-RESPONSE messages from responding replicas
and broadcasts it to all the replicas. Replica upon receiving a COMMIT mes-
sage, makes sure that the history in the message is consistent with their local
history. If consistent, replica responds with a LOCAL-COMMIT message.
If there exists two different ordering for the same request, replica initiates a
view change protocol with a proof of misbehavior (POM) message. In case,
a client receives less than 2f + 1 matching responses, it resends the request
to all the replicas. Upon receiving the request directly from the client, all the
non-primary replicas send the CONFIRM-REQ message containing the re-
quest to the primary for ordering. If primary confirms with CONFIRM-REQ
(assigning the sequencing number as well), replicas execute the request and
respond to the client. If the replicas fail to receive the confirmation, they cre-
ate the POM against the faulty primary and initiate the view change protocol
to elect a new primary. Under the fault-free scenario, Zyzzyva exhibits better
performance than PBFT and Q/U but it drops sharply upon fault occurrence
due to expensive view change protocol.
Atul et al. proposed Zeno [100], a protocol based on Zyzzyva aiming to
replace strong consistency (linearizability) with a weaker guarantee (eventual
consistency), i.e., clients can temporarily miss each other’s updates, but when
the network becomes unstable, states from all replicas are merged for consis-
tency (having the replicas to agree on a total order for all requests). There
is another protocol, called ZZ [110], proposed by Timothy et al., that reduces
the replication cost from 2f + 1 to practically f + 1 during the normal case
and activate additional f replicas only upon failures.
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2.4.2.4 Client-Based Protocols
Client-based protocols aim to prevent faulty replicas to attack, mislead or
delay correct replicas, by preventing inter-replica communication. For these
protocols, replicas rely upon or communicate only with the client and their
identity remains secret to other replicas in the system. Protocols completely
depend on the correctness of their clients. They assume their clients to be non-
faulty, honest, but crash-prone. Such protocols show comparable performance
to agreement and quorum based protocols.
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Figure 2.10: Communication pattern of OBFT
OBFT. Obfuscated BFT (OBFT) [98] is a client based abortable BFT pro-
tocol ensuring complete independence of failure among replicas unlike other
BFT protocols which include inter-replica communications. Replicas are ab-
solutely unaware of each other’s existence and communicate only with the
clients. This prevents a strong adversary from colluding with other replicas
and impacting the system’s performance. Therefore, the role of clients become
very crucial in OBFT. OBFT considers a strong assumption that clients can-
not be malicious (but are prone to crashes); since they can violate consistency.
A malicious client can send two different requests to two distinct subsets of the
replicas and behaves against each subset as if there was a single request. This
assumption is very strong and thus limits the usability of the protocol for
certain applications where clients are trusted members of the organization.
OBFT requires 3f + 1 replicas to maintain Safety and Liveness. However,
protocol uses only 2f + 1 replicas at a time constituting to an Active replicas
set and the extra f Passive replicas are used upon fault occurrence. Figure
2.10 presents the communication pattern of OBFT. OBFT launches the spec-
ulative phase on 2f + 1 Active replicas where a client sends a request to the
primary replica. Primary replica assigns a sequence number to the request
and executes it. Primary then sends the request with a sequence number and
its corresponding response to the client. The client then forwards this ordered
request to the remaining Active replicas which execute the request and send
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their responses to the client. If the client receives matching 2f + 1 messages,
it commits the request otherwise launches the recovery phase. During recov-
ery, a client sends a PANIC message to all the Active replicas. Upon receiving
PANIC message, replicas stop executing new requests and send a signed Abort
history to the client. The client waits for matching f + 1 abort histories and
send an INIT message to all the 3f + 1 replicas. The replicas then respond
with ACK messages and the first 2f +1 replicas (that respond the first) form
the new Active set. This phase replaces the suspicious (either faulty or slow)
replicas with correct replicas from the Passive set (forming a new Active set)
and resumes to speculative phase in the new view.
2.4.2.5 Trusted Component-Based Protocols
Considering the fact of impossibility to achieve a consensus in an asynchronous
system, trusted component-based protocols depend on external entities for
partial synchrony unlike other protocols which use timeouts and delays. These
protocols exploit components like Abortable Timely Announced Broadcast
(ATAB) [86] to enable correct servers compute operations during synchronous
period and blacklist the faulty servers responding out of bound, Trusted
Timely Computing Base (TTCB) [106] to provide total ordering services or
Trusted Ordering (TO) Wormholes [37] which are part of every server and
have their dedicated communication channels. All these external entities are
considered to be fault-free, but can crash and have periods of unavailability.
Such protocols display comparable performance with protocols in Group 1,
for fault free configurations. And they also minimize the number of replicas
required from 3f + 1 to 2f + 1 for tolerating the same number of f faults.
CheapBFT. CheapBFT [71], is a resource-efficient BFT system relying on
a FPGA-based trusted subsystem called Counter Assignment Service in Hard-
ware (CASH) which tunes a protocol to the minimal resource usage during
normal cases (i.e., fault free scenarios). CASH is used for message authenti-
cation and verification, and to prevent equivocation; that is, the ability of
a server to generate conflicting messages for other servers in a system. The
trusted CASH subsystem may fail only by crashing and its key remains secret
even at Byzantine replicas. This implies that an attacker cannot gain physical
access to a replica. The protocol runs a composite agreement-based protocol
and saves resources by exploiting passive replication with lesser number of
physical machines. To achieve this, each replica is composed of a trusted
CASH subsystem initialized with a secret key (this key is shared among all
the subsystems of replicas) and is uniquely identified by an id (corresponding
to the replica that hosts the subsystem).
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The protocol consists of three sub-protocols: (1) normal case protocol,
CheapTiny, (2) transition protocol, CheapSwitch, and (3) fall-back protocol,
MinBFT [106].
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Figure 2.11: Communication pattern of two sub-protocols of CheapBFT
Figure 2.11(a) and 2.11(b) present the communication patterns of Cheap-
Tiny and CheapSwitch, respectively.
CheapTiny. During normal case (fault free cases) executions, CheapTiny re-
quires only f + 1 replicas to agree on client requests and execute them. How-
ever, CheapTiny is incapable of tolerating any type of fault.
CheapSwitch. CheapTiny switches to CheapSwitch upon suspecting or detect-
ing any faulty behavior of replica(s). It activates the f additional (passive)
replicas to participate in consensus and execution. This protocol brings all
correct replicas into a consistent state.
MinBFT.Upon achieving consistency, CheapBFT temporarily executes MinBFT
protocol where all 2f + 1 are active. This protocol creates a new view with f
non-faulty replicas making a new active set before eventually switching back
to CheapTiny. MinBFT ensures progress, consistency and tolerates up to f
faults.
The results of CheapBFT demonstrate that it outperforms BFTSMaRt [24]
and MinBFT [106]. This is due to the fact of using minimal number of re-
sources with minimal number of message exchanges in comparison to MinBFT
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and BFTSMaRt which depends on PBFT communication pattern and under-
goes 3 rounds of message exchange.
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Figure 2.12: Communication pattern of MinBFT during normal case execu-
tions
MinBFT and MinZyzzyva. Giuliana et al. proposed MinBFT and
MinZyzzyva [106] which require only 2f + 1 replicas, instead of usual 3f + 1.
This reduction is achieved via a tamper proof distributed component called
Trusted Timely Computing Base (TTCB) which provides ordering services
and verification simplicity. Another trusted service USIG is a local service that
exists in every replica which is used to prevent equivocation (explained previ-
ously in CheapBFT). USIG assigns a unique identifier along with a certificate
to every request, implying that the ordering was verified by the trusted ser-
vice. During the normal case executions, both the MinBFT (non-speculative)
and MinZyzzyva (speculative) run in the minimum number of communication
steps, 4 and 3 steps, respectively.
MinBFT. Figure 2.12 demonstrates normal case operation. A client sends a
request to all servers, but only primary creates a PREPARE message con-
taining a sequence number and a unique identifier from USIG. Primary then
forwards PREPARE message to all the replicas. Upon receipt of PREPARE
message, replicas verify the message (using USIG) and multicast a COMMIT
message to other replicas. Upon receiving 2f + 1 matching COMMIT mes-
sages, servers accept the request, execute it and return a response to the client.
Client upon receiving matching f+1 responses, commits the requests. In case,
a client does not have f + 1 matching responses or f + 1 backup replicas sus-
pect primary to be faulty, a view change protocol is executed which elects
a new primary and the protocol continues normally. View change protocol
works in the same way as of PBFT [30] but with only 2f +1 replicas and help
of trusted components.
MinZyzzyva. During gracious execution, MinZyzzyva works exactly like Zyzzyva
but with 2f + 1 replicas. Moreover, the ordering of requests by primary and
verification of different messages at replicas is done using USIG. Figure 2.13
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illustrates the non-gracious executions of MinZyzzyva which happens when
the network is too slow or one of more servers are faulty, therefore, the client
will never receive 2f +1 matching responses. The client during this execution
collects f + 1 responses as a proof of misbehavior, to initiate a view change
protocol to elect a new primary.
MinBFT and MinZyzzyva benefit in terms of cost with fewer replicas to tol-
erate f faults, their resilience and management complexities. Even with the
overhead induced by trusted components, these protocols perform better than
PBFT and Zyzzyva.
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Figure 2.13: Communication pattern of MinZyzzyva during non-gracious ex-
ecution
Correia et al. proposed BFT-TO [37], an algorithm for asynchronous BFT-
SMR with only 2f + 1 replicas by leveraging a trusted component called
Trusted Ordering (TO) wormhole. Only the algorithm was proposed and
was never implemented. There is another protocol BFT-Mencius [86] based
on a new communication primitive, Abortable Timely Announced Broadcast
(ATAB), and does not use signatures. The protocol was implemented using
Scala and its results are comparable to PBFT. The implementation in Scala
adds an overhead of implementing other protocol in Scala too for performing
comparative analysis.
Several papers considered theoretical evaluation as an alternative, where
throughput is related to the number of cryptographic operations on the bot-
tleneck replica, and latency is related to the number of communication steps
in the critical path of the protocol [56, 74]. Table 2.2 provides the theoreti-
cal analysis of the above discussed protocols in terms of throughput, latency
and minimum number of replicas required to tolerate up to f simultaneous
Byzantine faults. We observe that the Group 1 protocols over the years have
enhanced in reducing the cost of replication, optimized in terms of number
of cryptographic operations performed (most protocols use computation of
MACs over public-key encryption) and ideally provide comparable perfor-
mance to the performance of a non-replicated system, but all in non-faulty
settings. Nevertheless, performance of these protocols degrades in the pres-
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Table 2.2: Theoretical Analysis of BFT protocols aiming to enhance the per-
formance in fault free scenarios
Type of Protocol BFT Protocol Throughput Latency
Replication
Cost
Cost of Bad
Runs
Agreement-Based
PBFT [30] 8f + 3 5 3f + 1 1 view change
BFT-SMaRt [24] ≈PBFT 5 3f + 1 1 view change
Chain [56] 2f + 2 3f + 2 3f + 1
Switch to PBFT +
PBFT execution
Ring [57] 4f + 4 7f + 2 3f + 1
Switch to resilient
mode of Ring
Quorum-Based
Q/U [11] 4f + 2 2 5f + 1 1 view change
HQ [40] 4f + 2 4 3f + 1
Switch to PBFT +
PBFT execution
Quorum [56] 2 2 3f + 1
Switch to PBFT +
PBFT execution
Speculation-Based
Zyzzyva [74] 3f + 2 3 3f + 1
Checkpointing +
1view change
Zeno [100] ≈Zyzzyva 3 3f + 1 1view change
Client-Based OBFT [98] 2 4 3f + 1 1 view change
Trusted Component
CheapBFT [71] 4f + 2 4 2f + 1 Switch to MinBFT
MinBFT [106] f + 5 4 2f + 1 1 view change
MinZyzzyva [106]
2 +
signatures
3 2f + 1 Switch to Zyzzyva
BFT-TO [37]
8f + 3 +
wormhole ops
5 2f + 1 −
BFTMencius [86] ≈PBFT 5 2f + 1 −
ence of arbitrary failures. This is mainly due to the inherent design defects or
complex implementations of the BFT algorithm.
2.4.3 Group 2: Minimizing Performance Degradation
in Faulty Conditions
One could argue that BFT protocols are meant to efficiently tolerate faulty
behaviors no matter how rarely they occur. The protocols of Group 1 which
were once considered to be Byzantine fault tolerant, crashed during faulty
scenarios. This is due to the fact that their prototypes were never evaluated
under faulty conditions. From the second group, Aardvark introduced the
notion of robust BFT protocols, i.e., maintaining a constant performance in
the presence of few Byzantine faults [36]. Robust BFT protocols such as Spin-
ning [105], Prime [15], Aardvark [36], and RBFT [18] are meant to efficiently
handle some worst-case malicious Byzantine behaviors.
Table 2.3 gives the list of attacks performed by some state-of-the-art pro-
tocols to evaluate performance in faulty conditions. Each protocol considers
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some Byzantine fault scenarios when evaluating their prototypes and measures
the performance in terms of latency and throughput for each case.
Table 2.3: Performance evaluation of robust state-of-the-art protocols under
different types of attacks
BFT
Protocol
Byzantine Fault Scenarios
Throughput
Evaluation
Latency
Evaluation
Aardvark [36]
Client floods the replicas Yes No
Replica floods the correct
replicas
Yes No
Client sending inconsistent
MAC authenticator
Yes No
Intentional delay of responses
on a specific client
Yes No
Intentional pre-prepare delay
by primary replica
Yes No
Prime [15]
Intentional pre-prepare delay
by primary replica
Yes Yes
Spinning [105]
Intentional pre-prepare delay
by primary replica
Yes Yes
RBFT [18]
Client floods the correct
replicas with invalid requests
or inconsistent MAC
authenticators
Yes No
Intentional delay by primary
on specific client
No Yes
Replica floods the correct
replicas
Yes No
Aardvark [36], Spinning [105], Prime [15] and RBFT [18], all employ dif-
ferent approaches for reducing the harm caused by a malicious primary. Ei-
ther they allow replicas to expect a minimal acceptable throughput from the
primary [36], or they change the primary with every batch of requests [105].
Furthermore, these protocols implement various fault adaptive mechanisms to
handle some fault behaviors. Aardvark allows the replicas to expect a minimal
acceptable throughput T from the primary (level of T is raised periodically)
which enable them to monitor the performance of primary. The inability of
the primary replica to maintain the T leads to frequent view changes. With
this mechanism system throughput remains high in the presence of faulty pri-
mary (mainly slow primary which is unable to maintain T at least at f + 1
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replicas). Spinning [105] proposed another approach for reducing the damages
introduced by a malicious primary by changing the primary every batch of re-
quests. But there is no mechanism to detect a faulty primary which delays a
request ordering just by a little less than the timeout at the client. Like Aard-
vark, Prime [15] also moved the task of monitoring the performance to replicas.
In Prime [15], the network performance is monitored by the replicas, while the
primary periodically sends messages (with or without request ordering) at a
constant rate. This mechanism allows the replicas to expect a constant fre-
quency of messages and enable them to identify a slower primary. But Prime
fails to improve the performance over Aardvark and Spinning when a ma-
licious primary colludes with a faulty client. Lastly RBFT [18], introduced
the concept of maintaining a constant performance during a fault occurrence.
Authors of RBFT demonstrated that the performance of Aardvark, Spinning,
and Prime is reduced by at least 78% when there is a fault while RBFT shows
a degradation of only 3%. This is due to the fact that RBFT runs f + 1
multiple instances of its protocol, where only one of the instances executes
the requests. The other f instances are meant to monitor the difference in
throughput at different instances. RBFT also implements few fault adaptive
mechanisms like Aardvark, to handle some fault scenarios.
On the other hand, the evaluation of BFT protocols has also raised several
questions. In [36], authors present results showing that the throughput of
PBFT [30], Zyzzyva [74], HQ [40] and Q/U [11] falls to 0 when encountering
a malicious client while these results are theoretically impossible. Thus, BFT
prototypes often perform poorly and in an unexpected way in the presence of
faults, violating Liveness property.
2.4.3.1 Robust Protocols
Recently, a lot of attention has been given to make BFT protocols robust,
i.e., protocols minimizing performance degradation during fault occurrences
(attacks from clients and Byzantine servers). The fact that Group 1 protocols
are fragile and offer less performance guarantees in case of attacks, motivated
the researchers to design robust protocols [15, 18, 36, 105]. According to ro-
bust protocols, the main reason for performance degradation is due to the
bottleneck replica, mostly primary (also known as a principal server). Robust
protocols design mitigate the responsibilities of the primary. This is achieved
by frequently changing the primary [36, 105] or by having multiple instances
with different primary for each instance [18]. Robust protocols show promising
results with minimum performance degradation [18] but with a lower perfor-
mance during fault free scenarios in comparison to the Group 1 protocols.
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Aardvark. Clement et al. present Aardvark [36], a protocol similar to
PBFT which is effective and robust, unlike protocols Q/U, Chain, Ring,
Zyzzyva, PBFT and HQ. Aardvark follows the same communication as of
PBFT (see Figure 2.4); it requires 3f + 1 replicas where one of the nodes is
primary, responsible for ordering client requests. Aardvark employs various
fault adaptive mechanisms to provide strong Safety and Liveness guarantees
to ensure system’s availability not only during gracious intervals (synchronous
network, timely, fault free replicas and correct clients) but also during uncivil
execution intervals (network links and correct servers are timely but with up
to f Byzantine servers and any number of faulty clients). Aardvark also by-
passes fragile optimizations which only improve best-case performance and
introduce expensive alternative protocol paths, making the system vulnerable
to faulty nodes.
Mechanisms implemented by Aardvark are as follows.
1. Malicious Clients. Aardvark does not rely on clients for anything except
sending their requests. It implements a hybrid signature/MAC authen-
tication construct to safeguard against manipulative faulty clients. This
is due to the fact that MAC-based authentication makes the system vul-
nerable to unfaithful (inauthentic) messages; worse, it fails to correctly
identify the malicious client/server. Aardvark diligently exercises sig-
natures by using it only for authenticating client requests. Rest of the
communication continues to use MACs. It uses Rabin-Williams signa-
ture scheme [84, 108] to disproportionately place the computational load
of signature generator at the clients rather than on the servers. A client
submitting a request, signs the request and then authenticates the signed
request with a MAC. Servers upon receipt of a request, authenticates the
MAC. If it is not valid, the request is discarded otherwise server verifies
the signature. If the signature is invalid, all the future requests from
this client are discarded to prevent the system from the spurious load.
This mechanism amortizes the cost of verifying signatures and brings
down the overhead in line with Group 1 protocols [30, 57, 74, 104]. Fur-
thermore, to mitigate the additional cost of using signatures, Aardvark
exploits multi-core commodity machines by processing client requests in
one core and messages received by servers in other core. Isolating the
computations performed for a request at replicas from messages send/re-
ceived by the replicas, facilitates the protocol to advance.
2. Vulnerable Primary. Unlike past BFT protocols which conservatively
trigger a view change to replace a malicious primary, Aardvark is a lot
aggressive on view changes. It relies on an adaptive throughput mecha-
nism to prevent a primary from achieving a tenure and encourages it to
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work hard to maintain its position. That means, a primary providing
adequate throughput remains a primary for at least 5 seconds (grace pe-
riod); also, a primary has only 5 seconds to make inappropriate progress.
Once a view change is triggered, minimum accepted throughput is de-
fined for the primary. At every checkpoint, performance of the proto-
col is measured. If the observed throughput is less than the required
throughput, primary is considered faulty and a view change is triggered.
The grace period is long enough to allow a primary to provide required
throughput. The acceptable throughput value is set to 90% of the max-
imum throughput observed in previous n views. Periodically, this value
is increased by a factor of 0.01, until a primary fails to provide the ex-
pected throughput. These throughput adaptive frequent view changes
do induce a performance loss of at most 10%. Furthermore, Aardvark
uses PBFT as its baseline, but its performance is lower than PBFT due
to these fault adaptive mechanisms.
3. Byzantine Servers. Aardvark exploits features of multiple network inter-
faces (Network Interface Controller (NIC)) to separate network traffic
of clients from servers. This limits the load imposed by generic net-
work flooding by relying on distinct network devices to communicate
with each replica. Each replica has 3f + 1 network interfaces; one for
replica-to-client communication and others for inter-replica communica-
tions. This prevents network traffic from clients to slow down the replica
traffic and vice-versa. Aardvark employs flood adaptive mechanism by
allowing a replica to detect excessive flow of messages from a replica than
necessary. This will ensure, that a spurious replica is stressing the net-
work with messages. Upon detection of network flooding from a server
(imposing excessive load), dedicated physical links are deactivated for a
while to prevent system’s performance degradation.
Client
Replica 1/ Primary
Replica 2
Replica 3/ Ordering
Replica 4
PO Request PO ARU PreparePre-Prepare CommitPO ACK
2 3 4 5 6 7 81
Request Reply
Figure 2.14: Communication pattern of Prime
Prime. Amir et al. observed the imperfection of existing Byzantine-resilient
replication protocols in the presence of Byzantine faults and present Prime [15]
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overcoming these drawbacks. Prime requires 3f+1 replicas where clients send
their requests to any of the replicas in the system and that replica then assigns
an order to the request. Figure 2.14 illustrates the communication steps of
Prime, which are similar to PBFT. Prime was motivated from the possible
attack on PBFT where an attacker can delay sending of pre-prepare messages
(by the duration just less than the timer at other replicas) without letting the
protocol undergo multiple view changes. The attacker benefits on the delay
introduced by it without ever getting detected as malicious and successfully
brings down the performance to almost zero. In the protocol, once a replica
receives a client request, it assigns attributes such a query, r and request or-
dering s and sends a PO-REQUEST message (containing r and s) to other
replicas. Upon receiving PO-REQUEST, replicas send PO-ACK message to
all containing s and n (n is a list of replicas sending PO-REQUEST). A replica
that receives 2f PO-ACK sends PO-ARU message contains the proof with the
replicas which have agreed on the pre-scheduling of the request with same r, s
and n attributes. The PO-ARU message is a proof of accepted sequence num-
bers by n replicas and it keeps replicas aware of the requests being executed by
other replicas. When the primary receives 2f matching PO-ARU messages, it
knows that requests have been pre-ordered and can now be ordered. It then
sends pre-prepare messages to all the replicas and the protocol continues as
PBFT. Prime allows replicas to monitor network performance by analyzing
the maximum time taken by the primary replica to order requests. Thus,
it becomes essential of the primary to periodically send scheduling messages
(even empty) to allow replicas identify a malicious replica. Even the replicas
expect to receive these messages at a certain frequency which is calculated us-
ing three parameters: (1) latency between replicas, (2) frequency of primary
replica for sending ordered requests, and (3) constant considering variable la-
tency of the network. Through this mechanism, it is easy to detect a faulty
primary if it fails to respond within the required frequency and trigger a view
change.
Prime benefits over performance maintenance in the presence of faults,
but the performance reduces many folds during fault free scenarios. This
is because, Prime does not use MACs, but signatures. The addition of a
new ordering phase and use of signatures for ensuring integrity, authenticity,
and non-repudiation, helps in fault detection and performance monitoring.
However, induces non-negligible cost and leads to lower performance than
Group 1 protocols.
Spinning. Spinning [105], another BFT protocol based on PBFT but with
an effort to mitigate performance attacks by changing the primary after every
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batch of pending client requests. This means, that instead of changing the pri-
mary upon detecting it to be faulty, Spinning changes the primary very single
batch of requests without any inter-replica exchange of messages. During nor-
mal operation, it follows the communication steps of PBFT (see Figure 2.4).
It has no view change operation, but rather merge operation which collects
the information from different servers to decide if the requests in the previous
views should be executed in the new view or not. In Spinning, client requests
are sent to all replicas. Upon receipt of a request from a non-primary replica, it
starts a timer to receive the request ordering message (PRE-PREPARE mes-
sage) from the current primary (of the view). If the timer expires, after the
maximum time duration Tacc
2 to accept the request, the current primary is
considered faulty and blacklisted. The protocol changes its state from normal
to merge. Merge operation ensures Safety and reliability of the system upon
expiration of the timer at non-primary replicas. Another replica becomes a
primary and the value of Tacc is doubled. If there are already f replicas in
the blacklist, the oldest in the list is removed to ensure Liveness property.
This operation is not a change the view, but to agree to the requests from
the previous views which were accepted and have to be executed by all the
correct servers (this excludes all the blacklisted replicas). Merge operation
collects information from all the servers to agree to the requests to be exe-
cuted considering loss of messages, not sent messages, acceptance of requests
by few correct servers and not all of them.
Unlike Aardvark, Spinning does not require clients to sign their requests.
Spinning uses only MAC authentication, thus improving the performance over
Aardvark. However, this makes the protocol vulnerable to MAC attacks. If
a malicious client sends valid messages only to a subset of correct replicas,
then primary would be forced to trigger a merge operation. This attack will
possibly make the protocol spend the majority of its time executing the merge
operation. This would reduce the performance to almost zero, but signing of
a request can always be employed to handle such faults. Also, as previously
said, Tacc is a static parameter, faulty replicas can intentionally trigger the
timeout. A faulty primary can delay the request ordering by a little less than
this parameter, without ever being detected as malicious. This behavior would
greatly reduce the throughput during the view when the faulty replica is the
primary. Several experiments were performed to analyze this intentional delay
by primary and it was observed that throughput drops by 99% [18].
2Tacc is a static system defined parameter and its initial value is defined by the system
user
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Figure 2.15: Communication pattern of RBFT
RBFT. Redundant-BFT (RBFT) [18] like Prime observed the malicious
behavior of the primary replica in primary-dependent existing BFT protocols
targeting high throughput, where primary can smartly degrade the perfor-
mance of the system without being detected by correct replicas. RBFT follows
the pattern of PBFT except the communication step to exchange the propa-
gate message among replicas before primary sends pre-prepare message with
request ordering to all replicas. RBFT executes multiple instances of the same
protocol, each with a different primary replica executing on a different physical
machine. All the protocol instances order the requests, but only the requests
ordered by the master instance are effectively executed. Other instances are
called backup instances, they order requests only for monitoring performance,
in order to check if the master instance is providing the required performance.
If the master instance is slower, then backup instances can trigger a view
change and a new primary is elected at each protocol instance. RBFT is in-
tended for open loop systems and it is presumed that backup instances would
never be faster than the master instance. It exploits the multicore architecture
of physical machines and uses multiple network interface controllers (NICs)
for ensuring robustness.
RBFT runs f + 1 protocol instances which are necessary and sufficient
to detect a faulty primary and ensure robustness of the protocol. Backup
instances run monitoring module to compute the throughput and if 2f +
1 nodes observe the ratio of performance of master instance to that of the
back instance is lower than a given threshold, the primary of the master is
considered Byzantine. It is also important that f + 1 instances receive the
same client requests. The client sends the requests (REQUEST message) to
all the replicas and once the request is verified by the replica (only after it
receives f + 1 copies of the same request), it sends a PROPAGATE message
to all other nodes. This step ensures that every correct node will eventually
receive the request as long as the request has been sent to at least one correct
node. RBFT follows the steps of PBFT from this point, with prep-prepare,
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prepare and commit messages. Furthermore, RBFT implements a fairness
mechanism between clients by monitoring the latency at each, which ensures
that client requests are processed fairly.
2.5 Benchmarking Tools
With the growing demand for cloud services, it has become challenging and
essential to guarantee performance and dependability aspects in the presence
of real world fault scenarios. There exist many benchmarks which we discuss
next.
2.5.1 Performance Benchmarks
Until recently, much emphasis has been given to performance benchmarks and
many tools have been proposed that include Open System Testing Architec-
ture (OpenSTA) [6], a distributed software testing architecture that evaluates
performance and resource utilization in the presence of realistic heavy loads
simulating activities of virtual users. It considers web servers, application
servers, database servers and operating systems under test. Pylot [6], a free
open source for testing performance and scalability of web services. SIPp [6]
is a performance testing tool for the SIP protocol. SLAMD Distributed Load
Generation Engine [6] is a Java-based application designed for stress testing
and performance analysis of network-based applications. DBMonster [6] is a
framework that test performance of SQL database driven applications under
heavy loads. There are many more such performance benchmarking tools for
various computer systems. This explains that users are most inclined towards
analyzing performance, resource consumption (CPU utilization, network be-
havior and memory usage) and their associated costs.
Research has been made in the field of Byzantine fault tolerant protocols
to guarantee Liveness and Safety properties in the presence of faults. Many
protocols have been proposed which result in better performance during fault
free scenarios but less effort has been made to evaluate these protocols in the
face of faulty behaviors. There are some protocols, that considered evaluating
the protocols under different types of faults, but compromises on the perfor-
mance during fault free conditions. It is a tradeoff between performance and
incorporating fault tolerant mechanisms which makes it difficult to analyze
and choose the best protocol among all. Byzantine fault tolerance benchmark
is a solution which can help the BFT system users to evaluate the prototypes
in different scenarios for performance and dependability evaluations, with an
ease of injecting different faultloads and workloads. However, even after a
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decade of research on BFT protocols and benchmarks, considerably less effort
as been done for benchmarking BFT systems. Such systems are defined next.
2.5.1.1 a/b Microbenchmarks
Castro et al. [31] devised a micro-benchmark for stress testing the BFT proto-
cols using different sizes of request and response messages. It is denoted as a/b
microbenchmark where ’a’ and ’b’ are sizes of request and response messages
in KBs, respectively. Microbenchmark uses a simple service emulating a real
service, but has no state. The request operations receive arguments from the
clients and return zero-filled results without performing any actual computa-
tions. Experiments can be performed for both read-only and read-write op-
erations considering different arguments and request/response message sizes.
For example, in a 0/0 benchmark, a client sends a null request and receives a
null reply. In the 4/0 benchmark, a client sends a 4KB request and receives
a null reply. In the 0/4 benchmark, a client sends a null request and receives
a 4KB reply. It is worth noting that, computations and I/O operations (over
the request data and operation) at both client and server side would introduce
varying delaying depending on the size of the request/response messages.
2.5.1.2 Hermes Framework
Hermes [29], developed under TRONE project, is a diagnostic tool that can
be used to inject faults in BFT-SMaRt [24]. Hermes allows system develop-
ers to evaluate the performance of BFT-SMaRt implementation by allowing
them to inject faults and observe the corresponding behaviors. Hermes archi-
tecture allows injection of different faults such as crash faults, network faults,
corrupted headers and forged signatures. It contains a fault injection orches-
trator, responsible for injecting multiple faults across different nodes. But the
actual fault injection is performed by the Hermes runtime which is integrated
in every node. It considers injection of four types of attacks:
• Attack 1 : Crash of malicious nodes
• Attack 2 : Malicious nodes forge their payload size with MAX INT.
• Attack 3 : Malicious nodes delay prepare messages to 90% of the timeout
set at all the nodes for receiving the prepare messages.
• Attack 4 : Malicious nodes delay prepare messages to 5 times of the
timeout value.
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The evaluation was performed in a simulated distributed environment with
11 virtual machines, where 10 machines ran BFT implementations and 1 was
reserved for clients. Hermes measures the throughput and latency during fault
free and faulty scenarios where the number of clients sending the requests vary
from 1 to 11. Even though Hermes can inject various faults, it is limited to
performance benchmarking of only BFT-SMaRt. Hermes is built in AspectJ
which could easily be integrated with the code base of BFT-SMaRt (devel-
oped in Java). Most of the other protocols are implemented in C and their
integration with Hermes C version is ambiguous. This creates an overhead of
implementing all the protocols in Java despite the fact how complex BFT al-
gorithms and their implementations are. However, Hermes was able to detect
some implementation issues in BFT-SMaRt while evaluating the prototype
under faults.
2.5.2 Dependability Benchmarks
The primary objective of benchmarking the dependability is to provide generic
and reproducible ways of characterizing the system behavior in the presence
of faults and also its impact on the performance. On the industry side, work
at Sun Microsystems [65] defines a high level framework specifically for avail-
ability benchmarking during failure of hardware components, installation of
software patches and system recovery. Another work by IBM, the Autonomic
Computing initiative [5], develops benchmarks for analyzing system’s self-
management, self-configuration, self-healing and self-protection capabilities.
In academia, Berkeley University proposed a dependability benchmark to as-
sess human assisted recovery process [27]. There are many other depend-
ability benchmarks available in the domains of hardware, cluster computing,
database systems, web services, operating systems, online transaction process-
ing (OLTP) systems, web-servers, etc. [8, 22, 50, 70, 92, 97, 107].
Considerable work has been done in designing fault and load injection sys-
tems to quantitatively assess the consequences of faulty behaviors in a system
both at software and hardware levels [8, 13, 32, 60, 102]. Hsueh et al. [62] pro-
vide a good survey of fault injection techniques and tools for testing software
dependability. Fault injector like Loki [32] injects various faults based on the
partial view of global state change in a distributed system. Orchestra [43, 44]
uses interception approach to inject communication faults in the different lay-
ers of a protocol by manipulating, dropping, injecting messages. Doctor [60] is
an integrated software fault injection environment for injecting CPU specific
faults, network and memory loads and network communication faults. Fer-
rari [69] (Fault and Error Automatic Real-Time Injection) also injects CPU,
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memory, and bus faults but uses software traps. FTaPE [103] (Fault Tolerance
and Performance Evaluator) allows injection of faults using mode registers in
CPUs, memory locations, and disk subsystems. Xception [38] injects more
realistic faults depending on underlying system applications and processors,
advantaging from advanced debugging and performance monitoring features.
Ballista [45] is a black box software testing tool that uses combinational tests
of correct and incorrect values for parameters to subroutine calls, methods
and functions. Finally, CLIF [47] is a load injection framework for distributed
platforms where it deploys, controls and monitors load injectors and captures
performance and resource consumption upon varying loads. Bobelin et al. [26],
also considered proposing security-aware architecture with an easy expression
of security requirements and an actual enforcement of those requirements.
Apart from the research on performance benchmarks for BFT systems,
advancements have been made in developing BFTSim [99], a simulation en-
vironment and Achilles [21], a tool to detect trojan messages in distributed
systems.
BFTSim [99] intends to implement BFT protocols from pseudocode in the
high-level declarative language and compare these protocols under identical
crypto-primitives, workload and network conditions. It implements three BFT
protocols, precisely, PBFT, Q/U and Zyzzyva and validates the performance
against the published results. Simulator observes that a protocol’s perfor-
mance characteristics are primarily inherent in its high-level design, not the
particulars of its implementation. However, other state-of-the-art protocols,
such as Chain, Ring, Aliph, OBFT, Aardvark, Prime, Spinning, etc., did not
consider using the simulator due to the underlying complex high-level declara-
tive language. Also, some protocols assume different network conditions, such
as, exploitation of multiple core architecture [24], and multiple network inter-
faces [18, 36]. Furthermore, as a known fact, BFT protocols are complex in
nature, therefore, their re-implementation is an overhead for BFT developers.
Radu et al. proposed a tool, Achilles [21], that searches trojan messages
in a distributed system. Trojan messages are messages that seem correct to
the receiver, but cannot be generated by any correct sender [21]. Such mes-
sages reside in untested, uncommon code paths and are difficult to track using
regular testing mechanisms. Such messages can have a major impact on the
performance of a distributed system. For example, Amazon S3 storage system
went down for several hours due to the propagation of single corrupted bit to
the whole system corrupting the entire stored information [1]. Achilles evalu-
ated PBFT for detection of trojan messages and rediscovered the previously
known MAC attack vulnerability. This attack is possible due to the simplicity
of verification by servers on the client’s requests. Servers would accept client
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(malicious) requests without checking the MACs. Achilles can be a useful tool
for determining coding flaws in the distributed protocols.
From our comprehensive analysis, we can conclude that it is necessary to
primarily focus on the practical evaluation of BFT implementations under
different workload and faultload settings from the viewpoint of adapting them
to real world systems. For realizing the same, it is important to design a
generalized, high-level, easy to use, performance and dependability benchmark
with faultload and workload injectors.
2.6 Discussion
This chapter embarks on the study of distributed system characterizations
which are extensively used in the representation of many replication tech-
niques such as agreement and consensus, state machine replication (SMR)
and quorum. We studied SMR replication thoroughly, that forms a baseline
for all the BFT protocols proposed so far. This chapter provides a comprehen-
sive research on Byzantine (arbitrary) behaviors, analysis of the upper bound
on the number of replicas required simultaneously to tolerate up to f Byzan-
tine faults and many existing BFT protocols. These protocols were classified
into two groups, precisely, (i) performance enhancements in fault-free scenar-
ios, and (ii) minimizing performance degradation in faulty conditions. Group
1 primarily consists of proprietary protocols aiming to reduce the cost (in
terms of the number of replicas) while increasing the performance of the BFT
system in the absence of faults. However, Group 2, so-called robust protocols,
aims to provide performance guarantees (i.e., minimum degradation in perfor-
mance in faulty settings in comparison to fault-free scenarios) in the presence
of Byzantine attacks. Additionally, this chapter provides a theoretical anal-
ysis of all the BFT protocols and lists the Byzantine fault scenarios handled
by robust protocols. This chapter also provided a complete taxonomy on the
known and published state-of-the-art BFT protocols in an effort of helping
the future researchers working on BFT techniques.
Furthermore, we studied the existing work on performance and depend-
ability benchmarks not only for BFT systems, but also in other domains such
as web servers, database systems, application servers, grid and cluster com-
puting. Our investigation of existing benchmark tools expresses absence of a
standard benchmarking approach for empirically evaluating competing BFT
systems in terms of Quality of Service (QoS) metrics under various workloads
and faultloads settings.
We were further motivated by the work of Kanoun et al. [8]. Their tech-
niques guided us with the basic building blocks required in designing a per-
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formance and dependability benchmark using complex workload, faultload for
different distributed systems.
Analysis of the state-of-the-art BFT protocols and benchmarking frame-
works motivated us to design a comprehensive performance and dependability
benchmark tool for evaluating BFT systems with the following objectives.
• QoS metrics scalability. By this we mean, that multiple metrics must
be analyzed in parallel without limiting the analysis to performance and
dependability aspects in terms of latency, throughput, availability and
reliability. A benchmark must also consider analyzing other metrics such
as cost, security, testability, interoperability, scalability, etc and must
be scalable to incorporate them. It should also provide some high level
statistics such as the number of unsuccessful and successful operations,
and number of incorrect responses. It must be structured to produce
low-level statistics such as CPU and network utilization, a number of
operations performed by each server in the system and size of data read
and written during each operation.
• Heterogeneity. It is well-known that distributed systems are com-
plex and consider various workloads, faultloads described via multiple
characteristics, features and dimensions. In real-world scenarios, we ob-
serve complex workload where some applications are computationally
heavy while others are data access intensive. However, few have both
bulky computational and data access characteristics. Similarly, we have
recognized various faulty behaviors commonly occurring in distributed
systems, such as operator mistakes, network failures, hardware and soft-
ware faults. Considering our analysis, a benchmark must provide a
simple way to define different workloads and faultloads attributes, and
inject them.
• Adoptability. Benchmarking framework must be easy to understand
and use by the researchers and as well as amateur end-users for analyzing
underlying system’s quality measurements.
Thereupon, our exhaustive survey affirms a need of comprehensive bench-
mark to evaluate performance, dependability and other QoS metrics of dis-
tributed systems under various workloads and faultloads.
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Until recently, for distributed systems, a benchmark implicitly refers and
limits to performance benchmarking. But there are many aspects which con-
verge on the importance of dependability measurement of today’s distributed
systems. Industries define easy to use standard benchmarks for measuring the
performance of a system in a deterministic and reproducible manner, but lack
in characterizing standards for dependability analysis. However, with novel
explorations, increasing demands and advantages of distributed systems, par-
ticularly in the aspects of cloud computing has compelled the researchers and
developers to fabricate solutions to benchmark the dependability and perfor-
mance of these services and distributed protocols.
A dependability benchmark is intended to characterize the system behavior
in the presence of faults which could potentially include component failures,
hardware or software design defects, arbitrary faults and disruptions due to
dynamic environments. Available dependability and performance state-of-the-
art benchmark solutions do not acknowledge many specific challenges faced by
a distributed system when intending to use distributed protocols. We believe
that there is a strong need for designing a performance and dependability
benchmark which evaluates the behavior of distributed protocols under faulty
and highly demanding real-world settings. Therefore, in this thesis, we in-
tend to devise a benchmark for analyzing dependability and performance of
distributed protocols, namely Byzantine Fault Tolerant protocols, which in-
crease the reliability and availability metrics of a system in the presence of
arbitrary failures [80].
In this chapter, we present a generic architecture of a benchmark for eval-
uating performance and dependability aspects of distributed protocols. We
describe each component of the benchmark, responsible for the generation of
various faultloads and workloads, their injections, and measurement and anal-
ysis of performance and dependability attributes. We have used the presented
generic architecture to design a software prototype, BFT-Bench (explained
in details in the next Chapter 4), which evaluates different implementations
of BFT protocols. We also demonstrate the benefits of building a generic
architecture and its easy adoption to enable researchers and developers in
industry and academia to extend it for analyzing various distributed proto-
cols for reliable file systems, verification, communications, different replication
techniques, etc., in the presence of different faulty behaviors.
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3.1 Overview and Objectives
With the increasing dependency on cloud services and its pay-as-you-go mod-
els, users have become more interested in evaluating the reliability and avail-
ability metrics of such services along with other high level statistics like per-
formance, scalability and cost. Furthermore, with growing on-demand nature
of the cloud services, it has become challenging and essential to guarantee
Quality of Service (QoS) attributes of the systems in the presence or absence
of different faulty behaviors. Until recently, substantial emphasis has been
given to evaluate performance aspects of various systems while lesser progress
has been made to benchmark distributed protocols. The primary objective of
any benchmark is to provide generic and reproducible ways of characterizing
system behavior in the presence of faults and also analyze their impact on the
performance and dependability metrics.
Clearly, a lot of work is still required concerning the empirical assessment of
dependability and performance aspects. However, Madeira et al. [83] point out
some of the recent works addressing coupling of such issues, such as bringing
together performance benchmarking and dependability assessments [7], field
measurement and fault injection [64], field measurement and modeling [68],
fault injection and modeling [17], and use of standard performance bench-
marks as a workload for dependability evaluation [39].
From the literature, we have seen that there is no scientific approach or
framework developed so far that can help the researchers and developers (from
industry or academia) to evaluate the dependability quality aspects of an
underlying distributed protocols in cloud systems. And in this path we explore
and design a comprehensive benchmark framework for measuring QoS metrics
of distributed protocols and their comparison with competing solutions.
From a practical point of view, dependability is a promising approach to
assess QoS metrics related to the behavior of a distributed system and its pro-
tocols in the face of various faults. Thus, any dependability benchmark should
be clear enough to allow implementation of the specifications in a system to
benchmark the dependability and complete understanding of benchmark re-
sults.
DBench report [8] provides a basic foundation of dependability benchmark-
ing and defines 3 major guidelines that should be followed while designing a
benchmark. These include (1) implementing the specifications, (2) perform-
ing the experiments with uniform conditions and (3) analysis of results. Any
benchmarking framework should be independent of the underlying infrastruc-
ture and must consider a wide range of workload characteristics, including a
number of concurrent users, and data vs compute-intensive jobs.
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Designing a benchmark framework for distributed protocols is complex
and time-consuming as it needs a thorough understanding of the algorithm to
determine the corner faulty cases, ways to inject these faults in a system and
definitions for evaluating different QoS metrics. Distributed protocols are the
building blocks of a cloud system and thus, it becomes necessary to analyze
their performance and dependability before they are integrated in the real
world settings. It is equally substantial to clearly define the objectives while
designing a benchmarking framework. Therefore, we recognize:
• Considering a system model which defines the protocols under study
with all the considered assumptions (probably common to all to have a
unified testing environment).
• Defining workloads and faultloads.
• Defining components and modules and relationships among them such
as fault injection module’s relationship with faultload and the system
under test for injecting a fault.
• Building components for the framework with minimum coupling.
This chapter makes the following contributions:
• We present the main dependability benchmark dimensions as per
DBench [8] report considering categorization which defines the applica-
tion area and benchmarking purpose, measures to define nature, type
and assessment methods, and experimentation to define the system un-
der test, faultloads, workloads and measurements of considered QoS
metrics. While defining these dimensions we also consider benchmarking
validation key features that includes representativeness, repeatability,
reproducibility, portability, non-intrusiveness, scalability, benchmarking
time and cost and simplicity.
• We illustrate the architecture of high-level and low-level classes which
can be adapted easily for integrating implementations of comparable
distributed protocols.
• We demonstrate the adaptability and usability of general architecture
proposed in this chapter by instantiating the integration of Byzantine
Fault Tolerant protocols. We propose a performance and dependabil-
ity benchmark framework BFT-Bench build using the components and
modules of general architecture such as generation of faultloads and
workloads, their injection, and analysis and measurements of perfor-
mance and dependability metrics using output logs and monitoring re-
ports.
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The proposed general architecture can be adopted for developing a bench-
mark for any type of distributed protocol for empirical and effective measure-
ment of performance, cost, availability, security, etc. BFT-Bench framework
(detailed in the next chapter) is designed specifically to analyze and compare
implementations of BFT protocols under different fault settings and various
workloads. The design specifications of the framework demonstrate easy inte-
gration of various BFT protocols with minimum code changes in the software
prototypes to inject some context-based faults. We graphically illustrate the
evaluation of performance and dependability aspects for these BFT prototypes
using BFT-Bench framework.
3.2 Dependability and Performance Benchmark-
ing Specifications and Validations
As said in the report of DBench project [8], a meaningful framework for de-
pendability and performance measurements is the one which clearly states
and understands all the impacting dimensions. This gives an essential insight
to the problem space, ways to catalog and determine the measurable aspects
of performance and dependability benchmarks. Along with dimensions, it
is equally important to consider a set of properties that should be satisfied
and verified while conducting experiments for analyzing the performance and
dependability metrics. For our approach, while designing the generic architec-
ture, we considered the same classifications: (1) Categorization, (2) Measure,
and (3) Experimentation, and the same set of validation properties like repre-
sentativeness, portability, reproducibility, scalability, benchmarking time and
cost, etc., which are mostly verified during measure and experimental phase
of the benchmark specifications.
Representativeness reflects how closely workload of the benchmark corre-
sponds to the actual workload of a real system and how well injected faults
resemble the real faults. Repeatability is a property which guarantees sta-
tistically equivalent results when a benchmark is run more than once in the
same environment, whereas reproducibility is the property which guarantees
that another benchmark user obtains statistically equivalent results when the
benchmark is implemented from the same specifications for evaluating the
same system. Portability refers to the usability of the benchmark for various
systems within the same application domain. This feature enables the bench-
mark users to compare different systems, services, protocols and modules. A
benchmark is said to be non-intrusive if it requires minimum changes in the
system under test. Scalability allows benchmark users to test systems of differ-
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ent sizes. For example, in case of BFT protocols, the size of a system changes
depending on the number of faults it can tolerate. A number of nodes required
are 4, 7, 10 for f = 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Benchmark time and cost, is the
time required to receive the results from a benchmark which includes system
setup and preparation time, running experiments, and data monitoring and
analysis.
Categorization
Considered System Byzantine Fault Tolerance 
Protocols
Application Area SLA oriented cloud systems
Benchmark Users Researchers, Developers
Measures
Quantitative Throughput, Response Time, 
Availability, Reliability, Resource 
Utilization
Qualitative Representativeness, Portability, 
Scalability, Reproducibility, Non-
intrusiveness, Benchmarking 
time and cost
Experimental Dimensions
Workload #concurrent clients,
Size of the request message
Faultload Fault type, 
Fault triggger time,
Fault location
Measurements Performance,
Dependability,
Cost,
Resource Utilization
Figure 3.1: Specifications and Validations of a Performance and Dependability
Benchmark
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the performance and dependability benchmark-
ing dimensions for any distributed protocol. In our case, we consider BFT
protocols.
3.2.1 Categorization
Categorization allows us to define the system in consideration (or system
under test) and benchmarking context. It also characterizes benchmarking
context which includes defining benchmark users or performers, and the pur-
pose of building a benchmark tool. Figure 3.1 illustrates these parameters
from the perspective of analyzing and comparing different implementations of
BFT protocols so that the best among all (depending on the performance and
dependability measurements and system requirements) can be integrated into
cloud systems to guarantee QoS metrics.
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Describing the considered system allows us to define the nature of the
system, application area and operating environment. This allows understand-
ing of the system at abstraction and functional layer levels. It enables the
users to perform evaluations of specific measures on key components, func-
tionalities and features. We consider contrasting various BFT protocols and
how their implementations handle faults and maintain their performance and
dependability aspects. Application area and operating environment impact
the selection of measures during experimentation that include types of faults
to be injected. We consider PaaS cloud models which intend to run a BFT
protocol for tolerating up to f Byzantine faults. Thus, we consider the im-
pact of cloud users running/developing an application and using underlining
features of a model. Performance and dependability benchmarking are use-
ful for PaaS cloud providers willing to integrate BFT protocols and aspire
in performing the comparative analysis of available BFT implementations in
the face of physical, design and arbitrary faults. Cloud providers become the
prospective benchmark users performing evaluations to assess the capabilities
and weaker areas of a BFT protocol.
3.2.2 Measures
For any dependability and performance benchmark, it is essential to con-
strue the measures to be assessed under various conditions. Measures allow
the characterization of the system in a qualitative and quantitative manner.
Qualitative measures are defined in terms of features related to capabilities
and properties like representativeness, portability, scalability, reproducibility,
non-intrusiveness, benchmarking time, and cost. Whereas, qualitative mea-
sures include system availability, response time, throughput of the system,
reliability, in the presence of faults. The occurrence of faults in a system leads
to performance degradation, but it is not always true for dependability. The
system may remain available and reliable. Thus, we consider defining per-
formance and dependability measures both under fault-free and faulty condi-
tions. We also define comprehensive measures that include a number of faults
a system is intended to handle, different faulty models, etc.
3.2.3 Experimental Dimensions
Figure 3.2 illustrates the various modules of performance and dependability
architecture with experimental aspects. It also defines system under bench-
marking or system under test which is a targeted system to be evaluated under
various faultloads, workloads for measuring QoS metrics. All these modules
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sure that key features of benchmark validation are satisfied (representative-
ness, portability, easy injection of faults, etc.) For the convenience of bench-
mark users, we generate the faultload file where users just need to input what
fault is to be injected, when (at what time) it is injected and where (location
in the system, for example, node address) it is injected.
3.2.3.2 Workload
The workload is an abstraction of the actual work that an instance or a set of
instances is going to perform. From the practical point of view, the primary
aim of any benchmark is to emulate the real world workloads to examine
the system’s actual behavior in handling it. It represents actual profile of a
considered system. We consider fabricated workload for evaluating the metrics
where we define the number of concurrent clients sending requests in the
system and size of each request/response message. Workload plays a vital role
and makes an impact on performance (with low load, the system maintains its
performance but during high load, performance degrades) and dependability
(with high load, it is possible that system breaks down and is unable to serve
clients’ requests).
3.2.3.3 Measurement
Measurements performed on the target system allow the observation of the
behavior of a system upon injection of workloads and faultloads. The mea-
sures of interest are then obtained from processing these measurements. Basic
measurements include the identification of outcomes of system under bench-
marking/test upon injection of workloads and faultloads. Another important
aspect related to the assessment of the behavior of the system is in the time
domain. For all performance benchmarking, timing related measurements
have formed the basis for evaluating any system. We extend the same for
benchmarking dependability metrics too. For any system under test, we make
the fault-free evaluations as the baseline for comparison with the analysis of
performance and dependability metrics in the presence of faults. Primarily,
we consider the following time-dependent metrics which are measured from
the perspective of a client:
Performance Analysis
• Latency is calculated as the time required by a system to respond to a
job. In other words, it the total time elapsed from the moment a user
submits a request until it receives the corresponding response.
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• Throughput is calculated in terms of a number of client requests (trans-
actions or jobs) executed by the system per unit of time.
Dependability Analysis
• Availability is a measure of time a system is responding to requests of
clients.
• Reliability is the ability of a system to always respond with correct
responses to the client’s requests, during a period of time.
3.3 General Benchmarking Architecture and
Framework for Distributed Protocols
In this part of the chapter, we discuss the various steps required for conduct-
ing the dependability and performance benchmark of a distributed system
or protocol or component and the high-level class architecture of the general
benchmark.
3.3.1 Benchmarking Steps
Benchmarking is achieved in several steps forming a benchmarking scenario. It
consists of three major steps, analysis step, experimental step and assessment
step. The experimental step is further divided into 2 phases; load injection
and statistics monitoring.
Figure 3.3 gives the three steps for performance and dependability bench-
marking and their interrelations.
The analysis step consists of defining the categorization and measure
dimensions for the system under test. This step can also be expressed as a
load generation step as benchmark users generate workloads and faultloads.
Before the target system is initialized, benchmark users can define system
configuration parameters which require basic information such as a number
of clients sending the request (in the beginning) and fault type (a system is
initiated under fault-free conditions). They also characterize the faultload
parameters where they define what fault is injected, where it is injected and
when it is injected into the target distributed system. Once the loads are
defined, it enters into the second step of benchmarking.
The experimentation step pertains to carry out the experimental part
of the benchmark, i.e., injecting the workload and faultload, and collecting
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Figure 3.3: Benchmarking steps for performance and dependability bench-
marking
statistical monitoring reports via output files, log files and SAR generated
files as the results of system execution.
1. Load Injection Phase: Experimentation is tightly related to the target
system, defined workload and faultload during the analysis step. Work-
load injector instantiates a concurrent number of clients as defined in the
workload to stress test the system under benchmarking whereas fault-
load injector triggers the type of fault at the specified time at a given
location (node).
2. Similarly, Statistics Monitoring Phase: measurements and monitoring
is tightly related to the target system accessibility and important mod-
ules. This phase specifies the kind of outputs to be produced during the
experimentation to assess the performance and dependability metrics.
Every experiment runs for a warm up period and then an execution period.
Warm up period gives enough time to the system to stabilize before the statis-
tics monitor starts collecting the data. During the warm up phase, system runs
on the basis of the configuration parameters and no workloads and faultloads
are injected. Once the experiment reaches the execution period, workload and
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faultload are initiated and triggered at the time mentioned in the parameters
which are in accordance with the beginning of the execution period. Actual
statistics are collected during execution phase for future analysis. Benchmark
user can define the time until which the experiments run. Once the execu-
tion ends, the system collects the SAR reports, output and log files to further
analysis to determine the performance and dependability benchmarking.
The last step, i.e. assessment step analyzes various reports from the
previous step and computes throughput, latency, availability and reliability of
the system under test. During this phase, we also measure resource utilization
in terms of CPU usage, network bandwidth consumption and some low-level
statistics like number of rejected requests, the number of times a request
was re-transmitted, etc. These results can be easily presented in the form
of graphs, pie charts, line diagrams for better comparison and analysis with
other competing target systems.
3.3.2 High-level class Diagram of Performance and De-
pendability Benchmark Architecture
Figure 3.4 illustrates the classes, methods and some of the member variables
of the general architecture presented in Figure 3.2. Most of the modules of
high level class diagram are generic and do not need any additional imple-
mentations (features wise) before integrating a new target system. However,
implementations of some classes like SystemUnderBenchmarking, faultload,
workload, and request are system dependent and require additional imple-
mentation. Considering faultload, it makes sense to inject a type of fault on
one system but may not hold the same significance when injected in another
target system. Classes such as FaultInjector, workloadInjector and Orches-
trator are independent of any system and require no modifications and can be
used as plug and play modules.
We now describe each of these classes and some of their associated methods
at implementation level.
1. Faultload. This class considers fault parameters from class fault and
generates a faultload to be injected into the system under test. Fault
describes the specifications related to the fault to be injected. It defines
the type of fault, time at which it is triggered in the system and where in
the target system (location of the fault). All the faults are user-defined.
2. FaultloadInjector. This class includes a method that injects a fault
in the target system. It also consists of onEvent methods which trigger
when it is the time for injecting a fault depending on the elapsed warm
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up and execution time. This class, thus, monitors experimental specified
times for injecting a fault accordingly.
3. Workload. This class consists of the methods to setup the initial target
system for benchmarking. For measuring the dependability of any sys-
tem (BFT protocols in our case), its needs to be instantiated. Methods
of workload class consider input data (request from the users), number
of nodes in the system that runs a distributed protocol, etc. Request
class considers the request message and its size, whereas setup class ac-
counts for total number of clients sending requests (initial), number of
faults target system must handle and the number of nodes running the
protocol.
4. WorkloadInjector. This class creates the number of concurrent clients
(emulation of real world system users) waiting for their requests to be
served. But the clients are allowed to send requests only in FIFO order,
where a client sends a request and waits for a response before sending
another request. Each client is given a fair chance to send their requests,
sending their requests in a round-robin fashion.
5. SystemConfiguration. This class includes the methods that are re-
sponsible for preparing the target system under test. It consists of meth-
ods to select one out all the competing distributed protocols (solving the
same problem), install them on the distributed cloud network (it can be
public, private, hybrid or any local setting as described in Section 1.1),
destroy the setup once the experimentation is over and finally, respon-
sible to distribute requests (coming from the clients) in the FIFO order.
6. SystemUnderBenchmarking. This class is actually responsible for
injecting faultloads and workloads depending on the parameters pro-
vided by the faultload and workload injector classes, respectively. This
class contains methods which identifies the complete system, consider-
ing the locations of the nodes, topological arrangements of these nodes
in the system, their properties, like whether it is a primary node or a
backup node. It is important and necessary as benchmark users might
want to inject a fault in a particular node. For example, failing of a
primary node (master node) in a protocol impacts the performance and
dependability of a system in a much critical way than the failing of a
backup node (slave node). Also, this class is responsible for starting
and stopping the nodes once an experiment starts or ends. It also in-
cludes methods that provide statistics such as SAR (System Activity
Reporting) reports generated at each node in the system.
78
Chapter 3. A General Architecture for Performance and
Dependability Benchmarking of BFT Protocols
7. Measurements. This class has methods to compute statistics depend-
ing on the information gathered from SystemUnderBenchmarking class.
It includes methods that compute latency (depending on the send and
receipt of the request and its corresponding response), throughput (de-
pending on the total number of successful requests served by the system),
availability (depending on the time the system is responding which in-
cludes correct or incorrect responses) and reliability (depends on the
number of correct responses by the system before it breaks down due to
any arbitrary fault). It also measures the resource utilization depending
on the usage of CPU and network bandwidth. This class computes some
other low-level statistics related to the total number of re-transmissions
of a request, etc.
8. Orchestrator. This class is the backbone of all the classes commu-
nicating with others and is responsible for providing data between the
classes. This class basically orchestrates the whole system from starting
until the end of the evaluation considering the parameters, configura-
tions, and experimental results from/to the benchmark users.
3.3.3 Overview of Communication Primitives Opera-
tion by Orchestrator
As seen in the above sections, orchestrator is the main component of the
benchmark and its primary goal is to provide the orchestration among all the
modules, for communication, data exchange and result analysis. It communi-
cates directly with the benchmark users, enabling them to prepare the target
system for evaluations and comparisons. The interaction between orchestrator
and a target system is built on top of two communication primitives, namely
injectFaultAction and StatNotification.
Figure 3.5 demonstrates the communication using these primitives.
InjectFaultAction.
The main responsibility of InjectFaultAction is to inject faults according to the
specifications provided by the orchestrator, determined from the parameters
defined by the benchmark users. InjectFaultAction uses the necessary network
infrastructure information to inject a fault in the specific node.
StatNotificationAction.
Orchestrator uses send and receive procedures for sending a request and re-
ceiving a response from the system under test and performs measurements
as per the collected statistics. StatNotificationAction communication primi-
tive is mainly responsible for sending the status report of all the nodes in the
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Figure 3.5: Communication Primitives Overview at Orchestrator
system. This enables the orchestrator to determine if the fault was correctly
injected at the right location or not, and is the fault performing the right
actions it is supposed to execute. This also allows the benchmark users to
test the system with corner cases and various malicious faults.
Orchestrator send and receives messages in a synchronous manner from
the manager in the target system (mechanism explained in details in the
next section) and performs analysis of performance and dependability met-
rics. Orchestrator monitors the warm up and execution time and once its
the time for triggering the fault, orchestrator calls InjectFaultAction. Man-
ager of target system sends StatNotificationAction to the orchestrator in an
synchronous manner notifying about the injection of the fault and its impact
through statistics reporting.
3.4 BFT-Bench: Case Study of Benchmark-
ing BFT Protocols
In this section, we illustrate a case study of implementing performance and de-
pendability benchmark for BFT protocols called BFT-Bench using the generic
benchmark architecture proposed in the previous section. This section not
only presents the guidelines to integrate multiple implementations of BFT
protocol but also demonstrates how easy it gets to design a benchmark frame-
work using a general architecture. We have considered three BFT protocols
for our case study, namely, PBFT [30], Chain [56] and RBFT [18]. We have
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briefly explained them in Chapter 2 demonstrating the communication pat-
tern. They are presented again in Chapter 4 from the perspective of fault in-
jection and fault handling mechanisms. As discussed previously, performance
and dependability benchmark must achieve some specification and validation
key features:
1. Providing a clear definition of System Under Benchmark (SUB) or Sys-
tem Under Test (SUT).
2. It should define the qualitative and quantitative measures.
3. Considering the experimental dimensions, it should characterize different
faultload and workload possible for the testing the SUBs and means to
inject them.
4. Benchmark must describe measurements to be performed such as through-
put, latency, availability, reliability, cost, etc.
BFT-Bench framework measures performance and dependability of the
various BFT protocols in presence of arbitrary faults, primarily considering
replica crash (a node completely halts and makes no progress), intentional
message delay (node starts to delay sending of messages to intentionally in-
crease the response time), network flooding (node sends malicious/corrupt
messages to flood the network) and system overloading (demonstrates the
maximum workload a system can handle and its impact on performance and
dependability metrics, before breaking down).
3.4.1 Faultload Dimensions
A faultload file in BFT-Bench framework describes the type of fault to be
injected, time at which it is to be injected, and the location in the system
where it is injected. All the BFT protocols are meant to handle any arbitrary
fault. But considerably less effort has been made to analyze the performance
and dependability of the implementations of these BFT protocols in the face of
various real world fault scenarios. Due to this, BFT protocols still encounter
reluctance in adoption by practitioners. Therefore, BFT-Bench provides a
mean to inject arbitrary faults in the BFT system and analyze the system
behavior in terms of performance and dependability attributes. We consider
injection of three types of Byzantine faults:
Replica Crash. In this fault, a node crashes and completely stops mak-
ing a progress. When a primary node crashes, backup nodes stop receiving
messages from primary and undergoes a view change protocol to elect a new
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primary node. Whereas, when a backup replica crash, the system still contin-
ues and does not need a view change protocol. All the nodes can still reach a
consensus and commit to the client’s request. In BFT-Bench benchmark, we
consider failing of primary as it has a higher impact on the performance and
dependability than the crash of backup nodes.
Message Delay. In this fault, any node can start to delay the messages it
is suppose to send to other nodes. But we select primary to delay a certain
message (due to its high impact on performance) by a period of time, which
is sufficient enough to hurt the performance of the system, but inadequate to
detect the faulty primary and trigger a view change protocol to replace it.
Network Flooding. In this fault, node starts to send corrupt malicious
messages to flood the network of correct nodes, with an intention of wasting
their computational resources in validation corrupt messages. Some BFT
protocols apply flood adaptive mechanisms to deal with such a behavior while
some do not.
Figure 3.6 illustrates an example of a faultload for a replica crash.
// faultload 
// Replica Crash
Line 1: <fault trigger time, fault type, {fault loc}>
Figure 3.6: An example of faultload descriptor
3.4.2 Workload Dimensions
A workload file describes the number of clients sending the requests con-
currently and the request size. We have considered request size as one of
the key parameters (higher the size of the request, higher is the time taken
by the nodes to perform cryptographic verification and validations). The
BFT-Bench framework considers fault type system overloading which is purely
workload dependent.
System Overloading. In this fault, we do not inject any Byzantine fault,
rather we inject a heavy workload (in terms of the number of concurrent
clients sending requests), which some BFT protocol implementations are able
to sustain while others succumb to the breakdown of the system.
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3.4.3 Measurement Analysis
BFT-Bench is used to measure the performance and/or dependability of BFT
protocols using various faultloads and workloads defined above. Framework
produces runtime statistics for performance, namely, throughput and latency,
and dependability, namely, availability and reliability. It also produces statis-
tics related to resource utilization in terms of CPU usage and network band-
width consumption. Some low-level statistics such as total number of request
re-transmissions, and number of failed vs successful jobs (although all the
BFT protocols should result in successful responses to maintain Safety and
Liveness properties (discussed in Chapter 2 under Section 2.2.1).
3.4.4 Potential Benchmark Users
With the growing dependency on cloud systems for different types of service,
namely, infrastructure, platform, application, it becomes equally important
for these services to be reliable, efficient, available, performing and safe. As
seen until now, these performance and dependability metrics are questionable
when the cloud systems encounter arbitrary faults. QoS parameters cannot be
guaranteed, leading to huge loss and trust of cloud users. Considering the sit-
uation, BFT protocols have a bright future as they intend to handle arbitrary
faults. But, it is fairly critical to test the BFT protocols to build confidence
that they are capable of handling various real world faulty scenarios. The
BFT-Bench framework is proposed to solve the problem of benchmarking the
BFT protocols in the presence of different fault models and analyze their
performance and dependability metrics. The users of BFT-Bench can be:
1. End users (distributed system, cloud providers) intending to use BFT
protocols for their systems.
2. End users willing to compare different available BFT prototypes in the
presence of arbitrary faults.
3. Researchers and developers design robust BFT protocols for constant
performance during the presence of faults, as it was when there were no
faults.
4. Researchers contemplating different implementations to modify the soft-
ware design of the algorithm to integrate robust mechanisms.
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3.5 Benefits of General Architecture
In this section, we point out some of the key features and benefits of the
proposed generic benchmark architecture in the previous section and how it
reduces the cost and effort of the researchers and users, benchmarking a dis-
tributed protocol. We consider the parameters that define the characteristics
of a software depending on operational, transitional and maintenance grounds
that include software development cost, extensibility, reusability, and testa-
bility.
3.5.1 Reduction in Software Development Cost
Cost is measured in terms of time required to develop a dependability and
performance benchmark which is primarily determined by the coding effort.
Considering the generic architecture proposed in the previous section (see
Section 3.3), we consider the cost of development and reuse of the compo-
nents. There are some parts of the benchmark which are system dependent
like faultload and workload. For any new fault type, it requires changes in
the faultload, fault injector and corresponding change in the system under
test. Similarly, for workload. Cost of development, thus, considers the effort
required to introduce and test different types of faults. In case of BFT-Bench,
the only effort required (in terms of implementation) was implementing addi-
tional methods/messages to recognize injection of faults at replica and client
side.
3.5.2 Extensibility
This characteristic measures, how easy it is to add a new functionality; a good
software design is likely to provide high extensibility. Higher the extensibility,
lesser the time it requires to add a new functionality as changes in the current
code are minimum. This means that system is adaptable and modular enough
to incorporate new changes without leading to regressions. In the generic
architecture for a benchmark, it is not difficult to integrate new fault models
as it will only require some modifications in the code of the target system to
allow fault injections. Faultload and fault injector are flexible and adaptable
and require minimal code changes, if required. It also depends highly on
modularity of the design.
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3.5.3 Reusability
This characteristic measures how different units of logic of a benchmark are
separated so that when a change is necessary, it is only performed in one place
in the current code. Higher the modularity, easier is to integrate more features.
Benchmark architecture design is quite modular where the functionality of
each component does not coincides with each other and they demonstrate low
coupling. Components are reusable with minimal code change effort.
3.5.4 Testability
This characteristic measures how much automation and coverage, the code
tests have. This not only covers unit testing, but integration testing, and
injection of different faults and workloads in the system. It gives more liberty
to the benchmark users to perform analysis and measurements under different
scenarios and extend the evaluation to analysis of other QoS metrics, such as
cost, security, and scalability.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced the generic architecture for building perfor-
mance and dependability benchmarks for distributed systems. We presented
the essential building blocks (components or modules) for developing a new
benchmark. They consist of (i) module for defining and injecting various work-
loads and fault models, (ii) component to automatically deploy system under
test and launch experiments, and (iii) module to measure and analyze perfor-
mance and dependability attributes (adapted to incorporate other QoS met-
rics). We believe, for any benchmark (generic or specific), it is necessary for
it to follow design guidelines and provide the following. First, it must provide
end-users an easy way to define and inject various workloads and faultloads,
encompassing different fault models and load conditions. This would also
users to effectively analyze system’s behavior under diverse settings. Second,
the benchmark must provide mechanisms to empirically evaluate various QoS
parameters with easy adaptability (to add more), for example, performance,
dependability, security and cost. Finally, it must be easy to use, portable on
a wide range of platforms, systems and cloud infrastructures.
This chapter also presents some details to use the generic architecture
for building BFT-Bench (discussed at length in the subsequent chapter) to
benchmark BFT protocols under various Byzantine fault models.
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Recently BFT protocols have gained popularity due to frequent occur-
rences of Byzantine faults causing high performance degradation and un-
availability of cloud systems. Constant enhancements have been proposed
to state-of-the-art BFT protocols with focuses on improving the performance
in fault-free scenarios (see Section 2.4.2) while some minimizing performance
degradation in faulty cases (see Section 2.4.3).
Considerably less progress has been made to analyze the robustness and
effectiveness of BFT protocols under real world conditions where nodes can
demonstrate arbitrary/malicious behaviors. Our comprehensive study in pre-
vious chapters motivated us to design BFT-Bench framework, the first perfor-
mance and dependability benchmark tool for evaluating BFT protocols under
identical settings.
The contributions of this chapter are as follows:
• We present BFT-Bench, a framework to evaluate the performance and
dependability metrics of BFT protocols in the face to real world faulty
and non-faulty scenarios to enable the researchers and developers ana-
lyze their effectiveness and robustness in practice.
• We describe the design principles of BFT-Bench framework which in-
cludes automatic deployment of experiments on cloud clusters (public,
private or a local configuration), selection of BFT protocol under assess-
ment, definition and injection of faultloads and workloads, and monitor-
ing of QoS metrics using generated output and log files.
• Lastly, we discuss the portability and usability of BFT-Benchto incorpo-
rate new fault models and other BFT protocols. Although the current
BFT-Bench prototype includes integration of three BFT protocols, but
it can be easily extended to incorporate other BFT implementations.
Section 4.7 describes the portability aspects of BFT-Bench framework.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 provides the brief outline
of the BFT systems. Section 4.2 discusses objectives of BFT-Bench. Sec-
tion 4.3 provides the design principles describing BFT protocols and fault
types in consideration for performing comparative analysis using BFT-Bench
framework. Section 4.4 presents the overview of BFT-Bench. Sections 4.5 and
4.6 respectively describe the automatic deployment of experiments and how
end-users can use BFT-Bench framework for evaluating their BFT protocols
and conduct measurement analysis. Section 4.7 demonstrates the portability
of BFT-Bench which makes it easier to integrate other BFT protocols. Finally,
Section 4.8 presents the summary of the contributions of this chapter.
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4.1 Background
Distributed systems must handle arbitrary malfunctioning, deceptive com-
puter components misleading other parts of the system with incorrect infor-
mation, hardware failures, and operator mistakes. These malicious behaviors
are termed as Byzantine (arbitrary) faults where a server can produce an in-
correct response to a client’s request, sends corrupt messages, disobeys the
ordering of the requests, etc. BFT protocols are used to maintain a resiliency
against such Byzantine behaviors. A BFT protocol manages the communi-
cation among the nodes and clients in the presence of partial synchrony [51]
to identify a malicious behavior in the system. However, the BFT protocols
often suffers from multiple orders of magnitude reductions in performance and
systems become unavailable for a long duration in the presence of Byzantine
behaviors, violating the SLA contracts. This makes it difficult for the system
programmers to trust and adopt BFT protocols for building a fault tolerant
cloud system without worrying about the complex nature of BFT protocols.
System developers intend to know the answers to many questions before
trusting and incorporating a BFT protocol in their underlying systems. They
demand responses on effectiveness, robustness, performance and dependability
aspects of the protocols in presence of Byzantine behaviors. They need to
know what kind of faults a system can tolerate? Can it really handle malicious
faults, including common faults like crash and complex faults like intentional
message delay by a node? What is the maximum number of faults a system
can handle before breaking down? What is the maximum workload a system
can endure? And is it possible to test different BFT implementations under
same settings and perform a comparative analysis to select the most efficient
and most reliable for the required cloud system. Therefore, it is not only
important but necessary to develop a generalized, high-level, easy to use,
performance and dependability benchmarking framework for analyzing BFT
implementations with mechanisms to define and inject various workloads and
faultloads.
All the BFT protocols consist of a primary/head node and backup replicas.
Users of cloud clusters (using BFT protocols) submit their jobs to the primary
node which is responsible for ordering/scheduling the client’s requests. The
other replicas undergo agreement (by message exchanges among themselves)
and commit phases before executing the ordered requests. By default, all
the requests are scheduled in FIFO order. Under fault free conditions, all
the replicas execute the incoming requests and share their state with other
replicas to maintain consistency. Once a request is executed, replicas send
back the responses to the client. Client upon receiving consistent matching
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responses from all the replicas, client commits the request. In case of faulty
scenarios, replicas go through a view change to maintain a correct primary for
correct ordering, consistency and Liveness of the system. Replicas and clients
maintain history logs and share them periodically for failure recoveries.
4.2 Objectives of BFT-Bench
In this section we define the objectives of BFT-Bench framework.
• QoS Metrics Analysis: BFT-Bench assesses and evaluates perfor-
mance and dependability aspects of the implementations of BFT proto-
cols. We consider latency (or response time) and throughput for measur-
ing the performance, reliability and availability for evaluating depend-
ability. We determine the cost of using the BFT-SMR techniques by
cloud services in terms of the number of replicas used by a BFT protocol
for handling Byzantine faults. We also consider low-level statistics like
network bandwidth and CPU utilization, the number of re-transmissions
of a request, failed vs successful jobs, etc.
• Heterogeneous Parameters for Evaluation: BFT-Bench character-
izes various types of loads such as faultload and workload for evaluating
different BFT implementations. Precisely, faultload is defined by type of
fault to be injected, time at which the fault will be triggered and location
(replica in the cluster) where the fault will be induced. For each type
of fault, there are few related parameters which complete a faultload.
Similarly, workload is characterized by the number of concurrent clients
(i.e., the users of the system) and size of the request message send by
each client.
• Usability: BFT-Bench is an easy to use framework where configuration,
deployment of experiments and analysis of results are automated. It is
independent of any cloud infrastructure; thus, can be deployed on public,
private, hybrid or any local cloud configurations. Statistics monitoring
of experimental evaluation can easily be comprehended with the smooth
generation of graphs and charts.
The intention of BFT-Bench framework is to enable researchers and de-
velopers working on cloud systems to understand and evaluate BFT protocols
by injecting various faulty scenarios commonly occurring (affecting) in a real
world cloud environment under different and varying workloads.
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4.3 Design Principles of BFT-Bench Frame-
work
BFT-Bench is intended to be an open framework, that includes BFT protocol
prototypes, and that may include new BFT protocols. This chapter defines
the system model of BFT-Bench framework where we consider different types
of BFT protocols for evaluation and different types of faults injected in the
system to emulate the real world settings. We describe the assumptions made
at the system level for nodes and the network, and Byzantine failure model
considered for a Byzantine environment. This section provides a brief overview
of the protocols considered for performance evaluation and finally we introduce
different types of faulty behaviors used in BFT-Bench.
4.3.1 BFT Protocols in Consideration
In the rest of this manuscript, we consider the following state-of-the-art BFT
protocols: (i) PBFT for being the first practical BFT protocol [30], (ii) Chain
for its performance efficiency in fault-free conditions [56], and (iii) RBFT as
an instance of robust protocols that minimizes performance degradation in
presence of failures [18]. For an effective comparative analysis of these BFT
protocols, we consider the same system assumptions for all. We assume a
distributed system where N servers/replicas1 are connected in a specific net-
work topology, for example, PBFT [30] and RBFT [18] are fully connected
whereas Chain [104] connects the replicas in a chain-like pattern (a replica
followed by another). The system is defined as a set of clients and servers
where a client sends a request in a closed loop, i.e., a client has to wait for
the response of a request before sending a new request. We assume a finite
client population where any number of them may be faulty, and at most N−1
3
replicas can behave maliciously. The links between nodes are asynchronous
and unreliable with synchronous intervals during which messages are deliv-
ered within a known bounded delay. We do, nevertheless, assume that if a
node keeps re-transmitting a message, the message will eventually be received
(partial synchrony [51]). However, the Liveness property can only be ensured
during periods of synchrony [53].
4.3.1.1 PBFT: A Practical BFT Protocol
PBFT [30] is considered the baseline of BFT protocols and its communication
pattern is used by many protocols such as Aardvark [36], RBFT [18], Spin-
1We will use the terms server, node or replica alternatively throughout this paper.
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ning [105], Prime [15] and BFTSMaRt [24]. The communication pattern of
PBFT is presented in Figure 2.4. The protocol ensures Liveness and Safety
properties as long as there are no more than f faulty nodes. In order to
maintain Safety, the primary must first assign a sequence number to each in-
coming request during the pre-prepare step. The two following steps, prepare
and commit, are dedicated to the exchange and validation of the sequence
numbers proposed by the primary. Liveness is ensured by detecting whether
the primary performs the correct ordering or not, within a dedicated time. If
Liveness becomes challenged, a view change is triggered accordingly, implying
that a new replica will replace the current primary. This view change mecha-
nism is essential for all BFT protocols relying on a primary for the ordering,
but could imply some conceptual variations depending on the underlying pro-
tocols [74].
Additional detail 1: In PBFT, the communication pattern is not affected by
the actual presence or absence of faulty nodes.
Additional detail 2: Even if PBFT is strong enough to ensure Liveness and
Safety in the presence of attacks, some Byzantine behaviors can substantially
decrease its performance. For instance the pre-prepare delay attack, which
has been the focus of several protocol proposals [18, 36, 105].
4.3.1.2 Chain: Performance Enhancement in Fault Free Condi-
tions
Chain [56] is designed to handle a high load of requests. It is dedicated towards
improving throughput in fault-free settings, while maintaining the ability to
detect inconsistencies. As the name suggests, it has a chain-like communi-
cation pattern that greatly benefits from the batch optimization (multiple
messages in one batch to avoid expensive authentication computations for ev-
ery single message) because unlike PBFT, the head of the chain does not send
the ordered requests to all the replicas but only to its successor, and does
not need to be authenticated by everyone. This greatly reduces the number
of authentications at the bottleneck replica. Chain is most efficient when it
is completely fed, i.e., when the network link between any 2 servers is fully
loaded [56]. This can be done by employing a large set of clients sending
a large number of requests. Thus, Chain gracefully handles a high load of
requests. Chain improves the throughput in fault-free settings among other
protocols from Group 1 (see Section 2.4.2), while maintaining the ability to de-
tect inconsistencies. But Chain is unable to ensure Byzantine fault tolerance
by itself, and must rely on a protocol switching mechanism when subject to
failures. The switching mechanism is activated when Chain cannot continue
to make a progress upon detecting Byzantine failures. Although the switching
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mechanism has been proposed theoretically, its prototype lacks switching to
PBFT in the presence of faults.
4.3.1.3 RBFT: Minimizes Performance Degradation in Presence of
Faults
Even though PBFT is theoretically strong enough to ensure Liveness and
Safety in the presence of attacks, some Byzantine behaviors substantially de-
crease its performance when evaluated practically [18]. For instance, delay
attack where a primary intentionally delays the sending of pre-prepare mes-
sage to other replicas to increase the latency of the system, has been the focus
of several protocol proposals including RBFT [18, 36, 105]. Redundant-BFT
(RBFT) [18] strengthens the architecture of PBFT and also incorporates fault
adaptive mechanisms to deal with certain faulty behaviors. Figure 2.15 illus-
trates the communication pattern of the protocol. Like other protocols, RBFT
requires 3f+1 replicas and relies on a primary replica for ordering the client’s
requests. RBFT runs f + 1 multiple instances of the same protocol in paral-
lel, but the requests are executed only by one of the instances called master
instance while other f instances are called backup instances. Each backup
instance has its own primary which orders the incoming requests in order to
monitor the difference of throughput between the master instance and itself.
If the performance at master and backup instances differ by a definite thresh-
old2 T at less than 2f + 1 replicas, the primary replica at master instance
is considered faulty and a view change is triggered, where a new primary is
elected at every instance. RBFT further implements few fault adaptive de-
fensive pathways for handling faulty behaviors of both clients and replicas.
RBFT exploits the multicore architectures of today’s world machines to run
multiple instances in parallel for efficiency and robustness.
We selected RBFT as it shows improvements over Aardvark, Prime and Spin-
ning. Although Aardvark was the first to test BFT implementations under
faulty scenarios, but it considered fewer cases than RBFT. Spinning and Prime
were also evaluated under some fault types (see Table 2.3). RBFT the most
robust protocol, not only evaluated the prototype under maximum fault sce-
narios, but also demonstrated that the performance degrades only up to 3%
in the presence of faults.
2The value of threshold depends on the ratio of observed throughput between fault-free
conditions to the throughput observed under attack
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4.3.2 Fault Types in Consideration
We assume a Byzantine failure model, in which any node (replica) or client
can behave arbitrarily. The network itself may fail to deliver messages, delay
them, duplicate them, delay them out of order, or even corrupt them. A ma-
licious node can perform these behaviors intentionally. We assume a strong
adversary that can manipulate and coordinate these malicious nodes to com-
promise the replicated service. However, we do assume that this adversary is
computationally bounded and unable to break cryptographic techniques like
collision-resistant hashing, digests, Message Authentication Codes (MACs),
encryptions and digital signatures. Apart from the above assumptions for
Byzantine model, we define different types of faults injected for evaluating
the BFT prototypes using the BFT-Bench framework.
The performance of the prototypes for these state-of-the-art protocols (see
Section 4.3.1) is greatly affected by the faulty behaviors [18, 30, 36]. There-
fore, it becomes extremely critical to analyze the performance and resiliency
of BFT implementations in real world faulty settings. We characterize four
types of faults from the perspective of software and hardware components,
out of many feasible faults (few were listed in Section 2.3.2). Some intentional
malicious behaviors like message delay, network flooding make it challenging
to identify a faulty network from a misbehaving server. And this often leads
to an incorrect diagnosis of the fault and becomes critical to preserve system’s
performance, integrity, and availability in times of such Byzantine faults. To
imitate these Byzantine behaviors, replicas are made to drift from the cor-
rect protocol expectations. Hardware faults include unpredictable events like
power outage which eventually results in a crash. Software faults, for exam-
ple, can be related to the addition of a delay before forwarding messages, or
flooding a system with corrupted information.
4.3.2.1 Replica Crash
Crash of a server is a common performance failure that can happen in a sys-
tem. Upon a crash, the server stops completely and do not participates in
any further communication with the clients or the servers. Most of the indus-
tries like Salesforce, Amazon, Oracle, etc., rely on Paxos [77, 78] for handling
crash. But during the occurrence of Byzantine faults, they face challenges of
disrupted availability. BFT protocols consider crash as yet another Byzantine
fault.
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4.3.2.2 Message Delay
Delaying the sending of messages benefits from the difficulty to distinguish a
faulty replica from a slow network. When a replica starts to delay messages, it
slows down all future operations depending on these messages. As described
in Section 2.4, most of the BFT protocols ensure Safety property by reaching
an agreement on the total order of execution of the requests. If the messages
containing these information are delayed, then the whole protocol is delayed,
leading to performance degradation. This Byzantine behavior is especially
critical when it occurs at the primary replica.
4.3.2.3 Network Flooding
Network flooding is meant to overload both the network and the computa-
tional resources with malicious messages which cannot be said invalid until
verified. This message verification consumes a lot of computational cycles and
prevents the resources from focusing on the correct messages.
4.3.2.4 System Overloading
Overloading the system with a large number of requests sent by many concur-
rent clients can prove to be catastrophic and can degrade the performance to
a large extent. Although none of the servers behave maliciously in this attack,
but continuous increase in the number of clients can eventually deteriorate the
performance or lead to system failure.
4.4 Overview of BFT-Bench
We present BFT-Bench, a novel framework that allows empirical evaluation
and comparison of state-of-the-art and new BFT systems. Figure 4.1 described
the major components of BFT-Bench, such as: (i) Cluster setup component
allows users to prepare the cluster for launching BFT protocols and perform
experiments. (ii) BFT protocol selector launches the BFT implementation
on the required number of nodes. (iii) Fault Injection that triggers the fault
scenarios in the underlying BFT system; (v) Load Injection that injects the
number of concurrent clients accessing the underlying system; and (v) Statis-
tics Monitoring that collects monitoring information, and reports performance
and dependability statistics of the system. BFT-Bench is a testbed to evalu-
ate performance and dependability of BFT systems. In this section we define
the building blocks of BFT-Bench framework in details.

96
Chapter 4. BFT-Bench: Performance and Dependability
Benchmarking Framework for BFT Protocols
4.4.2 BFT Protocol Selection
BFT protocol selector launches the prototype of the BFT protocol consid-
ered for evaluation on the required number of nodes (nodes designated in the
previous step). For evaluating the working of BFT-Bench, we consider three
BFT protocols, PBFT, Chain and RBFT (defined previously in this chapter)
but can be easily extended and adopted for other BFT prototypes. In case of
node failures or crash faults, it relaunches the prototypes once a new experi-
ment commences. Protocol selector takes care of the protocol switching and
its installation. BFT-Bench framework launches only one protocol at a time.
4.4.3 Faultload
Faults can occur accidentally or can be induced intentionally. To test the
practical implementations of BFT protocols in faulty environments, we delib-
erately trigger our faults at a fixed time. We thus do not consider accidental
failures. Users of BFT-Bench framework can generate synthetic faultloads in-
volving different faulty behaviors. Figure 4.2 presents the structures of fault-
loads for different fault types considered individually or in combinations (see
Section 4.3.2) where each line (line numbers) corresponds to one type of fault.
Each faultload contains various information which we describe below.
4.4.3.1 Fault Trigger Time
The fault trigger time contains the time at which the fault must be triggered.
It is the time to be elapsed from the time the experiment is launched.
4.4.3.2 Fault Type
Byzantine faults encompass numerous faulty behaviors. Nevertheless, we keep
our focus on the four faults (mentioned in Section 4.3.2), where each one
is designated with a specific keywords replica crash, message delay, network
flooding and, system overloading, respectively. We also consider the combi-
nation of these faults, such as message delay with system overloading. This
would mean injection of message delay fault when the number of concurrent
clients in the system is increasing.
4.4.3.3 Fault Parameters
Different faults may require additional fault parameters at the time of fault
injection. According to the type of fault to be injected, fault parameters
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// faultload 
// Replica Crash
Line 1: <fault trigger time, fault type, {fault loc}>
//Message Delay
Line 2: <fault trigger time, fault type, {fault loc, delay time, message type}>
//Network Flooding
Line 3: <fault trigger time, fault type, {fault loc, message size}>
//System Overloading
Line 4: <fault trigger time1 , fault type, {#clients1 }>
  <fault trigger time2 , fault type, {#clients2 }>
.
.
.
  <fault trigger timeN , fault type, {#clientsN }>
//Combination of 2 types of faults
Line 5: <fault trigger time1 , fault type, {#clients1  }>
  <fault trigger time2 , fault type, {fault loc, delay time, message type}>
  <fault trigger time3 , fault type, {#clients3 }>
.
.
.
<fault trigger timeN , fault type, {#clientsN }>
Figure 4.2: Faultloads for different types of faults considered in Section 4.3.2
might vary. For replica crash, message delay & network flooding, the location
of the fault must be specified, whereas in system overloading, the location is
irrelevant since no replica acts faulty. For network flooding, the size of the
corrupted messages is an important factor, as larger the size of the messages,
larger will be the time consumed during cryptographic operations. For mes-
sage delay, the value of the delay introduced before sending a message by the
faulty replica, must be specified.
These fault parameters have a huge impact on the performance and depend-
ability of the whole system. We now briefly define the fault parameters we
considered for injecting the four different types of faults.
1. fault loc: It defines the replica at which the fault will be triggered. This
parameter is required for replica crash to know which replica will crash,
for message delay to know which replica will start delaying the messages
and for network flooding to know which replica will send corrupt mes-
sages in an effort to degrade the performance by increasing network and
CPU utilization at correct replicas.
2. delay time : It defines the time by which a replica delays the sending of
messages to the other replicas. This parameter is required by message
delay.
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3. message type : It defines the type of the message that will be delayed
by delay time before being sent to the other replicas. This parameter is
used by message delay.
4. message size : It is the size of the invalid/corrupt messages send by a
faulty replica to correct/non-faulty replicas when causing network flood-
ing. This parameter is used by network flooding fault type. Larger the
size of the message, higher is the impact on performance.
5. #clients: It defines the number of concurrent clients sending their
requests to the servers. We define this parameter only in case of system
overloading.
4.4.4 Workload
BFT-Bench allows users to determine the impact of varying workload on per-
formance and dependability aspects in the presence or absence of a Byzantine
fault. The workload is characterized by the number concurrent clients issu-
ing requests to the cloud service and also the size of each request message.
Following are the parameters of a workload.
4.4.4.1 Concurrent Clients
It is the number of clients sending requests to the BFT system. Client requests
are executed in FIFO order in a closed loop, where a client submits a request,
waits for the request to get processed and receives a response, before sending
another request.
4.4.4.2 Message Size
It is the size of the client request/response messages exchanged with the BFT
system. It is an important parameter as large size messages affect BFT system
performance, due to time-consuming cryptographic operations executed by
BFT protocols. BFT-Bench includes a client emulator implementing multi-
client behavior, where each client process sends requests to the underlying
BFT system, and receives corresponding responses.
4.4.5 Fault Injection
The overall architecture of fault injection in BFT-Bench is described in Figure
4.3. The cluster runs BFT protocols on N +1 nodes, where N = 3f +1 nodes
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are dedicated to replicas, and one node hosts concurrent clients. We run
the fault injector in another node in the same cluster. Faultload injector uses
faultload (see Section 4.3.2) to determine which type of fault is to be triggered
from fault type, at what time this fault will be injected from fault trigger time,
and other required fault parameters (Section 4.4.3.3). The fault injector runs
a daemon that communicates directly with the replicas to trigger faults. For
instance, in case of replica crash, the daemon waits until the fault trigger time
is reached, then calls the fault injector of fault type which interacts with the
replica defined in fault location to trigger the fault. Practically, once a fault
is injected, it persists until the end of the experiment. In the absence of a
faultload, the fault injector lets the system run in fault-free settings. Some
modifications are enforced in the BFT implementations to enable them to
interact with the fault injector daemon.
In the following, we describe for each fault type introduced in Section 4.3.2,
how BFT-Bench implements its injection in a BFT system.
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Figure 4.3: Architecture of Faultload Injection
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4.4.5.1 Injection of Replica Crash
The simplest way to implement a replica crash is to completely shut down
the whole machine where it is hosted. However, since each replica is isolated
on a dedicated node and to avoid repetitive reboots, we simply shutdown the
replica process on the targeted node. Practically, when fault trigger time is
reached, the fault injector daemon remotely connects to the targeted node
and kills the replica process. After being killed, the replica process is not
restarted until the end of the experiment and no new replica is added to the
system. This fault is implementation independent, thus requires no changes
in the prototypes.
We consider the impact of crashing the primary versus crashing of a non-
primary replica for RBFT and PBFT. Since the primary replica is respon-
sible for ordering of incoming requests, crash of it leads to expensive view
change protocol, degrading the overall performance. Whereas, in case of a
non-primary crash, protocol continues as replicas need only 2f + 1 matching
responses. In case of Chain, location of the fault does not matter as the crash
of any replica will break the pipeline and expensive switching protocol will be
enabled.
4.4.5.2 Injection of Message Delay
It is an implementation dependent fault and needs changes in the BFT imple-
mentations. All the considered BFT protocols rely on a common code base
(RBFT and Chain use PBFT as an underlining protocol), and the functions
for sending and receiving messages follow the same pattern in all prototypes.
Therefore, we introduced a few messages to be recognized in addition to the
ones currently used, to allow fault injector daemon inject faults. Practically,
a delay message is now recognized by all the prototypes, and when a replica
receives it from a fault injector daemon, it triggers the following Byzantine
behavior: instead of sending messages according to the protocol specifications,
the replica process sleeps during the given value of delay time provided in the
fault parameters before resuming to send any messages to other replicas. Our
implementations can delay a subset of messages, to trigger this fault. More-
over, once a replica becomes faulty, it keeps delaying messages until the end
of the experiment.
From the communication pattern of the considered protocols, we observe
that the impact of delaying the pre-prepare message is maximum in compar-
ison to delay of any other message type. But this holds true only for RBFT
and PBFT. All the replicas upon receiving prepare messages, wait for the
corresponding pre-prepare message and start a timer. Upon failing to receive
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the message before the expiration of a timer, replicas start to exchange mes-
sages to identify the faulty primary and trigger a view change. View change
and election of new primary is time-consuming and degrades the performance,
whereas delaying of other messages does not trigger view change in RBFT and
PBFT. For Chain, there is only a single message type and all the nodes play
the same role (except the head, which orders the requests as well). Also, there
is no timer mechanism at replicas in Chain as replicas are not anticipating for
messages from their predecessor.
4.4.5.3 Injection of Network Flooding
Network flooding is a common denial-of-service attack that could be performed
both by clients and servers. We consider flooding by a replica since in prac-
tice the replicas are often co-located on the same cluster, making it easier to
monopolize network links. Just like message delay, this fault required to intro-
duce additional messages. Practically, a flooding message is now recognized
by the prototypes, and when received from the fault injector daemon, the
replica triggers the following Byzantine behavior: the faulty replica enters an
infinite loop, where it continuously transmits corrupted messages of a chosen
size (message size) to other replicas until the end of the experiment. We keep
authenticating the messages with the faulty replica’s public key in order to
exhaust not only the network but the computational resources of the other
replicas (the messages cannot be declared invalid until verified).
All the replicas with network flooding fault (primary or non-primary) will
impact the performance in the same way. In case of primary, it will send the
correct messages (prepare message with ordering, pre-prepare message, etc.)
along with corrupted messages. Similarly other non-primary replicas will send
malicious messages with prepare and commit messages.
4.4.5.4 Injection of System Overloading
Clients are not instantiated the same way in all the prototypes. In Chain and
RBFT, a manager is responsible for initiating and managing the clients, while
in PBFT, the clients are independent and can be deployed on multiple nodes.
As mentioned earlier, the workload injector can vary #clients after the exper-
iment has commenced. To do so, the fault injector daemon remotely connects
to the node in charge of hosting concurrent clients and starts additional client
processes.
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4.4.6 Performance and Dependability Analysis in BFT-
Bench
Cluster
(Amazon, EC2, Azure, ...)Fault Injection
Performance 
Analyzer
Faultload
Load Injection
Dataload Workload
Figure 4.4: Performance and Dependability Benchmarking Architecture of
BFT-Bench
BFT-Bench framework is used to evaluate and compare dependability and
performance metrics of BFT protocols. Figure 4.4 presents the high level ar-
chitecture of the benchmark. Following steps are performed to analyze the
performance and dependability for various BFT protocols: (1) build a fault-
load with specifications for injecting a fault (i.e., a specific Byzantine fault
scenario), (2) build a workload for setting up the test environment, (3) con-
duct experiments based on faultload and workload, and (4) collect statistics
for measuring performance and dependability of the BFT protocol under test.
Upon experimental execution, BFT-Bench produces statistics for performance
metrics, namely throughput and latency. They have been the two main per-
formance parameters considered when evaluating BFT protocols, both ex-
perimentally and theoretically. We focus on the experimental evaluation of
the prototypes, thus, we do not take into account any theoretical analysis.
BFT-Bench also considers the measurement of dependability metrics namely
availability and reliability. Along with measurements of performance and de-
pendability aspects, BFT-Bench also computes network level and low-level
statistics, considering network bandwidth usage, CPU utilization, the number
of successful vs failed requests, the number of re-transmissions of each request,
etc.
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4.4.6.1 Performance
1. Throughput. It is the number of client requests handled by the sys-
tem per unit of time. It can be evaluated both from the client or the
replicas side of the protocol. Nevertheless, in order to avoid unnecessary
operations on the replicas side, we choose to perform the evaluation of
throughput from the client side of the protocol. Just like latency, the
evaluation of throughput can be performed using timestamps, thus, we
do not need to collect any additional information. We evaluate through-
put in the performance analyzer by summing the number of response
timestamps collected on the client processes per unit of time.
2. Latency or Response Time. It is the time elapsed from the mo-
ment a client submits a request until the complete response is received
by this client. To evaluate latency, we rely on the timestamps of these
two events. We measure latency from the client side of the protocol
by collecting and bringing these timestamp values to the performance
analyzer. Then, performance analyzer evaluates the latency by com-
puting the difference between the response timestamps and the request
timestamps, for all the requests send by all the clients per unit of time.
4.4.6.2 Dependability
1. Availability. It is measured in terms of time when the service is avail-
able, i.e., the service is responding. It is the ratio of the time the service
was returning responses (correct or incorrect) to the total time the ser-
vice was meant to run. It is usually measured over a period of time, in
terms of days, months or years.
2. Reliability is measured as the ratio of successful client requests over
the total number of requests send by the clients over a period of time.
Theoretically, all BFT protocols should be 100% reliable and available.
The experimental evaluation (see Chapter 5) describes how well they perform
in practice.
4.4.6.3 Cost
1. Replica Cost is measured in terms of the total number of replicas
required to handle the f simultaneous Byzantine faults. As we defined
before, that each BFT protocol requires different number of servers, it
becomes an important parameter when it comes to the cost of using
BFT systems in real world applications.
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4.4.6.4 Network Level Statistics
1. Network Bandwidth Usage is defined in terms of the size of data
send and received by any server per second. Network bandwidth is used
as a synonym for data transfer rate, i.e., the amount of data that can
be carried from one point to another in a given time period (usually a
second). Network bandwidth is usually expressed in bits per second.
2. CPU Utilization is the amount of work that a computer system per-
forms in processing the computations on available resources. It is the
amount of work handled by a CPU. Actual CPU utilization varies de-
pending on the amount and type of computing tasks. Certain tasks
require heavy CPU time, while others require less because of non-CPU
resource requirements. BFT-Bench calculates CPU usage over a small
interval of time, considering the time spent by the CPU over real time.
BFT-Bench measures some oﬄine metrics along with above mentioned
online metrics. BFT-Bench provides statistics related to cost of computations
performed by the cluster, status of each request send by the clients (success
or failure), the total number of re-transmissions of each request, etc.
4.5 Automatic Deployment of Experiments
BFT-Bench framework allows testers to automatically deploy the prototypes
of BFT protocols, run extensive experiments under various Byzantine behav-
iors on a cluster in any cloud infrastructure. The cloud infrastructure and the
size of cluster (number of nodes required by a BFT protocol to run the ex-
periments) are two main configuration parameters of BFT-Bench. The frame-
work acquires on-demand resources maintained by the public or private cloud
providers like Amazon EC2, Azure, etc, where one node is dedicated for run-
ning load and fault injectors, and the rest of the nodes are used for deploying
test environment (installation of BFT prototypes). Once the cluster is set up,
BFT-Bench automatically runs the experiment scripts for injecting different
faults at various times while monitoring and reporting the execution traces of
each experiment for performance and dependability benchmarking. Resources
(nodes in the cluster) are automatically released once BFT-Bench terminates.
4.6 Using BFT-Bench
BFT-Bench user defines faultload and workload; and then BFT-Bench frame-
work automatically deploys the experiments on the reserved resources of the
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cloud infrastructure and injects the user defined workloads and faultloads
thereafter. BFT-Bench creates and initializes the concurrent clients as per
the workload. Clients send requests in FIFO order until the experiment ter-
minates. If user defines a faultload, then according to the parameters, fault
injector daemon triggers the specified fault during the experiment run. Once
the experiment ends, the running processes are terminated on all servers. For
each experiment, processes are restarted. Every experiment is independent
and runs with different settings, producing distinct measurement reports for
future evaluations. Every experiment may run a number of times to produce
an average statistics and variance reports.
BFT-Bench is an easy to use framework with very few parameters used for
its configuration. BFT-Bench configuration file mentions warm up time, exe-
cution time, number of nodes, etc. Once the experiment starts the execution
period, workload and faultload can be injected at the defined times. Since we
are evaluating different prototypes, we do not provide any default settings for
BFT-Bench to avoid any complications.
4.7 Portability of BFT-Bench
The prototype of BFT-Bench measures performance and dependability as-
pects of few BFT protocols, namely PBFT, Chain and RBFT. However, it can
be easily adopted for other BFT implementations like Ring, Aardvark, Prime,
Spinning, MinBFT, OBFT, etc. Most of the prototype of BFT-Bench testbed
is general and can be easily applied, except some parts like fault injection
integration where it requires some changes to source code to incorporate trig-
gering of a Byzantine behavior. In the following, we describe all the portable
parts of the framework and how to extend them for other BFT protocols.
4.7.1 Portability of Workload Injection
Workload injection depends on the testers intention on how rigorously he/she
wants to test the BFT system and what are his/her requirements or expec-
tations. Workload injection is used to send the requests (transactions jobs)
of varying sizes (it depends on the applications being used) of the imitating
clients to the cloud cluster running the BFT protocols. Portability of work-
load injection is pretty simple and straightforward and does not require any
change or new modifications unless there are some application specific loads.
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4.7.2 Portability of Fault Injection
Fault injection depends on the type of fault to be triggered in the system.
For some fault types, it is not necessary to modify the source code, but for
some, it is required to add addition tasks to enable the node to trigger a fault
upon receipt of a fault injection message. For instance, triggering replica crash
is simple where we just use a system to kill a process running at a node at
definite time (fault trigger time). This does not require any implementation
level changes for triggering the crash of a node. On the other hand, faults
like message delay where we delay sending of pre-prepare messages to other
replicas. It requires integration of new code which informs the node to start
delaying a particular message type. Thus, the injection of faults of these types
needs to be adapted to any new BFT protocol being considered for evaluation.
But for all faults, the framework should adapt to the actual names of the
underlying processes.
4.7.3 Portability of Performance and Dependability Anal-
ysis
BFT-Bench measures performance and dependability aspects, but can be ex-
tended to incorporate other Quality of Service (QoS) metrics. BFT-Bench also
measures network and CPU utilization at each server by using the files pro-
duced by Server Activity Reporting (sar commands for unix) for monitoring
individual CPU stats, memory usage, network stats, I/O activities, etc. Low-
level statistics such as the number of successful and failed requests, the number
of times a request is re-transmitted, are extracted from the log files generated
at all servers and clients. Pattern matching is used to extract the necessary
information from the generated reports. Thus, BFT-Bench must adapt to
these pattern recognition for every new QoS parameter.
4.7.4 Portability of Automatic Experiment Deployer
The BFT-Bench allows automatic deployment of experiments which can be
effortlessly adapted to launch other BFT protocols, create workloads and fault-
loads, start and stop experiments and generate required QoS metrics.
4.8 Summary
In this chapter, we presented BFT-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark tool for
evaluating the dependability and performance of BFT protocols under various
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real-world faulty and non-faulty settings. BFT-Bench framework allows end-
users to define and inject various workloads and faultloads, automatic deploy-
ment of experiments, and produce extensive dependability and performance
statistics. It also generates few low-level statistics such as CPU and network
utilization, the number of successful vs unsuccessful operations, etc. This
chapter also discussed fault and load injectors, automatic deployment of ex-
periments, and portability of BFT-Bench to incorporate other BFT protocols
such as Aardvark, Spinning, Prime, Zyzzyva, OBFT, etc. [15, 36, 74, 98, 105].
We demonstrate the adaptability and ease of use of BFT-Bench for inject-
ing Byzantine faults and also mechanisms to define new arbitrary behaviors.
BFT-Bench successfully achieves the main objectives of any benchmark, i.e.,
is to provide practical ways for:
1. Characterizing the dependability of modules or a system.
2. Easy detection of errors or faults in design specifications and its practical
implementations.
3. Identification of weaker segments and violations of protocol blueprints.
4. Obtain insights into the design decisions of the protocol developers.
5. Compare the dependability and performance of competitive solutions/
protocols based on different measurable aspects under unified environ-
mental settings.
This enables the benchmark users to give more attention and provide im-
provements of the implementations by fixing the identified bugs or issues to
enhance the dependability levels (either by using software wrappers or adding
fault tolerance mechanisms).
Furthermore, this work unfolds interesting perspectives in terms of inves-
tigating other faulty behaviors, heterogeneous workloads (computational or
data-access intensive or both) and evaluation of other QoS metrics such as
cost, security, scalability, etc. We believe, BFT-Bench aids researchers and
practitioners to better analyze and evaluate various aspects of BFT protocols
in a systematic manner.
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In this chapter, we present a comparative analysis of the three BFT proto-
cols considered for evaluation under fault free scenarios and when facing dif-
ferent fault behaviors, presented in Section 4.3.2. We specify our experimental
settings used for performing the experiments followed by comparative graph-
ical representations of performance and dependability metrics evaluations of
each protocol under different faultloads and workloads. We also monitor some
oﬄine statistics like CPU utilization, network bandwidth usage, etc., for all
the scenarios under scrutiny.
5.1 Experimental Setup
This section provides hardware and software settings used for performing ex-
periments. Hardware setup comprises of cluster configurations and network
utilities while the software setting is regarding the installation of BFT proto-
cols, assigning values to parameters for initiating and launching the experi-
ments.
5.1.1 Hardware Settings
All our experiments were conducted on a cluster running in Grid’5000 com-
posed of 34 nodes [28]. Each node hosts two 4-core Intel Xeon E5420 QC
processors at 2.50GHz frequency with 8GB of RAM and 160GB SATA of
storage space. Table 5.1 presents the hardware configuration of the cluster
used for conducting experiments.
All the machines in the cluster are interconnected through 1 or 2 Giga-
bit Ethernet and have only a single network interface. We created multiple
virtual network interfaces (also known as aliasing) on a single physical Net-
work Interface Controller (NIC) to exploit the robustness of RBFT [18, 36].
In the experiments we consider a system capable of handling only up to one
Byzantine fault, i.e., f = 1. Therefore, the cluster needs 4 nodes (3f + 1) for
running BFT protocol instances. We reserve 2 extra nodes, one for concur-
rent clients and one for hosting BFT-Bench framework. The reason to limit
the number of Byzantine faults to 1 is due to the difficult NIC configuration
for RBFT with more than one fault in Grid’5000 settings. Authors of RBFT
conducted some of their experiments on a cluster composed of ten built-in
network interfaces which made it easier to configure with f = 2. In practice,
this limitation does not hold for PBFT and Chain as they do not require
multiple virtual network interfaces. We performed some extra experiments to
determine the sustainable cluster size by each protocol based on the number
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Table 5.1: Hardware Configuration of the Cluster in Grid’5000
Cluster CPU Memory Storage Network
G5K I
4-core 2-CPU
2.5 GHz Intel Xeon
E5420 QC
8 GB
160 GB
SATA
1 Gbit
Ethernet
of faults they can handle. PBFT is able to tolerate up to 2 simultaneous faults
(7 replicas) before terminating and Chain remains available with a maximum
of 3 faults (10 replicas). This observation is made under fault free scenario
and no Byzantine faults were triggered. For effective practical comparison of
BFT prototypes we used the same environment, i.e., same configuration, same
cluster, same faultloads and workloads.
5.1.2 Software Settings
We have used original versions of the code bases for the three protocols in
consideration1. However, we modified and added some code in their imple-
mentations for triggering the faults which we explained in Section 4.4.5. All
the authors usually performed the experiments using echo service for evalu-
ating their protocols, but unlike them, we introduce a delay of 30 (±10%)
milliseconds before sending any response to the client. This delay is meant to
emulate the computations that a real service would perform during the com-
mit phase of all protocols. We believe this is more realistic than just sending
empty (echo) messages. We keep our focus on intentionally triggering the
faults at replicas and not the accidental failures which can occur at network
or hardware level. We model the faults by forcefully deviating execution of
instructions of the BFT algorithms.
We use BFT-Bench for evaluating throughput and latency for each faulty
behavior (similar to a/b microbenchmark by Castro and Liskov [30]). BFT-
Bench also produces runtime statistics for dependability metrics. Low-level
metrics such as CPU utilization and network usage are assessed oﬄine. Fi-
nally, all the experiments were performed three times to calculate the average
and standard deviations.
We consider total experiment runtime as the sum of warm up time2 and
execution time3 where warm up time is set to 180s, and execution time to
1Code base of PBFT was downloaded from http://www.pmg.csail.mit.edu/bft/#sw
whereas RBFT and Chain implementations were obtained directly from authors [18, 56].
2warm up time allows the system to stabilize before the statistics monitor starts to
collect the execution traces.
3execution time is the actual monitoring phase where system collects all the statistics
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either 600s or 800s. We exclude the results collected during warm up period
from all our results as no actual workload or faultload is injected during this
time. The fault trigger time is 1
2
of (execution time), i.e., 300s for fault types
- replica crash, message delay and network flooding (timer of the fault trig-
ger time starts with execution time). Once a server becomes malicious upon
expiration of fault trigger time, it remains faulty until the end of the experi-
ment. Independent of the protocols, during fault-free case (also corresponding
in our experiments to the time elapsed before a fault gets triggered) we mostly
achieve a peak throughput of around 32/33 requests per second. This is the
consequence of introducing the 30 (±10%) milliseconds of simulated compu-
tation before committing the incoming requests.
5.2 Comparative Evaluation under Faulty Sce-
narios
In this section, we present a comparative analysis of the three BFT protocols,
PBFT, Chain and RBFT when facing different types of faults presented in
Section 4.3.2 using BFT-Bench. It also demonstrates the loopholes of these
BFT implementations. Table 5.2 provides the list of different faults considered
for evaluation of prototypes for BFT protocols.
We inject one Byzantine fault, which means only one replica can be faulty
in a system at any point of time. All the faults are performed independent of
each other except fault type, delay with overloading, where we inject message
delay fault in the primary while increasing the #clients at different inter-
vals. This enables us to evaluate the prototypes with the varying (increasing)
workload in presence of a Byzantine fault, message delay. Faultload for each
fault is defined at the beginning of the experiment, but workload can also be
defined at runtime. Faultload cannot be modified once the experiment starts,
whereas workload is variable and depends on the injected fault type.
Table 5.3 provides a comprehensive analysis of PBFT, Chain and RBFT
when faults are triggered in the system. In all the graphs representing eval-
uations of performance and dependability aspects, the first half corresponds
to fault free scenarios, i.e., there is no fault injection. To perform each exper-
iment, we define few initial values, such as (i) experiment start time, (ii) re-
quest/response message size and (iii) number of concurrent clients.
Defined as:
<start time, size, #clients>.
for future analysis.
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Table 5.2: List of different faultloads considered for evaluation
fault type fault loc Description of the fault
Replica Crash primary
server stops and terminates all further
communications
Message
Delay
primary
primary delays sending pre-prepare
messages to other replicas
Network
Flooding
any non primary
replica
faulty replica floods correct replicas with
malicious messages to overload the
network and computational resources
System
Overloading
-NA-
#clients sending requests increases with
time
Delay with
Overloading
primary
it is a combination of two faults: message
delay and system overloading
Latency and throughput of each experiment depend on the initial values.
We observe throughput is mostly limited to 32/33 requests per second (with
any #clients) due to induced computational delay at each replica while la-
tency increases with increase in #clients. During a fault free scenario, system
is always available and maintains reliability. All the replicas adhere to the
instructions of BFT algorithms and do not deviate from the correct paths.
As studied, each protocol has a primary/head (Replica1), responsible for
handling the incoming client requests. The primary replica has the highest
computational load as it manages all the client requests, their ordering, client
connections and extra cryptographic operations (for verifying authenticity of
the client and its request). Interestingly, Replica4 in PBFT is used slightly
more compared to other non-primary replicas as we assigned it the responsibil-
ity for sending the encrypted response to the client instead of primary. Other
times, all the replicas just send MAC of the responses to the clients. This is an
optimization performed in PBFT by its authors. Similarly for Chain, the last
replica performs more than the middle replicas as it is sending the responses
to clients like PBFT. Due to the high CPU usage at primary, primary becomes
a bottleneck when there are a high number of concurrent clients and also, in
case of the Byzantine attacks at primary.
In all protocols, there are two network interfaces: replica-to-replica com-
munication and replica-to-client communication. We consider measuring the
total amount of data send (txkB/s) and received (rxkB/s) per second by each
replica to/from clients and other replicas. All the graphs illustrating network
utilization present normalized total data (total of incoming and outgoing data
at each replica). Generally, we observe that primary in PBFT and RBFT uses
the network more intensively than other replicas. This is primarily due to the
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Table 5.3: Comprehensive analysis of fault handling by each BFT protocol
PBFT Chain RBFT
Replica Crash X × ×
Message Delay X X X
Network Flooding X × X
System
Overloading
X X X
fails at clients
> 80
fails at clients
> 120
fails at clients
> 35
Delay with System
Overloading
X X X
Max. #clients
not evaluated
Max. #clients
not evaluated
fails at clients
> 10
incoming channel being used more often for receiving messages from replicas
and clients. For other replicas, it is only replica-to-replica communication ex-
cept for the Replica4 which uses slightly more bandwidth due to optimization
for sending encrypted response (rather than MAC) to clients. In case of Chain,
head and tail are under utilized while replicas in the middle are used exten-
sively. It can be explained by the fact that other replicas receive and send
twice the number of MAC authenticators as of head and tail. Head replica
receives MAC authenticators from a client for itself and next f + 1 replicas.
It then generates f + 1 MAC authenticators for its successors. So the replica
in total will have 3f + 2 MAC authenticators on the incoming (f + 1) and
outgoing (2f +1) channel. For the tail, it creates MAC authenticator just for
the client leading to under utilization of outgoing channel. Consequently, un-
even network bandwidth usage becomes an important, impacting factor that
results in lower throughput of a protocol.
We now consider evaluation of different fault types and their impact on
performance and dependability aspects using BFT-Bench.
5.2.1 Presence of Replica Crash
Here, we consider the Byzantine behavior described by the following faultload
(see Figure 4.2):
<300s, replica crash, {primary}>,
defining fault trigger time, fault type and fault location, respectively.
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matching responses. Figure 5.1 presents the performance of the prototypes
when primary crashes. In the results for PBFT, we observe a sudden increase
in latency (Figure 5.1(a)), and throughput (Figure 5.1(b)) drops sharply upon
crash of the primary. This is due to the view change protocol, which replaces
the faulty primary.
Prototypes for Chain and RBFT fail to respond once the primary crashes.
Upon a crash, Chain cannot maintain its pipeline structure as the successor
of the crashed server never receives any messages. Chain must switch to
PBFT upon crash, but, unfortunately, this mechanism is not present in the
original prototype. We would have observed the same performance as PBFT
if switching was possible [20]. In RBFT, clients broadcast requests to all
replicas. During crash fault, client enters an infinite request re-transmission
loop while attempting to send a request to the crashed replica. This is due to
the absence of a crash handling mechanism at the client side.
5.2.1.2 Dependability Analysis
Figure 5.2(a) demonstrates the impact on the availability of the system upon
the crash of the primary. This result can be easily predicted on the basis of
performance evaluation of BFT prototypes. As soon as the primary crashes,
availability of RBFT suddenly drops to zero while Chain drops slowly. It is
due to the fact that other replicas in the chain (after the head replica) are pro-
cessing the requests they have (exploiting the pipeline pattern of Chain). The
tail will eventually send the responses coming from the pipeline to the respec-
tive clients. But the head will not take any further requests and availability
will eventually hit zero. PBFT handles the primary crash by going through a
view change and thus continues to make a progress. Figure 5.2(b) illustrates
that reliability for PBFT is 100% even after the fault occurrence but Chain
and RBFT are no more available leading to undetermined reliability. The
requests of the clients will not complete and undergo infinite re-transmissions
before terminating. If the system was available after primary crashes, the sys-
tem would have continued to be reliable. We conclude this according to the
definition of reliability that is a measurement of the total number of successful
correct responses to the total number of requests send by the clients.
5.2.1.3 System and Network Level Statistics
Figure 5.3 represents the system and network level statistics of PBFT before
the crash, upon a crash and after the crash. From Figures 5.3(a) and 5.3(b),
we observe that PBFT is able to maintain almost the same CPU and network
bandwidth utilization before and after the crash with a new elected primary
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Figure 5.2: Dependability analysis of PBFT, Chain, RBFT when primary
replica crashes
(Replica4 in our case). Upon a crash, CPU utilization at primary (Replica1)
becomes zero and other replicas start to use the CPU rapidly (slightly more
than double of before crash). Upon crash, we observe more data exchange.
This increment in network bandwidth and CPU utilization is due to the nu-
merous message exchanges of view change protocol to elect a new primary
and a number of MAC authentications performed at each replica, respec-
tively. After the crash, newly elected primary (Replica4) uses more CPU as
it performs client-to-replica and replica-to-replica communications and send-
s/receives more messages due to client interactions for requests and responses
than other replicas in the system.
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Figure 5.3: CPU and Network utilization of PBFT in presence of primary
replica crash
5.2.2 Presence of Message Delay
This behavior has faultload:
<300s, message delay, {primary, 500, pre-prepare}>
where values correspond to fault trigger time, fault type, fault location, delay
time and message type (in reference to line 2 of Figure 4.2). We implement
this fault by forcing the primary to delay sending of pre-prepare messages by
500ms in case of PBFT and RBFT, and the only message send by the head
to its successor in case of Chain. We perform this fault with #clients sending
the requests equals 2.
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5.2.2.1 Performance Analysis
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Figure 5.4: Performance evaluation of PBFT, Chain and RBFT in presence
of message delay fault at primary
We observe that impact of delaying the pre-prepare message (it contains
the request ordering number) is higher in comparison to the delay of any other
message. But this holds true only for RBFT and PBFT. All the replicas upon
receiving a request, wait for its corresponding pre-prepare message. Upon
failing to receive the message before the timer expires, replicas go through an
agreement to trigger the view change protocol to replace the faulty primary.
View change and new primary election protocols are time-consuming and de-
grade the performance. View change is not triggered when other message
types are delayed. Notice that in Chain, the same behavior could be observed
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if the delay fault occurs in any replica, due to its pipeline structure. In Figure
5.4(b), we can observe that peak throughput of Chain is 15 while for RBFT
and PBFT it is 32 (before the fault is triggered). This is due to the fact, that
Chain is not completely fed to exploit its pipeline pattern. Also, every request
in Chain undergoes the commit phase, sequentially introducing a delay of at
least 120ms (simulated computation delay). Since requests are executed in a
closed-loop, fewer requests are sent to the Chain protocol, consequently less
requests are executed, thus, the throughput is lower than the throughput of
PBFT and RBFT. In presence of fault, the peak throughput falls from 32 to
2 requests per second for PBFT and Chain, and latency increases accordingly
in Figure 5.4(a). This throughput is relevant since no more than 2 requests
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Figure 5.5: Dependability analysis of PBFT, Chain, RBFT in presence of
message delay fault at primary
can be executed per second because of the 500ms delay. We do not observe
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the same behavior for RBFT as it implements a robust mechanism to handle
this fault4. RBFT uses a delay adaptive mechanism where it inspects the total
number of pre-prepare messages received by a replica within a bounded inter-
val. If the number is less than the one expected, a view change is triggered.
This is practically analyzed from the difference observed between the through-
put at primary and backup instances of RBFT [18]. Therefore, we do not see
a degradation in performance after fault injection except at the moment when
the fault was triggered. Throughput drops by 40% approximately during the
time taken by view change protocol to replace the faulty primary. This test
could be performed for a maximum of 5 clients as the prototype of RBFT fails
to make a progress upon fault injection. In PBFT and Chain, view change
protocol is not triggered due to the absence of fault handling mechanisms.
5.2.2.2 Dependability Analysis
Figure 5.5(a) displays that all the three prototypes continue even after primary
starts to delay the pre-prepare messages. Availability has no impact as the
system is always available, but responds slower which we clearly see in the
performance (latency) analysis. Figure 5.5(b) illustrates that system is always
reliable for all the considered BFT protocols. It is due to the fact that BFT
systems continue to work normally by responding to the client’s requests but
with a delay injected by the primary. This delay triggers the timeout at
clients and requests are re-transmitted. Primary do not add any delay to re-
transmitted requests as they are already ordered and pre-prepare messages of
these requests have already been sent.
Therefore, during the message delay, overall system remains available and
reliable except that the responses are delayed to the clients, triggering re-
transmissions of delayed requests. Hence, we see the impact only on the
performance and not on the dependability metrics of this fault.
5.2.2.3 System and Network Level Statistics
Figures 5.6(a) and 5.6(b) illustrate CPU and network utilization, respectively.
We observe a difference in CPU utilization of primary for all the protocols
as it delays pre-prepare messages and processes trigger time for sending these
messages. Delay by primary triggers the timeout (for receipt of pre-prepare
messages), which enables replicas to begin exchange messages with each other
and primary. This increases the utilization of network bandwidth at each
replica. Also, when timeout at a client expires for a response to a request,
4RBFT follows the design and specifications of Aardvark [36] for handling this behavior.
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Figure 5.6: CPU and Network usage in presence of message delay fault at
primary with #clients = 2
it retransmits the request. Thus, further augmenting the network bandwidth
for replica-to-client communications.
5.2.3 Presence of Network Flooding
Figure 5.7 presents the performance of PBFT & RBFT when a non-primary
replica starts to flood (sends as many malicious/corrupt messages as possible)
other replicas.
Faultload used is:
<300s, network flooding, {Replica2, 4KB}>,
where Replica2 will start to flood other servers with corrupt messages of size
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4KB at 300s (as defined in line 3 in Figure 4.2). To perform this experiment,
we consider #clients to be 10.
5.2.3.1 Performance Analysis
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Figure 5.7: Performance evaluation of PBFT, Chain and RBFT in presence
of network flooding by a non primary replica
We implement this behavior by forcing a replica to enter an infinite loop of
continuous transmission of malicious messages to other servers until the end of
the experiment (corrupt messages have the same size as of request messages).
We observe that any replica, either primary or non-primary would impact the
performance in the same way. The results illustrate that Chain makes no
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progress upon fault injection while the performance of PBFT becomes spo-
radic. This is due to the expensive, time consuming cryptographic operations
performed over corrupt messages by all the replicas in PBFT and successor
replica in Chain. Inability to handle corrupt messages introduces a gap in the
communication pattern and lack of protocol switching mechanism holds the
Chain from continuing.
RBFT uses multiple NICs to avoid malicious clients and replicas from
flooding client-to-replica & replica-to-replica communications. RBFT also
employs flood adaptive mechanism where non-faulty replicas can detect a
flooding replica and blacklists it [18]. Flood protection enables a non-faulty
replica to monitor the number of messages (including correct & malicious mes-
sages) received. If a non-faulty replica receives more than a specific number
of messages from a particular replica in a period of time, then it can label
this replica as faulty and initiates a blacklisting protocol. When this hap-
pens, RBFT closes the NIC of the misbehaving replica for some time but
after a given period it rejoins the system again. Due to this, we observe slight
variations in performance with up to 5% of degradation.
5.2.3.2 Dependability Analysis
In Figure 5.8(a) we demonstrate the availability of RBFT, PBFT and Chain
when network is flooded by one of the non-primary replicas (Replica2). We
observe that PBFT and RBFT are always available while Chain succumbs
to unavailability after the fault is triggered. RBFT handles network flooding
with flood adaptive mechanisms and PBFT prototype is robust enough to
manage to continue. Whereas for chain, this scenario is similar to crash as the
replica succeeding the faulty replica cannot handle the flood and terminates.
According to Figure 5.8(b), we can again conclude that BFT systems are 100%
reliable but not 100% available. In case of Chain, the availability reduces
to 0, but the reliability of the system cannot be questioned as the system
terminates to progress without producing any incorrect responses. There are
no responses at all. Having no response, cannot be equated to an incorrect
response. Therefore, reliability remains undetermined (it cannot be concluded
to non-reliability of the system).
5.2.3.3 System and Network Level Statistics
For evaluation of CPU utilization and network bandwidth usage, we do not
consider Chain as it terminates when a replica starts to flood other replicas.
We consider only RBFT and PBFT as they continue during this fault. Fig-
ure 5.9(a) illustrates the CPU utilization of RBFT and PBFT with network
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Figure 5.8: Dependability analysis of PBFT, Chain, RBFT in presence of
network flooding by a non primary replica
flooding in the presence of 10 concurrent clients. Computation at all the nodes
increases as they also perform authentication and validation of all corrupted
messages (corrupted messages are discarded once authentication fails). CPU
usage is maximum at Replica2 as it is generating those malicious messages for
all replicas. RBFT and PBFT behave similarly in this aspect.
Figure 5.9(b) demonstrates usage of network bandwidth at each replica
for RBFT and PBFT. Fault replica, Replica2, sends a lot of corrupt messages
on its outgoing channel and these messages are evenly distributed to all other
replicas to their incoming channels, increasing the network utilization at all
the replicas. But Replica2 uses the maximum network bandwidth by sending
a large number of malicious messages of equal size to correct messages.
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Figure 5.9: CPU and Network usage in presence of network flooding by a non
primary replica with #clients = 10
5.2.4 Presence of System Overloading
Figure 5.10 presents the performance of protocols under contention but in
fault free conditions. This fault type measures the maximum workload i.e.
#clients a protocol can handle before discontinuation. We do not inject any
Byzantine fault (f = 0). We implement this fault by simply increasing #clients
during the experiment run.
Faultload (see line 4 in Figure 4.2) for this experiment is:
<200s, system overloading, {20}>,
<400s, system overloading, {40}>,
<600s, system overloading, {100}>,
where #clients increase from 10 (at time (t) = 0) to 20 at t = 200s, then 40
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at t = 400s, and finally 100 at t = 600s.
5.2.4.1 Performance Analysis
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Figure 5.10: Performance evaluation of PBFT, Chain and RBFT when system
is overloaded with increasing number of clients at every 200s
From the results, we observe that all the protocols achieve the peak through-
put with 10 clients (Figure 5.10(b)), and the latency increases with the number
of clients in the system (Figure 5.10(a)). At t = 400s, the RBFT proto-
type cannot handle more than 20 clients, while PBFT and Chain continue
to progress. At t = 600s, the PBFT prototype does not appear as reliable
as before. It is unable to handle the load of 100 clients and thus terminates.
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However, Chain survives 100 clients with a constant throughput but latency
continues to augment (with increasing #clients).
5.2.4.2 Dependability Analysis
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Figure 5.11: Dependability analysis of PBFT, Chain, RBFT when system is
overloaded with increasing number of clients at every 200s
Figure 5.11(a) presents that RBFT and PBFT stop once they cannot han-
dle a certain number of clients. In this fault, no Byzantine fault is injected
and only the workload is increased with time. These results prove that the
prototypes of these BFT systems cannot handle heavy, realistic workload. To
be acknowledged by the real world practitioners, it is important for these pro-
tocols to demonstrate the ability to handle the workloads and faultloads of
real world applications. From the analysis, we conclude that Chain is able
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to handle more #clients. We didn’t test Chain for its maximum load in the
presence of message delay fault.
According to Figure 5.11(b) we observe that with time when PBFT and
RBFT gets unavailable, reliability becomes undetermined. For Chain, it re-
mains reliable and available all the time (until it can serve all the concurrent
clients).
5.2.4.3 System and Network Level Statistics
Figure 5.12 illustrates the CPU utilization at each replica for all the consid-
ered BFT protocols with increasing #clients at different intervals of time.
For all the protocols, we observe that replica receiving the client requests, i.e.,
the primary has the maximum CPU load. It is due to the replica-to-client
communication. For Chain, head performs more work in comparison to other
protocols as it computes and verifies more MAC authenticators for every in-
coming request (Chain profits from batching). CPU utilization for PBFT and
RBFT is comparable as they both follow the same communication pattern (of
PBFT). RBFT halts when the number of clients increases to 40 and PBFT
stops at 100 clients while Chain continues until 100 clients (that’s why there
are no bars at these times for PBFT and RBFT).
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Figure 5.12: CPU Utilization of PBFT, Chain and RBFT when system is
overloaded with increasing number of clients at every 200s
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5.2.5 Combination of Different Types of Faults
In this experiment, we inject a combination of faults, i.e., message delay in
presence of system overloading. This enables us to determine the maximum
number of clients a BFT system can survive when there exists a Byzantine
fault in the system. Figure 5.13(a) and 5.13(b) present latency and through-
put, respectively, upon injection of delay fault in presence of increasing work-
load (#clients).
The faultload (line 5 in Figure 4.2) is:
<200s, message delay, {primary, 500, pre-prepare}>,
<400s, system overloading, {5}>,
<600s, system overloading, {10}>.
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Figure 5.13: Performance evaluation of PBFT, Chain and RBFT in presence
of system overloading with message delay fault. At every 200s, number of
clients increases in the system
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5.2.5.1 Performance Analysis
The experiment launches in a fault free environment with #clients = 2. At t
= 200s, delay fault is injected at the primary while keeping constant #clients.
Until 400s, the result is same as message delay (Section 5.2.2). At t = 400s, we
increases #clients to 5. Now we observe that RBFT continues to handle the
delay fault (exploiting delay adaptive fault mechanism) without a significant
effect on the performance while Chain and PBFT demonstrate an increase in
latency and their throughput continues to be 2 requests per second. Finally at
t = 600s, #clients grows to 10. RBFT cannot handle contention (more than
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Figure 5.14: Dependability analysis of PBFT, Chain and RBFT in presence
of system overloading with message delay fault. At every 200s, number of
clients increases in the system
10 clients) and terminates, however, Chain and PBFT continue to advance.
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PBFT undergoes a view change where the faulty primary is replaced with a
new primary. This phenomenon occurs due to the expiration of the timers
at backup replicas waiting to get pre-prepare messages for a request received
earlier. With the new primary, we observe the same performance of fault
free scenario. Chain continues to worsen in terms of latency, but maintains a
constant throughput of 2. It is interesting to observe that in the presence of
message delay fault, workload handled by all the protocols reduces by many
folds. This clearly demonstrates ineffectiveness of the protocols when a fault
occurs under high workload conditions.
5.2.5.2 Dependability Analysis
Figure 5.14(a) is a combination of Figures 5.5(a) and 5.11(a). As demonstrated
previously, RBFT can handle a maximum of 20 clients in fault free scenario
and with message delay fault, maximum #clients can only be 10. We see
the same behavior in the figure 5.14(a). At 600s, RBFT fails to continue and
system becomes unavailable, whereas PBFT and Chain advances. We are sure
that PBFT will fail once #clients reaches more than 40 (we did not perform
this analysis). According to Figures 5.14(a) and 5.14(b), we observe that
PBFT and Chain continue to be available and reliable while RBFT becomes
unavailable. Therefore, reliability cannot be determined until the time system
is available once again.
5.3 Summary
The evaluation affirms our motivation that prototypes for most of the consid-
ered state-of-the art protocols (for Chain and PBFT) have been assessed only
in fault-free scenarios which make them challenging to be used in real time
systems where faults are prone to happen. Since RBFT uses fault-adaptive
mechanisms for certain types of faults, it is able to maintain a constant perfor-
mance with a small percentage of degradation during these malicious behav-
iors. However, it still fails to sustain all types of injected faults, as illustrated
it terminates the progress in the most prominently occurring crash fault. Our
experimental results confirm our above statements.
We also observe that availability is 100% when the system is up and run-
ning, but upon fault injection, for some protocols, availability drops to 0%
upon fault injection. According to the conducted experiments, all BFT pro-
tocols are 100% reliable (i.e. maintains consistency across replicas) until the
system is available. Once the protocols fail upon fault injection, reliability
cannot be measured. Theoretically, all BFT protocols must be 100% reliable
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and available in the presence or absence of various faults, which is not the case
in practice. Performance and dependability evaluations by BFT-Bench affirms
that prototypes have not been tested rigorously under various fault models. It
also demonstrates many loopholes in the BFT implementations which cause
the termination of the prototypes when a fault is triggered.
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6.1 Conclusions
The cloud computing represents a significant shift our society has gone through.
It radically changes the way enterprises manage IT - like servers, data centers,
OS, middleware and clustering. With the increasing on-demand computing,
performance and dependability have become the important requirements of
today’s critical cloud services and data centers. The growth of cloud tech-
nologies, their applications, service oriented models, have raised many types
of failures and attacks paradigms. Such faults have been termed as Byzantine
faults.
Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) is a general approach to make distributed
systems, theoretically, tolerate arbitrary faults. BFT has been investigated ex-
tensively in previous years, with two main families of BFT protocols, (i) pro-
tocols that enhance performance in fault-free cases, and (ii) protocols that
minimize performance degradation in the presence of some types of faults.
Although considerable effort has been made to study Byzantine faults and
achieve BFT protocols, but yet they fail to convince the practitioners for
adopting them in real world settings. Serious concerns have been raised in
the last decade for theoretically dealing with such behaviors, but not many
attempts have been proposed to bring Byzantine fault tolerance to the sight
of potential users. This is mainly due to the significant lack of practical anal-
ysis of QoS metrics, on common grounds. Evaluations of BFT protocols have
been conducted in simplified settings which fail to challenge the prototypes in
worst case scenarios, i.e., presence of arbitrary faults, high contention, mali-
cious clients, etc. Also, no constant improvements are made to any of these
prototypes after their initial release. To the best of our knowledge, there is
no practical solution to identify and inject various Byzantine behaviors for
evaluating performance and dependability levels of BFT protocols.
In this thesis, we underwent extensive research on technical and scientific
know-how in designing a dependability and performance benchmark for dis-
tributed systems. We proposed a generic software architecture in an effort to
help designers and researchers developing benchmark solutions for distributed
protocols for analyzing various QoS aspects. We further used the generic
architecture as a building block for BFT-Bench.
This thesis presented BFT-Bench, the first framework for empirically eval-
uating BFT implementations to quantify their dependability and performance
levels under different faulty behaviors and workloads. BFT-Bench framework
tests three state-of-the-art BFT protocols, automatically deploys them, al-
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lows to generate different types of faults, injects them at different locations
and different rates, and computes performance and dependability measures.
We also presented the experiments conducted with BFT-Bench. The eval-
uation results show that BFT-Bench is able to successfully compare various
BFT protocols, in various faulty behaviors.
We wish to make BFT benchmarking easy to adopt by developers and end-
users of BFT protocols. BFT-Bench framework aims to help researchers and
practitioners to better analyze and evaluate the effectiveness and robustness
of BFT systems.
6.2 Perspectives
This work unlocks the way of evaluating BFT protocols under real world
settings, bridging the gap between the research and practical usability of
BFT. While this work concentrates on presenting the current version of BFT-
Bench with some BFT protocols and their related fault types, we believe
that the proposed approach can be easily extended to other BFT protocols
listed under Section 2.4, and many other faulty behaviors. Addition of dif-
ferent fault models will open up the interesting prospects for analyzing other
QoS metrics such as security, scalability, cost, etc. In this thesis, we have
interested in evaluating performance and dependability aspects, considering
throughput, latency, availability and reliability, in addition to some low-level
network statistics and cost of using BFT services in terms of the number of
physical resources used.
BFT-Bench can also interest developers and end-users to model it as a
selection tool for determining the suitable BFT prototype abiding to required
real world settings and QoS parameters. Such an example is of a non-critical
system which would care more for performance rather than dependability
guarantees under high contention.
The proposed benchmark can be used to aid researchers from Byzantine
community to trace implementation issues and tune their source codes and
default parameters (such as various timeouts at client and server side) accord-
ingly. These modifications and corrections will not only improve the original
implementations many folds, but will also boost the robustness and effective-
ness of BFT prototypes. An integration of a debugging tool can ease the
process of determining bugs.
Another technical perspective of this work could be considering high-level
application domains such as database systems, web services, and web servers,
that runs on BFT protocols under comparison. For example, PBFT imple-
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mented Byzantine fault-tolerant NFS service using their algorithm while au-
thors of RBFT proposed using their protocols for applications like Zookeeper [63]
or Boxwood asynchronous API [82].
Furthermore, cloud providers can cater BFT-as-a-Service to their cus-
tomers, specifically to ones deploying mission critical applications. This would
imply Byzantine fault tolerance could be proposed as a cloud service, on-
demand, adapted to application needs.
6.3 Publications
Some of our work have been published in international conferences, and few
are under submission.
1. Divya Gupta, Lucas Perronne, Sara Bouchenak. BFT-Bench: Frame-
work to Evaluate Robustness and Effectiveness of BFT Protocols in
Practice, 7th ACM/SPEC International Conference on Performance En-
gineering, Delft, The Netherlands, March 12-18, 2016.
2. Divya Gupta, Lucas Perronne, Sara Bouchenak. BFT-Bench: Frame-
work to Evaluate Robustness and Effectiveness of BFT Protocols in
Practice, 6th ACM Symposium on Cloud Computing, Hawai’i, USA,
August 27-29, 2015. Poster.
3. Divya Gupta, Lucas Perronne, Sara Bouchenak. BFT-Bench: Towards a
Practical Evaluation of Robustness and Effectiveness of BFT Protocols,
16th IFIP International Conference on Distributed Applications and In-
teroperable Systems, Heraklion, Crete, June 6-9, 2016 (To appear).
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